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Abstract 
 
The Arab uprisings have certainly caused quiet the watershed among scholars 
of civil-military relations. Incumbents that were rendered coup proofed were 
suddenly falling victim to the mercy of their militaries. Questions like, “Why is 
coup proofing more successful in some cases more than others?” and “Does 
coup proofing work?” guided the literature on coup proofing in the last decade 
even more so in the last four years. Significant research has been undertaken 
outlining possible reasons for the success/failure of coup proofing. Some 
authors have even questioned the viability of the coup-proofing process, but yet, 
no clear reasoning for variations in outcomes of coup-proofing appear to have 
emerged from the literature to date. Thus, this thesis attempts to take a step 
back and examine the process through which coup proofing mechanisms are 
formulated. More particularly, I pose the following questions: Why are there 
variations in the implementation of some coup proofing mechanisms and what 
are the conditions contributing to this variation in application? Escaping thus 
the trap of studying coup proofing as a monolithic process, this thesis studies 
the variation in the application of economic coup proofing – approach, 
technique and implementation – in relation to the organizational features of  
the military on which the tactics are implemented. To achieve this, the study 
conducts a qualitative comparison between Jordan, Syria and Egypt. All the 
regimes in question applied economic coup proofing as a means of buying 
military loyalty and they also bought them out of day-to-day politics. The 
Syrian Military, for example, relies on personalized and illicit activity 
 – smuggling and currency dealing – as a means of generating military 
incentives. This is in comparison to the Egyptian and Jordanian Militaries who 
profit from controlling large industrial complexes. Questions explaining the 
reasons behind such variation remain unanswered. While it is theoretically 
valuable to study economic coup proofing as simply a means of buying off 
officers that ties the military to the incumbent, it is intuitively compelling to 
study it as a form of military business. This in-turn affects the military’s 
autonomy vis-à-vis the incumbent but also influences the military’s relation 
with society at large. 
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Chapter	  1:	  Introduction 
 
With inconsistent military reactions to the Arab Uprisings, the functionality of coup-
proofing strategies is becoming more central to the study of civil-military relations in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Scholars of civil-military relations 
including Holger Albrecht (2014), Jonathan Powell (2011) and Raymond Hinnebusch 
(2006) assert that coup d’état is both the most imminent threat to autocrats as well as the 
primary means of removing authoritarian regimes.1 Therefore it is safe to argue that it has 
become common knowledge - if not self-evident - that all authoritarian incumbents 
justifiably engage in a process of immunizing their rule from military takeover of power 
by means of coup d’état. However, the efficacy of this strategy remains an issue whose 
ambiguity constitutes a barrier to the understanding of civil-military relations in 
autocracies. Efforts in deepening the analysis of coup-proofing have varied in method 
and scope. Because of the difficulty in measuring the coup-proofing process, and placing 
it within a timeframe as regards to its beginning and its end, comprehensive conclusions 
are scarce. Therefore, it becomes necessary to view coup-proofing as the product of years 
of trial and error, successes and failures. Coup-proofing is an on-going process that does 
not stop with the eradication of coup cascades, the reduction of successful coups or with 
the durability of autocrats. As Claude E. Welch proclaims, civilian control is “not a 
matter of precluding overt intervention, for a coup d’état may be the proverbial tip of the 
iceberg.”2  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Milan Svolik holds the same premise by empirically showing that out of a total of 303 
authoritarian leaders, 205 autocrats were removed through acts undertaken by segments of the 
state apparatus (members of government or members of the security apparatus including both 
military men or other security forces). See Milan Svolik, “Power Sharing and Leadership 
Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes,” American Journal of Political, 53, no. 2 (2009): 478. For    
more detail see: Holger Albrecht, “The Myth of Coup-Proofing: Risk and Instances of Military 
Coups d’état in The Middle East and North Africa, 1950-2013,” Armed Forces and Society  
(2014): 12 & Raymond Hinnebusch, “Authoritarian Persistence, Democratization Theory and The 
Middle East: An Overview and Critique,” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 43.  
2 Claude E. Welch, Civilian Control of The Military, Theory and Cases From Developing 
Countries (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976), 2. 
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Therefore, the question remains: How do existing structural realities influence the 
implementation of coup proofing mechanism?  
 
What is more: How does the systematic application of coup proofing mechanisms 
influence the development of political-military and societal-military relations? 
 
In the attempt to help solve this puzzle, this dissertation argues that coup-proofing 
should be seen not as a single unified tool but rather as a number of mechanisms, 
sensitive to structural characteristics such as military organizational structure and the 
states’ capacity to enforce civilian control on the military. In contrast to the general 
tendency in coup-proofing literature, my thesis asserts that coup-proofing mechanisms 
cannot be evaluated and treated as a single recipe. 
Moreover, I wish to go beyond the literature’s reductive understanding of coup-
proofing as a mere strategy for the prevention of coups d’état, for, with the exception of 
scholars examining the influence of mechanisms of counter-balancing and ethnic stacking 
on reducing military effectiveness in combat and increasing the probability of civil-war 
traps (e.g. Risa Brooks, 2006 & Kristen Harkness, 2014 etc.), most coup-proofing studies 
are preoccupied with immediate results – that is, the effectiveness or ineffectiveness in 
reducing coup incidences. But in fact, the systematic implementation of coup-proofing 
over time becomes more of a well-thought-out policy than a reaction to an immediate 
threat. Especially in cases from the MENA region where coups disappeared for an 
extended number of years until 2010 (in Egypt, for 57 years; in Syria, no coups since 
1982 and in Jordan, no coups since 1957), coup-proofing has remained a consistent 
feature of civil-military relations.3 Therefore, I felt compelled to examine the by-products 
of such policies beyond the usual simplistic analysis; the insightful premise of Hicham 
Bou Nassif (2014), that lasting relationships result from the historical pairing of different 
coup-proofing mechanisms with varied types of militaries, was very helpful in this 
regard.4 Pierson (2004) addresses these relationships as well: “Coup-proofing techniques 
became self-reinforcing; they created networks of powerful military actors whose 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances  Coups,” 250.  
4 Hicham Bou Nassif, Generals and Autocrats: Coup-proofing and Military Elite’s Behavior in 
The 2011 Arab Spring (PhD Dissertation, Indiana University, 2014): 24. 
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influence and interests were dependent on making the reversal of the established pattern 
of civil-military relations difficult. In a word, the methods used by Arab autocrats to 
coup-proof became path-dependent.”5  
 This statement emphasizes the importance of the economic and political influence 
and benefits that coup-proofing generally grants military actors. Moreover, it stresses the 
path-dependency aspect of coup-proofing, thus making clear the need for a historical 
approach to civil-military relations and a careful examination of changes in the military’s 
economic and political role in authoritarian regimes. As my chief interest lies in the 
military’s economic role, I will here examine the process through which economic coup-
proofing develops, as well as the conditions affecting its implementation. ‘Economic 
coup-proofing’ is defined here as the allocation of resources with the intention of 
garnering officers’ loyalty, the most viable indicator for a regime’s coup-proofing 
capacity, because all the other mechanisms (which will be discussed below) require an 
economic investment. This kind of spending is one of the oldest and most widespread 
methods for averting the threat of military intervention.6  
To understand how economic coup-proofing strategies shape civil-military 
relations, we need to first examine various factors such as military organizational 
structures, rentierism and state capacity. ‘Military organizational structure’ refers to the 
influence of ethnic stacking (or lack thereof) on the implementation of economic coup-
proofing. ‘Rentierism’ and ‘state capacity’ refer respectively to the availability of 
resources to fund economic coup-proofing, and to civilian institutions’ power to govern 
the necessary spending. These factors will then be analyzed in terms of how they 
contribute to variations in technique, execution and distribution of economic coup-
proofing tools.  I thus pose the following questions: 
 
How does the variation in military organization affect the implementation of economic 
coup proofing? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), 4. 
6 Holger Albrecht, “Does Coup-proofing Work? Political-Military Relations in Authoritarian 
Regimes Amid The Arab Uprisings?,” Mediterranean Politics 20, no. 1 (2014): 5.	  Also see Risa 
Brooks, Political-Military Relations and The Stability Arab Regimes (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998). 
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What is more: How does the variation in the implementation of economic coup 
proofing contribute to the military’s role as an economic actor? 
 
In response to the question of how variation in military organization affects the 
implementation of economic coup-proofing and how variation in the implementation of 
economic coup-proofing contributes to the military’s role as an economic actor, I suggest 
that military organization (here, the use or non-use of family, ethnic and religious ties) 
plays a dominant role in determining the allocation patterns of economic coup-proofing 
in the MENA region. To be specific: in a communal military where ethnic stacking 
(recruitment based on ethnic ties or bloodlines) prevails, the incumbent ruler is under 
pressure to lavish direct, personal material benefits upon his own ethnic group, ranging 
from illicit economic activity to disproportional accessibility to wealth-generating 
opportunities. Because ethnic ties are historically embedded in the development of the 
military organization, the incumbent adapts to the demands by using a mixed approach of 
targeted incentives joined with turning a blind eye to officers’ engagement in illegal 
activities, so that military business take on the form of the Spoils Model (see below). 
 In an institutionalized military, however, the targets are less obvious as a result of 
the lack of clear-cut ethnic lines to determine the allocation of riches, so the incumbent 
garners loyalty by distributing indirect institutional benefits. These include arms 
purchases, high commandership salaries and bonuses, and in some cases the benefits take 
the form of independent economic/industrial complexes. The Egyptian military’s ability 
to retain a considerable hold over giant industrial complexes (often with little or no 
civilian oversight or taxation) whose revenues go directly to the military institution is a 
case in point. This leads to the military business taking the form of the Institutionalized 
Entrepreneurship Model (see below). 
The second set of hypotheses attempt to answer the question of how the variations 
in military business forms influence the officer-incumbent bond on the one hand the 
officer-societal bond on the other hand. 
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The Spoils Model: 
The direct personalized or in some cases illegal character of the benefits places 
the military at the mercy of the incumbent because the sustainability of such economic 
resources are dependent on the continuous guarantee of loyalty. In cases where 
communality plays a major role in military organization, benefits are allocated in a 
personalized individual (sometimes illegal) manner, diminishing the role of the military 
institution as an economic actor and making it into a kind of shield for the incumbent. At 
the same time, the incumbent can eliminate unwarranted members by simply lifting the 
curtain from targeted illegal activities.  
 
The Institutionalized Entrepreneurial Model:  
This arrangement enhances military autonomy by giving the military institution 
economic benefits that do not depend on special loyalty to the incumbent. I would thus 
expect that in institutionalized militaries, the military-incumbent bond would be looser 
than in the Spoils Model. Also, in cases where general conscription contributes to the 
military being a reflection of the broader society, I would expect a stronger societal-
military bond to develop (enhanced by the institutions’ ability to maintain a civic-
integration role) as well as a heightened economic-provider role (facilitated by their 
strong hold over economic revenues independent of the national government budget).  
To illustrate my hypotheses, I have compared the cases of Egypt, Syria and 
Jordan: Syria and Jordan display varied levels of communal military organizational 
structures, which I expect to illustrate the Spoils Model of economic coup-proofing. 
Having the level of patrimonial recruitment as the main independent factor, the Syrian 
and the Jordanian cases share a considerable ethnic/tribal imprint in the military structure. 
However, what sets them apart is the absence of general conscription in the Jordanian 
military which leaves more room for a wider use of favoritism and discriminatory 
selection to dictate the membership of both the rank and file and also the officer corps. 
While as, the case of Syria represents partial communality, which is mainly limited to the 
officer corps and the higher echelons, leaving the rank and file exposed to general 
conscription. Whereas, Egypt exhibits an institutionalized ‘a-communal’ military 
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structure, which I expect to display the characteristics of an institutional entrepreneurial 
model. Nonetheless, since not all the factors named above can be examined here, I keep 
rentierism and state capacity constant. Taking heed of Joseph Wright, Erica Frantz and 
Barbara Geddes’ (2013) empirical research suggesting that oil wealth has a direct and 
positive effect on providing the funds needed to distribute patronage, I have selected 
these cases based on their being semi-rentier and poor in oil-wealth in order to go beyond 
the oil-wealth explanation successfully developed by Geddes’ work. I also keep constant 
the state capacity to enact civilian control on the military’s access to economic resources; 
by examining constitutional texts, which show that all three cases lack effective 
mechanisms, which civilian entities (e.g. parliaments) can utilize to question military 
expenditures. To explain this further, I adhere to Jorn Brommelhorster’s and Wolf-
Christian Paes’ (2003) understanding of the relationship between state capacity to control 
the military and the military’s economic activity: “Where states are weak and civilian 
control of the armed forces is poor or effectively non-existent, military elites have an 
added incentive to carve out commercial enterprises for themselves. While military 
business is by no means confined to weak states, it can be said that poor civilian control 
increases the likelihood of opportunistic behavior on the part of the armed forces.”7 
In light of cases briefly outlined above, the implementation of economic coup 
proofing will be studied in terms of direct off budget personalized and indirect on-budget 
institutional allocations. Using data derived from the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency’s (ACDA) World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers reports (WMEAT), 
I will examine the on-budget category by calculating the percentage of budget allocated 
to military spending over the last thirty to forty years (between 1970 and 2010); I will use 
secondary sources to look at forms of off-budget benefits, including services to which 
military personnel have privileged access in addition to other opportunities of self-
enrichment. Thus I will explore the relation between military organizational structure and 
the development of diverse economic coup-proofing trends, as well as how the type of 
allocation affects the incumbent-military bond that results from it. To be specific: the 
extent to which a sustained benefit is dependent on the survival of the incumbent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jorn Brommelhorster and Wolf-Christian Paes, “Soldiers in Business: An Introduction,” In The 
Military As An Economic Actor: Soldiers in Business (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 
14. 
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determines the strength of the military’s attachment to the incumbent. In contrast, the less 
direct the benefits, the looser the bond between the military and the incumbent. 
 
Table 1: Thesis Hypothesis 
Country Rentierism State 
Capacity 
Military 
Organization 
Type of 
Economic 
coup- 
proofing 
Incumbent-
military 
bond 
Syria Poor Semi-
rentier 
Weak Semi-
Communal 
Direct 
Personalized 
Tight 
Egypt Poor Semi-
Rentier 
Weak A-communal 
/Institutionalized 
Indirect 
Institutional 
Loose 
Jordan Poor Semi-
rentier 
Weak Communal Direct 
Personalized 
Tight 	  	  
1.1	   Structure	  of	  the	  Dissertation	  	  
In order to conduct the research previously outlined, this research project will first 
present a substantial review of the existing relevant literature in chapter 2. In doing so, 
the dissertation visits germane academic works needed for the generation of operational 
definitions associated with military organizational structures. The chapter explores 
relevant literature on coup d’état, coup proofing and economic coup proofing, which 
outlines research approaches trying to place, asses and explain the possible relationship 
between military organization and economic coup proofing. It will also briefly suggest 
that the originality of the research lies in the fact that it analyzes economic coup proofing 
as a collection of strategies that is sensitive to military organization. The rest of the 
chapter builds on the literature and subsequently lays out the case-selection process and 
the methodology. This section includes a detailed account of the method employed to 
conduct the research project, highlighting the variables, and a rough outline of the variety 
of sources utilized for studying such variables in relation to the case studies.  
The third chapter deals with Jordan, laying out an overview of the historical 
developments inciting tribal favoritism in military recruitment and focusing on significant 
moments in this policy’s enforcement. It also describes incidents related to beginning and 
maintaining the ‘depalestinization’ of the military, stressing the dynamics leading up to 
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the consolidation of an East Bank-dominated officer corps. The chapter then moves on to 
examine how military communality influences waves of change and continuity in the 
technique, execution and distribution of economic coup-proofing in Jordan, with a focus 
on variations in the use of budgetary tools versus off-budget sources. In addition, it 
assesses similarities and dissimilarities in coup-proofing applications by comparing direct 
personalized with indirect institutional incentives, hopefully providing insight into the 
military’s role as an economic actor in Jordan as well as an overview of incumbent-
military relations.   
The fourth chapter addresses Syria, beginning with an overview of the military’s 
historical development and focusing on the steps that led to the consolidation of a 
communally-guided recruitment pattern in the officer corps and general conscription in 
the rank and file, which eventually developed into a partially communally-organized 
military. Then it analyzes the available data on budgetary economic incentives like arms 
purchases and personnel costs. This is followed by an examination of the military 
institution’s access to productive activities, in order to better understand both these 
activities’ growth and decline over time and military financial autonomy. The chapter 
also looks at the extent of off-budget opportunities available for military personnel. 
Highlighting waves of change and continuity in the application (technique, execution and 
efficacy) of economic coup-proofing within Syria, this chapter provides an overall 
analysis of patronage distribution in relation to the military institution, while also 
describing how the military’s economic activity plays a role in strengthening or 
weakening the military-incumbent bond.  
 The fifth chapter examines the Egyptian Armed Forces, first giving an overview 
of noteworthy moments in the historical development of a non-communal or 
institutionalized military in Egypt. Highlighting its relatively heterogeneous social 
composition (associated with the enforcement of general conscription early on), this 
chapter provides evidence that Egypt’s military exhibits an institutionalized 
organizational structure. The following section attempts to show that since the military 
lacks an ethnic in-group, economic coup-proofing will take the form of indirect 
institutional incentives that, in turn, target the institution as a whole. These include an 
expansion of the military industrial-complex as well as an increase in military 
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expenditures as a percentage of GDP. Finally, it suggests that the institutionalized nature 
of economic coup-proofing contributes to weakening the military’s financial dependence 
on the political leadership.  
The sixth chapter will present an in-depth analysis of the information on 
economic coup-proofing gathered from the three cases, with the aim of comparing the 
distribution of patronage in both communal and non-communal militaries. It utilizes the 
compiled findings to provide insight on the type of economic benefits that militaries 
acquire and how these benefits function in binding the military to the incumbent or 
enhancing the military’s autonomous economic activities. 
The final chapter will provide my conclusions, reflections and possible alternative 
explanations for the research problem, state the limitations and difficulties encountered 
during the gathering and the analysis of the data, and finally make recommendations for 
future research on this subject. 	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Chapter	  2:	  Literature	  Review	  
	  
2.1	   Introduction	  	  
This review scans civil-military literature with the aim of shedding light on the various 
lenses used to analyze the possible relation between military organizational structure and 
economic coup-proofing. It starts with an overview of the nature of military institutions, 
with a focus on the complex process of civilian control. A description of the current 
literature on military organizational structure follows, distinguishing between communal 
and institutionalized militaries through an analysis of recruitment patterns in the MENA 
region.  Finally, I will review current concepts of economic coup-proofing to see how it 
is implemented, measured and distinguished from other coup-proofing mechanisms. 
 
2.2	   Approaches	  to	  military	  nature	  and	  civilian	  control	  	  
In order to understand the interplay between different coup-proofing mechanisms, one 
must first become familiar with the existing literature on civil-military relations in 
general, and civilian control in particular. The civil-military-relations literature mainly 
revolves around the nature of the military institution and how to keep it under civilian 
control – the basic principle of coup-proofing.  This literature exhibits two main strands 
describing the nature of the military institution.  
On the one hand, scholars including Peter Feaver, Edward Luttwak and Samuel 
Finer agree that the military is a parasitical power-hungry institution with an inherent 
predisposition for political intervention. Feaver’s concept of “civil-military 
problematique” draws on the Hobbesian understanding of the human condition, that of a 
war of all against all. Hence, a protective power is necessary for state survival. However, 
the paradox lies in the fact that this very force, whose main responsibility is to shield 
society from harm, can eventually turn against the society it is meant to protect.8 Luttwak 
also shares this opinion as he looks at the consequences of modern states’ possession of 
modern militaries (inherently violent institutions) leading to grave vulnerability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Peter Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and The Question of 
Civilian Control,” Armed Forces & Society 23, no. 2 (1996): 151. 
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guerilla warfare and coups d’état.9 This reinforces Feaver’s argument by pointing to the 
idea that militaries possess enough power to destroy the very polity they are designated to 
protect. Finer’s famous statement “Instead of asking why the military engage in politics, 
we ought surely to ask why they ever do otherwise,” explains this paradox very neatly.10   
This particular approach assumes that since coup risk is constant, coup-proofing is 
also a constant necessity – a valuable point to consider in the analysis of economic coup-
proofing, leaving one free to study the process across time regardless of specific coup 
incidences. Though individual coup occurrences may contribute to shifts in spending, 
they do not change the fact that since coup risk is constant, so is the existence of a coup-
proofing process. This fact underscores the need to study the historical context in which 
coup-proofing mechanisms are rooted. 
On the other hand, scholars such as Eric Nordlinger and Barbara Geddes view the 
military’s nature as that of a public institution that aims at securing and maintaining 
professional autonomy, organizational cohesion and its own political and economic 
interests. 11  Consequently, their approach to studying coups d’état focuses on the 
structural circumstances that motivate militaries to intervene, addressing issues that 
extend to expertness, exclusiveness, maintenance of political order and political calm.12 
Robert Jackmen (1978), Craig Jenkins and Augustine J. Kposowa (1992) are prominent 
representatives of this particular strand of literature, using structuralist approaches to 
analyze coup incidences in Africa. They view external aspects – like social mobilization, 
cultural pluralism, party systems and mass participation – as the most important factors 
influencing coup risk. Even though these factors are outside of the scope of this 
dissertation, the structuralist approach is valuable in shedding light on how structural 
conditions contribute to providing the military with the motive and the capacity to 
intervene in politics.  
This dissertation concurs with the findings in Nordlinger’s and Samuel Decalo’s 
research, which shows that the most salient motive for coup d’état is the protection or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Edward Lutwak, Coup d’etat: A Practical Hand Book- A Brilliant Guide To Taking Over A 
Nation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 20. 
10 Samuel Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger, 1962), 21. 
11 Barbra Geddes, “What Do We Know About Democratization?,” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2, no. 1 (1999): 126. 
12 Eric Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 48. 
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development of the military’s corporate interest.13 Decalo’s compiled data on coups 
d’état in Africa supports this finding by showing that the enhancement of economic 
benefits post-coup can be found in nearly every military regime in Africa.14 Therefore 
this thesis focuses on economic coup-proofing as the major mechanism to garner military 
loyalty.  
 
2.2.1	   The	  Dilemma	  of	  Civilian	  Control	  in	  Authoritarian	  Circumstances	  	  
In order to embark upon an investigation in the field of civilian control of the military in 
the MENA region, it is of vital importance to be aware of the problematics as well as the 
pitfalls that can be encountered in such a study. Since the early cold war period, which 
altered the face of security studies, the field of civil-military relations was confronted 
with a major dilemma that is the maintenance of military institutions during peacetime. 
This debate stemmed from the US’s desperate efforts to reconcile the need to preserve a 
powerful military and at the same time curb it’s detrimental effect on liberty.  
This tension extended beyond democratic states to civilian subordination of 
militaries in non-democratic circumstances where the nature and function of the military 
are drastically different.  Samuel Finer elaborates on this by asserting that the very nature 
of civil-military relations is determined by the military’s function: in non-democratic 
regimes, the military is predominantly used for internal or domestic purposes, which 
dictates stronger relations with the ruling elite as well as a considerable detachment from 
the society as a whole.15  
The non-democratic context is especially problematic for studying civilian control 
simply because, more often than not, it is difficult to distinguish between civilian and 
military entities. Moreover, civilian control is the exception to the rule in authoritarian 
regimes; ‘coup-proofing’ is the most suitable term to describe the philosophy governing 
the interaction between civilian governments and military institutions in non-democratic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Ibid, 63. 
14 Samuel Decalo, Coups and Army Rule in Africa (New Haven:  Yale University Press, 1976), 
31. 
15 Finer, The Man on Horseback, 25. 
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circumstances.16 Therefore, it is safe to argue that studying coup-proofing is absolutely 
indispensable to the understanding of political-military relations in authoritarian regimes.  
 
2.3	   Studying	  Coup	  proofing:	  Perception	  and	  views	  	  
This section establishes an operational definition for coup-proofing, starting with a 
discussion of the definitions used in the current literature. The second part of this section 
explores the measures implemented by states to ensure control of the armed forces, then 
goes on to examine the different approaches used to analyze coup-proofing, together with 
their strengths and weaknesses.  
 
2.3.1	   Defining	  coup	  proofing	  	  
Previous scholarly research on the topic yields a number of working definitions that 
mostly repeat two words - “minimize” and “coup”. James Quinlivan, who studies coup-
proofing in the Middle East, asserts that the essence of coup-proofing lies in the creation 
of structures that are especially designed to minimize the chances of “groups” leveraging 
the system to instigate a “coup”.17 Florence Gaub, who studies coup-proofing in Libya, 
agrees with Quinlivan’s definition but adds the element of “meddling with the micro-
level for macro-level purposes”.18 Holger Albrecht, who also studies coup-proofing in the 
Middle East, argues that coup-proofing indicates actions of “authoritarian incumbents” to 
prevent “militaries” from assuming power.19 He also reiterates Quinlivan and Gaub’s 
argument by citing Samuel Finer’s definition that refers to coup-proofing as the process 
of reducing the chances of “coup instigators”.20 Jonathan Powell’s article “Determinants 
of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d’état” defines coup-proofing as efforts by 
“leaders” to reduce the likelihood of a coup.21 In another piece titled “Coups and conflict: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Welch, Civilian Control of the Military, 35. 
17 James T. Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,” 
International Security 24, no. 2 (1999): 133. 
18 Florence Gaub, “The Libyan Armed Forces Between Coup-proofing and Repression,” Journal 
of Strategic Studies 36, no. 2 (2013): 4. 
19 Albrecht,“The Myth of Coup-Proofing,” 5. 
20 Ibid, 4. 
21 Jonathan Powell, “Determinants of The Attempting and Outcome of Coups D’état,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 56, no.6 (2012): 1018.  
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The Paradox of coup-proofing”, he cites Peter Feaver, saying that coup-proofing works 
on reducing the willingness or the capacity of “militaries” to instigate a coup.22  
For the purpose of disentangling the relationship between military organizational 
structure and economic coup-proofing, this dissertation defines coup-proofing by drawing 
on notions extracted from Albrecht and Finer’s definitions. In order to allow for the 
incorporation of unsuccessful coup attempts in the three cases at hand, I follow 
Albrecht’s notion that coup risk is constant over time. The rationale behind this notion is 
that coup-proofing does not only work on the immediate causes but is also engaged in a 
dynamic relationship with structural underpinnings, like the organization of military 
institutions.23 Hence coup-proofing can be viewed as successful if it effectively postpones 
coup d’etat, even if a coup does eventually take place.  
 In another article, Albrecht points to the fact that coup-proofing measures are not 
only designed to prevent coup attempts but also to help incumbents withstand coup 
attempts that could not be prevented.24 Therefore, an unsuccessful coup does nothing to 
negate the effectiveness of the coup-proofing process for the duration of time when no 
coups happened, as it fulfilled its purpose of prolonging the incumbent’s reign in power 
and helping him put down coup efforts.25  
Another reason for utilizing Albrecht’s logic in regards to my cases is that coup-
proofing strategies were generally successful in all three cases. For example, in the cases 
of Egypt and Syria, there is a clear absence of ‘coup cascades’, which had been a 
recurring event during the 1950s and 1960s. Jordan has not experienced any coup 
attempts since the early 1970s. Consequently, this dissertation defines coup-proofing as a 
collection of actions developed by leaders to prevent militaries from taking over power. 
This study also adheres to Jonathan Powell’s threshold for a successful coup, which is 
fulfilled by the coup instigators holding power for a whole week. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Jonathan Powell, “Coups and Conflict: The Paradox of Coup-Proofing,” (PhD dissertation, 
University of Kentucky, 2012): 9. 
23 Albrecht,“The Myth of Coup-Proofing,” 2. 
24 Albrecht, “ Does Coup-Proofing Work?,”4. 
25 Ibid, 3. 
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Table 2 - Defining Coup-Proofing 
Coup-proofing A collection of actions developed by leaders to prevent the 
military from taking over power. 
Successful coup-
proofing 
Coup proofing can be viewed as successful if it effectively 
postpones coup incidences. 
Unsuccessful coup-
proofing 
The military effectively takes over power and holds it for a 
whole week. 
 
	  
2.3.2	   Approaches	  to	  the	  Study	  of	  Coup-­‐Proofing	  Mechanisms:	  A	  discussion	  of	  
Strengths	  and	  Weaknesses	  	  	  
In order to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the approaches used to study coup-
proofing mechanisms, we must first identify disaggregate strategies of the coup-proofing 
process. Prominent scholars including Quinlivan (1999), Albrecht (2013), Gaub (2013), 
Kamrava (2000), and Brooks (1998) agreed on five mechanisms that form coup-proofing 
processes: 
 
1. Counterbalancing: the creation of parallel militaries to counter the official armed forces. 
2. Ethnic coup proofing: relying on or in some cases excluding certain ethnic, family or 
religious groups to ensure loyalty. 
3. Fostering of expertness in the regular military. 
4. The development of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping jurisdiction that 
constantly monitor the loyalty of the military and one another with independent paths of 
communication to critical leaders 
5. Economic coup proofing: Distributing economic benefits in addition to funding the 
previously mentioned measures. 
 
The main weakness exhibited by the literature is that it evaluates the process as a 
monolithic concept, neglecting the potential effectiveness of individual mechanisms. 
Nonetheless, progress has been made in recent coup-proofing studies that propose 
plausible theories and prove them using Large-N data as well as in-depth analysis of 
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relevant cases; but they fail to conduct thorough assessments of the effectiveness of 
singular coup proofing mechanisms.  
The literature successfully observes the effect of such mechanisms on the 
cohesion of militaries during popular uprisings and further examines how coup-proofing 
can affect the military’s inclination to support a regime against the people, e.g. Barany 
(2011), Bellin (2012), Lutterbeck (2012), Brooks (2013), Droz-Vincent (2013) and 
Nepstad (2011 and 2013). Another fraction utilizes the approach of isolating a single 
coup-proofing mechanism as opposed to studying coup-proofing in general. These 
include Schofer (2005), who studied counterbalancing and how it affects a military’s 
ability to instigate a coup.26 Also Powell (2012), Sprinborg (2013), Bou Nassif (2013), 
Conrad et al. (2013) and Wiktorowitz and O. Mora (2003) look at economic coup-
proofing and how it affects a military’s disposition to intervene in politics. Moreover, 
Louër (2013), Makara (2013) and Neumayer et al. (2008) explore authoritarian regimes’ 
reliance on ethnic loyalties in military recruitment and formation as a type of regime 
survival mechanism.  
However, these studies still have a number of gaps and weaknesses that need to 
be addressed. For example, they do not explore the possible impact of varying military 
organization on the use of separable coup-proofing mechanisms. They observe and assess 
the application of coup-proofing in a varied number of countries with different military 
types, but they fail to really highlight how these structural differences contribute to a 
variation in coup-proofing application. They also fail to account for the clear relationship 
between concepts like economic coup-proofing, ethnic coup-proofing and military 
organization. Ethnic coup-proofing, or the exploitation of ethnic, family or religious ties, 
is generally seen as a mechanism of coup-proofing – or in other words regime survival. 
Examples include McLauchlin, 2010; Bellin, 2012; Lutterbeck, 2012; Makara, 2013 and 
Gaub, 2013. This approach is shortsighted because it neglects the lasting influence of 
military organization, a structural reality that moves and changes very slowly.  
Nevertheless, not all share this shortsightedness. Cynthia Enloe (1980) and 
Philipe Roessler (2011) recognize the importance of regarding military organization as an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 Counterbalancing is the creation of an armed force parallel to the official military in addition to 
the creation of multiple internal security agencies with overlapping tasks to balance each other 
out to reduce the chances of a military coup. 
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aspect that both shapes and is shaped by communal and economic coup-proofing. Enloe’s 
argument stems from the need to understand statist processes towards the military in 
multi-ethnic societies. She explains that regime interest is to align itself with some 
resident ethnic communities against other excluded groups as a way of ensuring regime 
hegemony.27 This process is particularly reflected in the military institution, a main – if 
not primary – executive instrument of authoritarian control in the majority of third world 
states, where ensuring hegemony in the military entails organization along ethnic lines, a 
process that mirrors ethnic coup-proofing.28 Moreover, this particular regime interest is 
reinforced by another process of targeted or unequal distribution of economic benefits 
within the military organizations, which in turn structures the implementation of 
economic coup-proofing.  
Roessler also highlights the dynamic relationship between military organization 
and economic coup-proofing. Like Enloe, he sees ethnic exclusion as a tool of power 
preservation. He also describes the incumbent’s use of economic benefits to harness 
loyalty from already-favored ethnic groups. Furthermore, he writes that privileged 
ethnicities within the military possess a sense of entitlement, which furthers their taking 
an active role in pressuring the incumbent to lavish them with excessive economic 
rewards.29 Bou Nassif adds to this argument by referring to Syria and similar states where 
ethnic divisions define the military organization, and reaffirms the fact that the 
incumbent’s ethnic clique is promoted to reach the upper echelons in the hierarchy – in 
addition to being able to accumulate wealth as a result of their privileged connection to 
the regime.30 These observations directly support my argument regarding the value of 
studying the interplay between military organization (the usage or the absence of ethnic 
stacking) and the technique and execution of economic coup-proofing.  
 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Cynthia Enloe, Police, Military and Ethnicity, (New Brunswick, N.J: Transaction Books, 
1980), 159. 
28 Ibid, 141. 
29 Philip Rosseler, “The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups and Civil War in Africa,” World 
Politics 63, no. 2 (2011): 301. 
30 Bou Nassif, “Generals and Autocrats,” 64. 
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2.4	   Theories	  on	  Military	  Organization	  	  	  
2.4.1	   Defining	  Military	  Organization	  	  
Recently published literature is mainly concerned with the cause behind the variation in 
the military’s likelihood to takeover power. These pillar their analysis on the method of 
recruitment as the major defining criteria of military organization.  
Lutterbeck draws on Kamrava’s typology, which divides MENA militaries into 
three types. The first is the autocratic officer-politician type where the armed forces 
exercise a de facto veto power over presidency as in Algeria, Egypt and Syria.31 Another 
type is the tribally dependent monarchies that predominantly rely on forces pulled from 
tribes loyal to the regime, for example in Morocco, Jordan, Yemen and Saudi Arabia or 
even depend on foreign mercenaries as in Bahrain, Oman and Qatar. Kamrava’s third 
military type, which he refers to as dual militaries, encompasses factors from the first two 
types. This particular type is more or less based on tribal loyalty but also on ideology.32 
The problem with this particular approach is the fact that there are no unified criteria on 
which the cases can be measured. This makes it very difficult to account for changes in 
the organization of militaries and hence it gives no space for scholars to shift cases from 
one box to another.  Lutterbeck also looks at Eva Bellin’s typology, which distinguishes 
between militaries according to the extent to which a military is patrimonial or 
institutionalized.33  
Zoltan Barany, in contrast, focuses solely on patterns of accessibility of 
membership, which refer to the rules and regulations governing the recruitment process. 
This differentiates between militaries whose make-up is defined by general conscription 
versus those which are dominated by minorities. His analysis of the military’s role in the 
recent Arab revolts accurately shows how recruitment affects a military’s disposition to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Ibid, 31. 
32 Dual militaries can also be found in Iran’s revolutionary guard, Iraq before 2003 and Libya 
under Qaddafi. 
33 Institutionalization in this context refers to the fact that that the military is rule-bound and 
based on meritocratic principles while as patrimonialism refers to political favoritism and 
cronyism, internal hierarchy and advancement are determined by political or ideological loyalties, 
high levels of corruption are also prevalent and most importantly such militaries have little or no 
legitimacy outside the regime. See Derek Lutterbeck, “Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-
Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 39, no. 1 (2012): 32. 
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react to a popular uprising. He used the cases of conscript armies of Egypt and Tunisia to 
show that strong ties with society contribute to such armies refusing to put down the 
uprisings.34 On the other hand, he looks at the cases of Yemen and Libya to demonstrate 
how Saleh’s and Qadhafi’s “stacking the deck” led to the military’s division and 
eventually civil conflict.35  
Michael Makara considers yet another way in which recruitment can contribute to 
a divergence in the military’s willingness to stage a coup. He analyzes patterns through 
which communal ties are exploited in the formation of militaries in the MENA region. He 
organizes militaries into three types: communal, in which the ruling regimes stack most if 
not all the military apparatus with members of loyal communities of trust; partial 
communal, in which only a portion of the security apparatus is hired on the basis of 
communal ties; and finally, a-communal militaries in which no communal ties are used in 
staffing the military.36 
It is safe to conclude that these authors focus primarily on the extent to which the 
armed forces are professional or institutionalized. This thesis views institutionalization in 
terms of the degree to which they represent the society’s make-up. Thus the criterion for 
differentiating between varied military types will be established by looking at general 
conscription as being the most representative or institutionalized, and selective 
recruitment as being the least representative of society or communal in the context of the 
MENA region.  
 
2.4.2	   	  Military	  Organization	  and	  the	  Officer	  Corps:	  Why	  is	  the	  link	  crucial?	  	  
Does the study of military representativeness of society entail the tracking of recruitment 
patterns in the whole military? Samuel Huntington answers this question by clearly 
stating that the main focus of civil-military relations is the civilian government’s power 
relative to military groups, referring to the officer corps as “the active directing element 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Zoltan Barany, “Comparing The Arab Revolts: The Role of The Military,” Journal of 
 Democracy 22, no. 4 (2011): 32. 
35 Ibid, 33. 
36The term a-communal is used to describe the militaries of Egypt and Tunisia, communal refers 
to Syria and Bahrain and finally Yemen and Libya are categorized as partially communal 
militaries. See Michael Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection and The Arab Spring,” 
Democracy and Security 9, no. 4 (2013): 341-343.  
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of the military structure … responsible for the military security of society.”37 Thus, the 
recruitment pattern of the officer corps reflects the military’s ties to society. Albrecht 
makes the same suggestion in his analysis of the varied reactions of MENA militaries to 
the Arab uprisings, criticizing the approach of studying the military as one homogeneous 
entity; according to him, the assumption that the same method of recruitment is applied 
universally is false, since some factions are recruited through general conscription while 
others are not.38 A case in point is Syria where the rank and file is generally conscripted 
while the officer corps is stacked along ethnic lines. This is again another reason why this 
thesis will focus on the military organization of the officer corps.  
Other approaches include that of Roger Owen who analyzes militaries in terms of 
size, and Nordlinger who categorizes militaries on the basis of the extent to which they 
access political power. Owen contributes positively to our understanding of the nature of 
military organization, suggesting an approach that views a military institution as a special 
form of organization with its own hierarchy, discipline and defined boundaries.39 This is 
a useful insight necessary for the understanding of how militaries are formed as well as 
how they function. In light of his historical analysis of MENA militaries, he divides 
militaries by size to facilitate the study of the region. According to his typology, military 
size is directly connected to the military’s role in both internal and external security.40 
The chapter sheds light on the historical background of each military, which is needed to 
better understand the distinctive military type. However, the typology presented by Owen 
lacks specific criteria against which the types will be measured. Also, the problem with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Huntington, The Soldier and The State (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1957), 3. 
38 Holger Albrecht and Dorothy Ohl, “Out of Order: Military Repression and Defection in The 
Arab Spring,” (Unpublished article manuscript, International Security, 2013): 9-10. 
39 Roger Owen, “The Military in and Out of Politics,” In State, Power and Politics in the Making 
of the Modern Middle East, 3rd ed. (London: Routledge, 2004), 178. 
40 Ibid, 180. Large militaries include Egypt, Syria and Iraq, which were required to fulfill a 
function both on the internal security front to put down strikes and regional revolts in addition to 
their classic role, which is to protect from external attacks. The second category encompasses 
smaller Arab armies, which he then goes on to divide them to four sub-categories. Algeria, 
Jordan, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen are referred to as modern professional armies. 
Tribal-based military organizations describe militaries of Saudi Arabia and Oman. He also uses 
the term modern confessional to refer to Lebanon. The last of the small armies is the guerilla 
faction, which only includes the Palestinian resistance. Finally, the third type encapsulates 
Turkey, Iran and Israel. 
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grouping militaries according to size is that it disregards the structural differences within 
each military.  
Nordlinger’s chapter focuses on militaries in politics; here he hypothesizes that 
the more ambitious the military, the more likely it is to intervene. This chapter uses a 
typology based on the level of intervention and the ambitiousness of the plotter’s 
objectives, in which he divides militaries into moderators, guardians and praetorian 
soldiers.41 The first refers to militaries with a moderator complex such that they have veto 
power over many governmental decisions without taking over the government.42 The 
second type is the guardian military, which is characterized by its ability to overthrow a 
government and to retain power but only for a period of two to four years.43 The last and 
the most extreme type is the praetorian ruler, who exercises complete domination of the 
political, economic and social spheres. 44  However, this approach to distinguishing 
militaries presupposes the military’s inherent interest in political intervention and 
neglects the possibility of an existing doctrine of non-intervention. It also lacks any 
consideration for disaggregate corporate interests of varied groups within the military - a 
flaw that my approach attempts to remedy.  
 
Table 3: Operational Definitions of Military Organizational Structure 
Military 
Organization 
Defined according to the recruitment method used to employ 
personnel. 
 
Communal Military 
Military recruitment either formally or informally follows the 
logic of stacking the military apparatus along ethnic, family or 
religious lines (Makara, 2013).  
Institutionalized/A-
communal military 
Military recruitment through general conscription which reflects 
a considerable level of the military’s representativeness of 
society (Lutterbeck, 2012)  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Praetorian soldiers are “military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of 
their actual or threatened use of force”. Militaries with a moderator complex such that they have 
veto power over many governmental decisions without taking over the government. See 
Nordlinger, The Study of Praetorianism” In Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Government 
(New Jersey: Prentince-Hall, 1977), 2. 
42 Ibid, 22. Moderators are highly politicized and may take part in what Nordlinger referred to as 
a displacement coup –one in which a government is overthrown or prevented from taking office 
and is replaced by another group of civilians. Also it is possible for them to transform over time 
into guardians or rulers 
43 Ibid, 25. 
44 Ibid, 26-27. 
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The following section addresses the definition, implementation and measurement 
of economic coup-proofing through an extensive review of the literature. It also offers a 
more careful look at economic coup-proofing than the general understanding of it as the 
mere funding of the whole coup-proofing process, which makes it practically impossible 
to study its varied applications. 
 
2.4.3	   Studying	  Economic	  Coup	  Proofing:	  Definition,	  implementation	  and	  
	   measurement	  	  	  
Samuel Huntington’s renowned chapter on curbing military power sets the stage for 
coup-proofing in general, and economic coup-proofing in particular. He provides ten 
rules for democratizing states, but his logic can certainly be extended to nondemocratic 
states, since the governments in question fall under the civilian category whether by 
being civilians from the beginning like the royal families in Jordan or by having a 
military background and taking off the military uniform like in Egypt and Syria. He 
asserts that military men tend to perceive themselves as financially underprivileged 
employees of the state and thus recommends that civilian governments treat their armed 
forces with generosity – e.g. with increased salaries, pensions, benefits and living 
conditions. He also introduces the concept of  “give them toys” which basically entails 
providing militaries with new and fancy equipment that are designed to keep the military 
“happy and busy”.45 This translates into a comprehensive recipe of economic privileges 
especially devised to bind the military to the civilian government, hence reducing the 
chances of a military coup.  
Risa Brook’s analysis of economic coup-proofing in the MENA region led her to 
differentiate between two different types of interests that need to be fulfilled through 
economic coup-proofing. On one hand she looks at the macro-level to detect the 
military’s corporate interest, which can be satisfied through increases in budgets, weapon 
supplies and the funding of parallel military forces designed to counterbalance the official 
one. On the other hand, she focuses on an equally vital bulk of interests that are 
exclusively private benefits, which are closely related to remedies for grievances of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 252. 
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individual officers.46 These are satisfied through disproportionally high wages paid to 
officers relative to other civil servants, as well as housing and transport subsidies, access 
to scarce consumer goods, self-contained military cities, access to subsidized consumer 
goods, high-quality medical care, and transport facilities unavailable to the general 
population. Nordlinger shares Brook’s approach to studying the corporate interest model 
by identifying two levels of corporate interest; one is the institutions’ corporate interests, 
which can be satisfied by adequate budgetary support, and the second is the personal 
level marked by officers’ desire for promotion and other benefits, their political 
ambitions, and fear of dismissal.47  
This distinction between differing economic coup-proofing processes is valuable 
for two reasons: on one level, it is necessary to differentiate between funds that are 
allocated on the macro-level (affecting the institution as a whole) versus micro-level 
(organized on a personal basis and affecting individual officers). On another level, it is 
important to distinguish between direct benefits - in the form of easily calculated material 
riches like salaries, bonuses etc. -, and indirect funds that may be spent on public services 
to which military personal are given disproportional access (relative to other public 
servants).  
Eric Rittinger’s, in his study of coup-proofing in Latin America, defines the 
phenomenon by referring to Miguel Centeno’s understanding of the term.48  Rittinger 
criticizes a broad definition, saying that it is misleading to treat any spending as an 
attempt to coup-proof and that it is thus important to distinguish between normal military 
spending and spending aimed at garnering special loyalties. He defines economic coup-
proofing as any spending beyond that necessary to strengthen national security. This 
illustrates the problem of defining economic coup-proofing, because as Rittinger's 
definition demonstrates, it requires the establishment of a number of thresholds that are 
very hard to identify. These include concepts like excess spending, which cannot be 
identified without setting the normal standard of spending - also difficult to assess, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Brooks, Political-Military Relations and The Stability of Arab Regimes, 26. 
47 Nordlinger, Soldiers in Politics, 65. 
48 For more detail see Miguel Centeno, Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin 
America (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002). 
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especially with the rapid changes in what states perceive as a threat which requires 
enhancement of military power.  
Following the brief discussion of what economic coup proofing entails I proceed 
to look at a number of trends in the examination of economic incentives as a means of 
ensuring the military’s loyalty. 
The first trend is described by Mark Beeson in his study of economic incentives 
as increasing or decreasing a military’s motivation to stage a coup. He uses the corporate-
interest theory to argue that a military’s access to economic resources is a vital factor 
determining the strength or weakness of the bond between the military and the status quo. 
Beeson supports his argument by saying that the Indonesian military’s easy access to 
economic resources makes it less likely than its Philippine counterpart to make a power 
grab, since even though the Indonesian military continues to play a leading role both on 
economic and political fronts, it was the Philippine military and not the Indonesian one 
which experienced a coup in 2006. He furthers his argument by stating that the 
Indonesian military enjoys an autonomous budget wherein their off-budget resources 
accounts for around 60% of their running costs, and that each branch of the military 
operates its own business through large holding companies - useful for drawing parallels 
with the Egyptian case (which we will address later).49 Beeson’s use of the discrepancy 
between the Indonesian case and the Philippines lends merit to the corporate interest 
argument showing the efficient incorporation of economic coup proofing as a major tool 
to not necessarily “curb” military power as argued by Huntington but certainly to reduce 
their willingness to overthrow the government.  
A debate took place on the usefulness of the corporate interest model. Among 
scholars that were critical of the concept is Terence Lee, who delivers a number of 
criticisms to Beeson’s argument and the corporate interest model. He accuses it of being 
overly simplistic in general and as a result it missed striking issues that contribute to a 
military intervention.50 One of his main critiques is that fact that the corporate interest 
approach studies the military as one entity and thus assumes that military factions share 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Mark Beeson,“Civil−Military Relations in Indonesia and The Philippines: Will the Thai Coup 
Prove Contagious?,” Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 3 (2008): 480.  
50 Terrence Lee,“The Military's Corporate Interests: The Main Reason for Intervention in 
Indonesia and the Philippines?,”Armed Forces and Society 34, no. 3 (2008): 492. 
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the same corporate interest. This is a valid point, which is also shared by Holger 
Albrecht.  
However, it does not discredit that approach, it simply calls for the deepening of 
the analysis of military constituents bearing in mind that corporate interest manifests 
differently with varied groups within the military. A good remedy for that is Albrecht’s 
approach to distinguish between two different forms of benefits. One that integrates the 
military as an integral part of the regime’s infrastructure and the other segregates thus 
pushing the military out of politics.51 Another valuable addition is Albrecht’s approach to 
differentiate between the corporate interest of military leadership/commander and the 
interest of lower ranking personal or the subordinate.52 This distinction is particularly 
useful when looking at the selectivity/universality of patronage patterns incorporated in 
economic coup proofing, which raises the question of whether incumbents grant 
militaries equal generosity. 
Moreover, if the answer is yes then what does this mean for the underprivileged 
ones whose personal interests are not met? Also what form of bond does this selective 
allocation garner between the incumbent and the military? In relation to the above 
questions, Lee attacked the concept of military intervention on the basis of their corporate 
interests being threatened; he even ridiculed the approach by quoting Brian Taylor who 
asserted that if the threat of corporate interests were enough reason for militaries to 
takeover power then the whole world would have been run by militaries. 53  It is 
undeniable that there are many issues to be considered when addressing the reasons for a 
military coup, but this does not reduce the importance of the rationalist perspective, 
which dictates military personnel’s’ corporate grievances as a major motive. 
 Another counter-argument regarding the discrepancy in the allocation of benefits 
in the military institution is Hicham Bou Nassif’s (2014) progressive work on the 
Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF). His approach insightfully differentiates between two 
officer corps, arguing that varied incumbent-officer bonds can develop within the same 
institution, depending on the level of benefits they receive. For example, he compares the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Albrecht, “Does Coup-Proofing Work?,” 6. 
52 Albrecht, “ Military Repression and Defection,” 19. 
53  Lee, “The Military's Corporate Interests,” 493. 
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military elite, who is showered with economic benefits, with younger officers whose 
corporate interests are not satisfied.  
Lee attempts to discredit the assumption that the armed forces have rationalist-
materialist preferences, basing his argument on empirical evidence suggesting that 
military budgets actually decrease after a military takeover,54 but this argument fails to 
consider other venues for enrichment, as found in Beeson’s account of the Indonesian 
military’s off-budget resources, for example. The acknowledgment of off-budget 
revenues is particularly important for the Syrian case, where Alawite officers engage in 
illicit smuggling activities, which cannot be studied through the scope of budgetary 
expenditures.  
Bueo de Mesquita and Smith’s (2011) winning coalition theory analyzes the 
economic coup-proofing process by arguing that the armed forces’ bond with the autocrat 
is dependent on the regime’s fiscal health. Though I would agree that the technique and 
execution through which the economic coup-proofing process is implemented has a 
major influence on the strength of the bond between the armed forces and the autocrat, I 
find several limitations in the winning coalition theory. One problem is that reliance on 
the concept of fiscal health is out of touch with the economic realities of the majority of 
authoritarian regimes, which struggle economically. Also, this argument does not take 
into account historical examples where the military’s expanded participation in 
commercial activities played a role in countering economic crises in Indonesia, 
Philippines, Egypt and many others, so that the worse the regimes were faring 
economically, the more keen they were on buying the military’s loyalty.  
Another issue is that connecting loyalty to fiscal health assumes that the majority 
of the benefits are legal, on-budget and monetary, whereas the smuggling trade, direct 
cash installments and post-retirement careers (Syria and Egypt are prime examples) also 
play a role. A further problem with the winning coalition theory is that it focuses on the 
regime and neglects direct benefits endowed by the incumbent himself. Finally, de 
Mesquita and Smith’s work presupposes that good fiscal health equals happy militaries, 
failing to account for the role of ethnicity in the distribution of benefits. 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Ibid, 494. 
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Though studying economic coup-proofing as a distinct process might lend the 
field of civil-military relations a lot of insights on how it can effectively reduce coup 
incidences, my research moves away from this outcome-oriented approach, considering it 
insufficient in grasping the complexity of the mechanism. One problem, for example, is 
that it overlooks the fact that allocation of economic benefits, with the intention of 
garnering political loyalty, is among the processes influenced by interaction between 
political leaders and powerful military actors, whose backgrounds are determined by 
historical developments of military organization as well as ethnic stacking in the 
recruitment process. It also fails to address the dominant role that economic coup-
proofing (whether in the form of positive or negative reinforcement) plays in shaping 
military business formations. It is also problematic to ignore the influence of economic 
coup-proofing on fostering or hindering (in the form of fierce competition or fruitful 
cooperation, for example) the officers’ relations with business elites – a factor highly 
relevant to understanding civil-military relations. The type of military business (illicit 
activity, military-industrial complex used to manufacture civilian products, heavy 
industry, construction of infrastructure etc.) dictates the extent to which the military 
personnel are financially autonomous or financially dependent on the incumbent, which 
lends insight into the incumbent-military bonds that arise as a result of varied forms of 
economic coup-proofing. The form of economic activity can also help determine the 
nature of military personnel’s interaction (or lack thereof) with ordinary citizens, as in the 
case of enterprises being owned and managed by officers as opposed to being cooped up 
in the barracks. Also, the integration of military officers in society can reduce their 
willingness to act against the people in case of popular uprisings. A comparative study of 
the relationship between the military organization and economic coup-proofing, as in this 
dissertation, can clarify the conditions under which economic coup-proofing strategies 
manifest and therefore improve upon the literature mentioned above.  
 
2.5	   The	  Methodology	  	  	  
For my research I employ a comparative research method drawing on qualitative tools 
supported by empirical data. 
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In order to understand the relationship between variation in military organization 
and the implementation of economic coup-proofing, this thesis selects three MENA cases 
for the following reasons: 
For the purpose of studying economic coup-proofing in the MENA region, Arab 
authoritarian regimes can be separated into two types according to the availability or non-
availability of economic-financial resources, drawing on insights from political economy 
rentier theories.  
 
1) Rentier states: Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), Algeria, Iraq and Libya.  
2) Semi-rentier states: Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen. 
 
This list does not include all countries in the Middle East, as it excludes the non-Arab 
countries Iran, Israel and Turkey and disregards those Arab countries that are either not 
fully recognized states (Palestinian Territories) or that cannot be considered authoritarian 
regimes (Lebanon). 
I chose the three cases Jordan, Syria and Egypt on the basis of three main criteria:  
1) I excluded countries with rentier economies because of the abundant 
availability of funds for financing coup-proofing actions, since they have a much higher 
capacity to coup-proof as outlined by Geddes’ oil wealth and authoritarian survival 
theory.  
2) The second criterion refers to military organization in terms of recruitment 
factors; I selected two cases with varied levels of communal recruitment  (voluntary, 
organized according to ethnic, family or religious affiliation) and one with an 
institutionalized military (general conscription and reflective of societal make-up) in 
order to assess military organization as the main factor influencing technique, execution 
and efficacy of economic coup-proofing. Having the level of patrimonial recruitment as 
the main independent factor, I chose the Syrian and the Jordanian cases, which share a 
considerable ethnic/tribal imprint in the military structure. However, what sets them apart 
is the absence of general conscription in the Jordanian military, which leaves room for a 
wider use of favoritism and discriminatory selection to dictate the membership of both 
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the rank and file and also the officer corps. While as, the case of Syria represents partial 
communality, which is mainly limited to the officer corps and the higher echelons, 
leaving the rank and file exposed to general conscription. By contrast, I chose Egypt as 
representative of little to no patrimonial recruitment.  
3) The respective country must have experienced coup incidences that were 
detectable by scholars studying coup d’états, to establish the fact that such states are 
involved in coup-proofing. The result is the continuum displayed in Graph 1: 
 
Graph 1: The Variation in the Level of Patrimonial Recruitment  
 
The larger the blue area, the higher the level of patrimonial recruitment. 
 
Second, to detect differences in how military organization affects the 
implementation of economic coup-proofing, I trace the historical development of the 
military organization in each case, with a focus on changes in recruitment laws governing 
the staffing of the officer corps. This section examines formal and informal trends in 
recruitment patterns to detect forms of favoritism, in order to understand the development 
of a particular in-group within the military structure, and through the example of the 
communally organized militaries of Jordan and Syria explores the dynamics of economic 
coup-proofing in communal militaries and the institutionalized military in Egypt. The 
case of the Jordanian Defense Forces exemplify a military that is dominated by tribal ties: 
since the coup attempts of 1957 and 1970, Jordanians of Palestinian origin have been 
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completely marginalized (this is known as the de-Palestinization of the military).55 These 
incidences intensified an existing communal reality in which Palestinians, who constitute 
two-thirds of the entire Jordanian population, represent just under ten percent of the 
officer corps. Following the coup attempts, the communal factor intensified as a result of 
large-scale desertions by Jordanians of Palestinian origin, leading to the complete 
abolition of general conscription in 1992.56 This marked the bringing out of a fully-
fledged communal military that is predominantly stacked by East Bank tribes such as Al-
Zabens and Habshnehs, especially in commanding positions and officer 
corps.57 Similarly, scholars on the Syrian military, including Quinlivan, unveiled a 
number of informal practices prevalent in the recruitment process of the officer corps that 
would suggest that such a military faction is picked along communal lines as opposed to 
meritocracy.58 Egypt continues to uphold a strict military organization based on general 
conscription, where the military organization is representative of the population - making 
Egypt an ideal case of an ‘a-communal’ institutionalized military in the MENA region.59 
The Egyptian military is a textbook case of resource allocation with the aim of ensuring 
military loyalty. Bou Nassif’s analysis of military economy shows that Egypt exemplifies 
the regime’s continued garnering of military loyalty through the advancement of the 
military’s corporate interest - a feature of civil-military relations over three regimes and 
six decades of authoritarianism in Egypt.60 Zeinab Abulmagd and Robert Springborg 
estimated the military control of the Egyptian economy at around 40%, evidence of a 
deep-rooted tradition of economic coup-proofing. However, this is an overestimation; a 
better estimate would be 10-15 percent, which still points to the military’s significant 
influence on the economy. In contrast, Mora and Wiktorowicz’s (2003) study of civil-	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military relations in Syria shows that the Syrian regime showered the officer corps with 
economic as well as financial privileges, including engagement in illicit smuggling 
activities to satisfy their corporate interests and ensure their loyalty.61 
Third, following the establishment of Alawi and East Bank tribal in-groups in 
Syria and Jordan respectively, and a cohesive military in Egypt, we will see how the 
different types of economic benefits are distributed to maintain such an in-group/out-
group organizational structure versus the implementation of coup-proofing in an 
ethnically heterogeneous officer corps in Egypt. This analytical phase is two-fold. The 
following sections are concerned with investigating variation in technique and execution 
of economic coup-proofing in communal and institutionalized militaries. One level of this 
variation is differentiating between on-budget and off-budget benefits, through the 
exploration of secondary as well as empirical sources. In the on-budget section, the study 
explores constitutional text pertaining to budget control, in order to show both the extent 
to which the incumbent, the military leadership and the legislator are able to influence 
allocation, and how the budget is used as a tool of economic coup-proofing.  
The on-budget benefits are examined through budget estimates, useful in showing 
the trends of military spending in the countries in question. Though the topic calls for the 
close analysis of military budgets, I have refrained from strict reliance on this particular 
source, for I found grave discrepancies in the available sources. One of these is that 
numbers vary for the same year across sources, and another is that moments of leaps or 
sharp dips vary greatly across sources. Finally, for Syria in particular a large number of 
consecutive years are unavailable in some but available in others. I attempt to resolve this 
problem by using the US Arms control and Disarmament Agency’s (ACDA) World 
Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers reports (WMEAT) which draws data from a 
wide-range of sources including Military Balance issued annually by the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (IIS in London), Jane’s World’s Armies, government 
finance statistics issued by the IMF, SIPRI military expenditure database issued annually 
by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Jane’s Defense Budget and the 
defense budget sections of the Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessments, the EDA’s Defense 	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Data Portal for non-NATO EDA member states, the country armed forces profiles on 
defenceWEB and media reports. This combines most of the sources available on military 
expenditures, thus reducing the chances of grave discrepancies. 
Another way of digging deeper into economic coup-proofing in the cases at hand 
is to examine any public statements of economic grievance made by military personnel in 
these countries. These will be analyzed in terms of the kind of grievance, the way they 
expected it to be satisfied and, most importantly, the background (rank and ethnicity) of 
the calling group. This is particularly useful in extracting information about the targets 
and the patterns of economic allocations in terms of the benefactors and the excluded to 
shed light on the possibility of pressure being exerted on the incumbent on behalf of the 
ethnic group. 
The formal economy is another place to examine the distribution of economic 
incentives: militaries’ involvement in owning economic enclaves can illustrate the extent 
to which benefits are institutional versus personalized. As for the last category of 
benefits: direct off-budget benefits are detected through a study of secondary sources 
such as books, academic journal articles and other sources including national and 
newspapers archives. An in-depth analysis of the way such benefits are managed, in 
addition to the exploration of the rank and the ethnic background of the main 
beneficiaries of the two types of benefits, can shed light on how economic coup-proofing 
targets the institution or individuals. 
Fourth, the dissertation distinguishes between different forms of loyalties that 
result from variations in economic coup-proofing techniques and execution. The rationale 
here is that the efficacy of economic coup-proofing depends on the strength of the 
incumbent-military bond; direct personalized benefits are more dependent on the survival 
of the incumbent, so they form a stronger bond. In contrast, indirect institutional benefits 
are less contingent on the incumbent’s being in office, and thus generate a weaker bond. 
In my dissertation I examine the rules and legal frameworks that govern the economic 
interaction between the executive and the military institution, and so provide information 
about the extent to which the process depends on the incumbent. 
A number of challenges arose due to the sensitive nature of this topic. One of 
these is the difficulty both of acquiring raw data due to the time constraint and of 
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acquiring security clearances to conduct interviews or collect primary information. Also, 
due to recent political events in the region and further increases in militarization to 
combat the recent threats coming from IS (Islamic State) troops, gaining the trust of 
concerned personnel became increasingly difficult. Moreover, as a result of the lack of 
transparency of the militaries under consideration, I was unable to get the disaggregated 
budgets needed to quantify my analysis. To avoid these obstacles, I focused on readily 
available secondary sources and the few empirical sources I could get my hands on in 
order to understand the interplay between military organization and economic coup-
proofing mechanisms. I thus conclude by quoting Bou Nassif saying “it is better to find a 
partial answer to an important question rather than an incontrovertible one to a trifle.”62   
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Chapter	  3:	  Economic	  Coup	  proofing	  in	  Jordan:	  The	  Institutional	  	  
	   	   Entrepreneurial	  Model	  	  	  
To address the question of how military communality affects the distribution of economic 
incentives, this chapter focuses on the Jordanian Armed forces, offering a historical 
overview of a communally-organized military based on the recruitment of East Bank 
tribes and showing that the Hashemite rulers enhanced divide-and-rule legislation from 
the British mandate to ensure the loyalty of the officer corps through favoring a few 
tribes historically known for supporting the kingdom.  
 In order to assess the implications of the on-going tribal character of the military 
institution for the formation of economic coup-proofing strategies, I show that the 
historical faithfulness of certain East Bank tribes helped institutionalize the Hashemite 
Kingdom’s reliance on these tribes as the main recruitment pool for the officer corps, to 
guarantee the loyalty of the security apparatus. I also argue that King Hussein, and later 
his son Abdullah II, follow a strategy whereby they satisfy the in-group – in this case, the 
East Bank tribes – by allowing it disproportional access to economic incentives. I also 
show that the kingdom’s dependence on these tribes to uphold the regime increases the 
Diwan’s susceptibility to pressure, such that they often responded positively to the officer 
corps’ continued demands for more benefits despite their already-privileged positions. In 
addition, I will provide an analysis of how the Hashemite Kingdom allocates military 
economic incentives, whether through the official budget or as off-budget opportunities 
for self-enrichment, and then explore the extent to which Jordan’s military engages in the 
formal economy. Finally, I will show how the reliance on a minority to sustain military 
loyalty shapes civil-military relations in Jordan. 
 
3.1	   The	  Historical	  Development	  of	  a	  Communal	  	  
Military	  Organizational	  Structure	  	  
The Jordanian Armed Forces have evolved as a communally-organized military, 
characterized by a minority-dominated officer-corps which sees itself entitled to a large 
portion of the economy as a reward for their loyalty.  
	   39	  
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was created as a British mandate over 
Transjordan (East Bank), whereby the British arbitrarily placed an outsider, Amir 
Abdullah al-Hashimi (referring to the clan allegedly descending from the family of the 
prophet Muhammad in Mecca) in control of the territory. Jordan as a young state in the 
1920s was characterized by family, clan and tribal affiliations, a framework, which 
defined security, economic, political and social establishments.63 Grave socioeconomic 
inequalities reigned at this time, as only 20% of the country’s 400,000 inhabitants lived in 
cities while the vast majority resided in tribal formations and earned their living through 
farming or nomadic activities such as herding and raiding other neighboring tribes.64 
Moreover, the development of a cohesive national identity was difficult as tribal roots 
transcended the newly established borders. In addition, the development of modern 
political institutions was challenging as the people’s adherence to traditional institutions 
and tribal law blocked the identification with novel formations. In this way a highly 
troubled state was born whose ruling elite, territory, population and identity were strongly 
contested. Joseph Massad (2001) accurately described Jordan as a state where “Outsiders 
conceived of its borders… identity and a people whose roots within existing memory lie 
beyond the new border of the country.”65 Since the Hashemite Kingdom possessed 
neither clan nor tribal legitimacy, the government relied on policing the tribes into 
submission, so that the kingdom’s existence depended on the armed forces as the 
guarantor of political stability.   
The Jordanian Armed Forces were the heirs to the Arab Legion (Jaish al-Arabi), a 
small force formed in 1920 under the leadership of British officer Frederick Peake. In its 
infancy, the Arab Legion was drawn from ex-soldiers of the Ottoman army. However, in 
the late 1930s, Captain John Glubb, Peake’s successor as commander-in-chief of the 
Arab Legion, altered the recruitment pool first by forming the Desert Patrol (a force 
consisting purely of Bedouin personnel), a recruitment policy that he later applied to the 	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Legion as a whole.66 As in Syria, where the French favored the Alawi and the Kurdish 
minorities as a result of their economic, social and territorial marginalization, the British 
favored the Bedouins for their vulnerable position vis-à-vis city dwellers, as well as for 
the fact that they were well-suited for combat as a result of their harsh physical 
environment. Glubb also saw that Bedouins were easily persuaded to enlist as they took 
pride in military service. Moreover, since the Bedouins (East Bank tribes) were difficult 
to govern, both because of their involvement in raids on other tribes as well as their 
martial skill, Bedouin absorption into the security apparatus functioned as a form 
of containment and pacification, which facilitated the governance of such groups.67 
According to Glubb’s account in his book “The Story of the Arab Legion” (1948), 
recruits were carefully selected mainly from East Bank tribes - both southern Jordanian 
tribes including the Huwayfat and the Bani Sakhr and northern tribes such as Bani Khalid 
and Ahl al-Jabal.68  
The British mandate was a turning point in the modern history of the Jordanian 
military, for its discriminatory recruitment policies not only planted the seeds for the East 
Bank dominance in the officer corps but also helped shape tribe-state interaction. Glubb’s 
policy towards the Transjordanian Bedouins embodied four main principles: humanity 
and sympathy, light taxation and lucrative employment, subsidies to the sheikhs and 
respect of tribal law.69 Adhering to these values, Glubb attempted to shift the Bedouins’ 
loyalty from the tribe to the military institution. In doing so, Glubb started by appealing 
to the Bedouin perception of himself as a warrior which he satisfied by providing them 
with positions in military service. 70  He prevented Bedouin raids and international 
crossing by criminalizing the traditional Bedouin herding economy, appropriating 
livestock and diminishing the tribes’ productive capacities in order to reduce their 	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independence from the state. At the same time he bound them to military service by 
providing volunteers with steady income and literacy training; moreover, he distributed 
land allocations according to the Land Settlement Law of 1933, thus forcing the 
privileged tribes to settle down in one place.71 In the legal arena, Peake and his successor 
endorsed the abolition of the independent Tribal Administration Department (Niyabat al-
‘Asha’ir) in favor of the Bedouin Control Laws of 1924 and the subsequent legislations 
of 1929 and 1936 which restricted undocumented Bedouin movement but at the same 
time left tribal leadership with control over conflict resolution as well as personal and 
family status laws.72 This created a middle ground between abolishing Bedouin law in 
favor of a national code, and upholding and respecting tribal legal traditions. These 
various policies allowed East Bank tribes to be gradually absorbed into the Jordanian 
state as unique entities that not only enjoyed a strong politicized role as a result of being 
favored in military recruitment whose main function was to police populations, but were 
also privileged both economically through welfare and stable public service jobs, and 
socio-culturally on account of their being subjects of their own parallel legal system.73	  
Vatikiotis (1967) asserted that this process was successful in co-opting the Bedouins first 
in the military and later the nation state.74 However, he emphasized that even though by 
the end of the Mandate Bedouins dominated the military, their loyalty was not to the 
nation-state but to the British commander, and then to the King, so change of leadership 
could potentially alter their tenuous loyalties.75  
Bedouin domination of the officer corps became more pronounced as the 
Jordanian demographic reality changed following the annexation of central Palestine and 
the West Bank in 1948. The union with the West Bank allowed the integration of around 
460,000 residents into Jordan where they were granted full citizenship as well as property 	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ownership rights.76 However, this overwhelming influx of Palestinian citizens did not 
translate into a significant change in the makeup of the officer corps, except for the fact 
that Palestinian Bedouins from the Beersheba region were eventually allowed to join the 
military as rank and file soldiers.77 The King’s reluctance to recruit Palestinians in the top 
brass saw its justification in 1957 when a coup attempt led by chief of staff Ali Abu 
Nawar, a pro-republican Jordanian, occurred.78 Nawar found support for his plot amongst 
Palestinian members of the military and so formed an infantry brigade made up purely of 
Palestinians, simultaneously purging a number of tribal officers who threatened his plot. 
Hussein uncovered the plan and Habes al-Majali, a loyal Bedouin tribesman from the 
loyalty nucleus city of Al-Karak, swiftly replaced Abu Nawar, while around 50-75 
officers were arrested and the fourth infantry division was dissolved. Out of the fear of 
uniformed Palestinians, which arose as a result of this coup attempt, the Transjordanian 
element, particularly in the praetorian armored and Royal Guards brigades that were 
permanently stationed in the Capital, was enhanced.79 
The demographic reality continued to play against Hussein in 1967 when an 
estimated 310,000 Palestinians escaped the West Bank and Gaza Strip to the East Bank. 
This exodus continued to the point that the Palestinians constituted 65 percent of the total 
population,80 giving rise to conflicting developments in the possibility of Palestinian 
inclusion in the Jordanian military. The demographic change coincided with the 
dismantling of the Palestinian National Guard, many members of which Hussein 
reluctantly absorbed into the Jordanian Armed forces after careful security screening.81 
At this point, Palestinians made up 40 percent of the Jordanian military forces.82 Though 
this was a promising opportunity for the dilution of the East Bank tribal dominance of the 
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officer corps, it was quickly cut short as fierce hostilities developed between the 
Jordanian military and the Palestinian national movement.83 
In the period between 1967 and the early 1970s, political tensions between 
Palestinian residents and the Kingdom rose as the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO), under the leadership of Yasser Arafat, defied Jordanian sovereignty (in the eyes 
of the king) by taxing Palestinians in the West Bank. Further defiance came in the form 
of consecutive attacks on Israel that brought on large-scale Israeli attacks on Jordanian 
cities. The Jordanian government had already cut off support for the PLO in 1966, and 
with increased Palestinian propaganda against Hussein, popular protests arose against 
Hussein as a result of the Israeli attack on the West Bank village al-Samu so that the 
Jordanian Armed eventually intervened to stabilize the situation.84 Matters continued to 
escalate as the struggle for power between the Jordanian government and the armed 
Palestinian organizations intensified. One of the main clashes took place in 1968, when 
the Armed Forces attempted to disarm Palestinian Refugee camps; this evolved into a 
volatile situation where guerrilla groups conducted widespread attacks against the 
military.85 Joined by six other organizations, the PLO and the Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) demanded escalations to the extent that the commandos 
called for a general strike and propagated the idea of civil disobedience.86 Fighting 
evolved into the ten-day civil war known as Black September, in which the commandos 
seized control of several important places, including the oil refinery of Al-Zarqaa’. The 
loyal Bedouin-dominated military eventually emerged victorious, killing around a 
thousand Palestinians, defeating the PLO and consequently expelling its troops from 
Jordan.  
This period of violent confrontation is particularly significant, not only for the so-
called Jordanization (Urdana) or the de-Palestinization of the military and the public 
sector, but also because it paved the way for Palestinian domination of the private sector. 
The primary sign of the times can be seen in the diminished role of Palestinians (or 
Jordanians of Palestinian origin) in the military, such that the percentage of Palestinians 	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serving in the military fell to 15 percent by the mid- 1970s.87 Another manifestation of 
this period was that the confrontation between the Hashemite regime and Palestinian 
factions demanded a new social contract to help ensure the country’s stability. Hussein 
ensured rewarding opportunities in the private sector for Palestinians who were willing to 
live in peace; this program was gradually expanded through structural adjustment policies 
in the late 80s, and later in the late 1990s and throughout the 2000s by Abdullah’s bolder 
privatization strategies.88  
More importantly, this period brought to the surface some of the bottled-up 
tension between the East Bank tribes and the Palestinians. Such mutual resentment 
manifested in the form of nationalisms: for example, the rise of a Transjordanian 
nostalgic sentiment, expressed by the slogan “East Bankers first," which took the form of 
outspoken opposition to the role of Palestinians and Palestinian institutions in Jordanian 
affairs, thus emphasizing the Transjordanian eagerness to dominate state institutions – 
most important of which is the military.89 Subsequently, a tribal-oriented recruitment 
method was enhanced through the gradual development of an imminent threat to the 
existence of the kingdom evoked by the rise of the slogan “Jordan is Palestine,” mainly 
propagated by PLO members and heeded by a number of Arab leaders.90 
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The propagation of threats to the existence of the kingdom made Hussein more 
dependent on the loyalty of the East Bank tribes than he had ever been before and 
strengthened the military leadership vis-à-vis the Hashemite ruling elite. A major stride in 
empowering the political agency of the military had already started following the 1967 
War with the imposition of martial law, which placed the executive and to a large extent 
the legislative power under the General Intelligence Department (GID or Mukhabarat), 
which was keen on expanding the Trans-Jordanian character of the security apparatus 
(not surprising, since the Mukhabarat was heavily stacked with East Bank tribesmen in 
uniform).91 Politicizing the military further, Hussein appointed Jordan’s first military 
government under the leadership of Brigadier Mohammad Daoud as Prime Minister, who 
in turn appointed a cabinet full of military officers, granting them more leverage in 
political decision-making as well as paving the way for the military personnel’s ability to 
use their political importance in exchange for economic benefits.92  Another important 
development was the 1974 decree granting Bedouin members of the military immunity 
from tribal law, issued by a Palace Convention (Mahdar al-Qasr).93  
However, pressure to expand and modernize the military prompted Hussein to 
alter the military recruitment method in order to satisfy the military’s growing need for 
highly educated personnel. A National Service Law, stipulating compulsory two-year 
military service for all eligible males upon reaching 18 years of age, was passed in 1976 
by a royal decree.94 This law succeeded in achieving the desired modernization, as the 
whole military was effectively mechanized within eighteen months of the law’s issuance. 
Nonetheless, it was applied selectively, as political reliability continued to play a major 
role in the acceptance of applicants as career officers in the military establishment. 
Undoubtedly, the conscription legislation was useful in altering the conformation of the 
younger officers over time, as around 30 percent of conscripts were of Palestinian 
origin.95 However, scholars studying the Jordanian military including Axelrod (1978), 	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Jureidini and McLaurin (1984), and Day (1986) stressed that even after the imtroduction 
of general conscription, older officers - the majority of whom were of Bedouin origin 
(mainly tribes such as Bani Sakhr, the Huwaytat, the Sirhan and the Shammar) - 
continued to hold vital leadership positions such as commandership of strike units at 
battalion.96  
The late 1980s and 1990s witnessed the full restoration of the Bedouin factor in 
the military institution. Palestinian membership fell to insignificant levels as King 
Hussein relinquished Jordan’s legal and administrative claim to the West Bank in 1988. 
Also, following the conclusion of Jordan’s peace agreement with Israel in 1994, Hussein 
issued a royal decree suspending general conscription and instead installed a system 
whereby the Jordanian military was converted into a professional all-volunteer army 
consisting of around 100,000 troops.97  This development helped to restore Bedouin 
dominance, as Bedouin military leaders continued to encourage as well as facilitate the 
enlistment of their fellow tribesmen. One policy facilitated by Hussein’s propagation of 
favoritism in university placement was the “Royal Dispensation” (makrumah malakiyaa) 
to the children of favored military personnel, which increased their chances of admission 
into military academies.98 Moreover, with Palestinians’ increased involvement in the 
economy, East Bank tribes found solace in the relatively high salary guaranteed through 
military service, in addition to taking advantage of the political and social prestige that 
comes with wearing the uniform.99  
Upon coming to power in 1999, King Abdullah II followed in his father’s 
footsteps as he upheld both the suspension of general conscription and the Kingdom’s 
reliance on the Bedouin-dominated military and intelligence apparatuses - shown by the 
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fact that all the heads of military and public security100 belonged to tribes whose loyalty 
has historically lain with Hashemite rule (The Bani Sakhr tribe in particular).101 More 
evidence of Abdullah’s support for a Bedouin-dominated officer corps is his continuing 
resistance to the revival of the National Service Law, despite increasing calls for the 
restoration of general conscription by Prime Minister Ma’rouf Bikhit in 2007.102  
To sustain the East Bank tribes’ loyalty to the kingdom, King Hussein, and later 
his son Abdullah II, formulated a number of economic coup-proofing strategies to bind 
them to Hashemite rule. This was not an easy task, since even though relying on one 
communal group for military recruitment should provide a natural base for organic 
loyalty, the Hashemites are neither indigenous nor do they belong to the tribes on which 
they desperately rely. On several occasions, the Bedouins did not uphold their loyalty for 
the kingdom, and tribes have given their allegiance to other entities according to current 
interest. One example is the northern tribes who are loyal to the Syrian regime; many of 
them hold dual citizenships and even raised the Syrian flag during the Syrian invasion of 
Jordan in 1970, so that the Jordanian Armed Forces intervened to compel them to raise 
the Jordanian flag.103 Moreover, the southern tribes, who constitute the loyalty nucleus of 
the kingdom, have also historically pledged loyalty to whomever provided better benefits 
- starting with the Turks, then the British, and for now the Hashemites.104 Other occasions 
where Transjordanians publically defied the state include the 1989 riots in Ma’an, Karak 	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and Tafila (Transjordanian populated governorates), where thousands of residents took to 
the streets in protest of the removal of subsidies and subsequent price increases.105 
Needless to say, the kingdom continues to carry the burden of mediation between the 
majority Palestinian population and factions of the indigenous Transjordanians, both of 
which have exhibited secessionist tendencies on various occasions. Therefore, to combat 
coup risk, the Hashemite elite is under intense pressure to cater to the economic needs of 
opposing groups, to not provide them with autonomy but to decimate just enough benefits 
to keep them loyal.  
The following sections show the functionality as well as the development of the 
applications of economic coup-proofing in the on-budget and the off-budget forms.  
 
3.2	   On-­‐budget	  incentives	  	  
“The cohesion of the Jordanian regime and the loyalty of its security establishment is a 
function of the economic dependence of the East Bank population on a militarized 
welfare-regime for secure employment and social provision. Entitlements disbursed by 
the military exchanged loyalty for economic security, ensuring that the Hashemite 
monarchy endured despite a precarious location on the frontlines of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. Even after the cutbacks enforced by IMF driven structural adjustment during the 
last decade of King Hussein’s rule, the welfare functions of the security sector were 
maintained. A ‘militarized liberalization’ of the Jordanian state shifted entitlements from 
the East Bank population at large and concentrated them on a ‘strengthened military’”106 
 
Drawing on Tariq Tell’s summary of patronage distribution in Jordan, this section 
explores how military spending was used to garner the loyalty of the Kingdom’s 
backbone, the East Bank Transjordanians. I will begin by analyzing the legal frameworks 
within which the Hashemite Kings control budgetary allocations (primarily using 
constitutional text), showing the regime’s ability to guide budgetary goals. Because of the 
Jordanian military’s communal character, I expect to find that the budget was heavily 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 David Leathers, Against The Grain: Bread Riots, and Altered State Development in the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Senior diss., Claremont McKenna College, 2015), 2-3. 
106 Tell, “The Socio-political Mobilization,” 1. 
	   49	  
used to cater for personnel costs. Second, I will analyze the distribution of arms 
purchases, focusing on how arms contracts are used to distribute benefits on the majority 
Bedouin military leadership.  
 
3.2.1	   Budgetary	  Control	  in	  the	  Constitution	  	  
Since independence, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has seen one constitution, which 
came into force in 1952 and has been amended a number of times since - though the text 
on financial matters has remained intact. Chapter seven of the constitution, which does 
not refer directly to the military budget, nonetheless stipulates the drawing, the 
management and the execution of the general budget. According to article 112, the 
government is responsible for the preparation of the General Budget law, which is then 
presented to the National Assembly for review and authorization. The article also adds 
that “The National Assembly, when debating the General Budget draft law or the 
provisional laws relating thereto, may reduce the expenditures under the various chapters 
in accordance with what it considers to be in the public interest, but it shall not increase 
such expenditures either by amendment or by the submission of a separate proposal. 
However, the Assembly may after the close of the debate propose laws for the creation of 
new expenditures.”107 This shows that in theory, the minister of defense is directly 
responsible for the management of the military which grants him responsibility for 
administrative and logistical functions but forbids him from taking any decision 
regarding modification in budgetary allocations until sanctioned by the king himself 
under article 31, which necessitates the king’s ratification of the General Budget Law for 
it to come into effect.  This shows that any increase in military expenditures, in practice 
falls under the full control of the king or at times the prime minister. This lends insight on 
the fact that if the budget was to be used as a tool of economic coup proofing then the 
king has high capacity to influence the sum and where it would go.   
In order to detect the extent to which the budget can be used to garner loyalty, it is 
important to look at the management of spending pertaining to personnel costs. 
According to Leo Sommarja (2012), author of the report “Jordan Budget Manual” for the 	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“Jordan Fiscal Reform II Project” produced by the USAID/Jordan Economic office, each 
government department and unit submits a detailed manpower table showing information 
about every position in the government department or unit (such as salaries & 
promotions) with a brief outline of personnel funding levels for each position provided by 
the Civil Service Bureau.108 The military, however, belongs to a category of departments 
that are exempt from the Civil Service law. Therefore, they follow the same processes as 
other government departments and units that are subject to the regulation, but unlike 
other regular departments, the military is privileged with additional flexibility regarding 
specific changes in the distribution of personnel expenses, providing the king sanctions 
such changes. This reinforces the argument that Hussein and later his heir could utilize 
the budget as a tool of economic coup-proofing.  
 
Graph 2: Military Expenditures in Jordan: An Analysis Over Time 
 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers reports (WMEAT) 
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3.2.3	   Rentier	  Politics	  and	  the	  Jordanian	  Military’s	  Welfare	  system	  	  
Military aid constitutes the major source of income for the Jordanian military, which has 
always enjoyed generous benefits including non-repayable grants, concessions on arms 
purchases, operation and maintenance costs and technical support. The armed forces 
received such benefits first from the British throughout the 1940s and 1950s, then from 
the Gulf States between 1974 and the early 1990s (especially at the Arab Summits at 
Rabat in 1974 and Baghdad in 1979), and this pattern continued as the country received 
between 6 and 10 billion US dollars from 1991 to 2010109 - particularly since Jordan 
gained the status of Major Non-Nato Ally (MNNA) which grants the military privileged 
access to US defense articles, loans and equipment. 110 This contributed to the Diwan’s 
ability to distribute regular and consistent benefits that could buy the military’s loyalty - 
shown by stable military expenditures as a percentage of GDP (see Graph 2). 
 
3.2.4	   Military	  Spending	  and	  Arms	  Purchases	  	  	  
Arms purchases play a number of roles in the process of economic coup-proofing. The 
major function of arms purchases was described by Samuel Huntington and widely 
shared by many others: that providing the military with state-of-the-art equipment can 
help ensure their satisfaction. This argument pertains to satisfying the military’s corporate 
interest, which will be explained in the section on the Jordanian military’s industrial arm, 
the KADDB. Moreover, arms purchases can be a venue for direct personalized incentives 
targeted at favored military factions. This point will be explained further in the later 
section on off-budget coup-proofing.  
Of all military spending, personnel and personnel-related costs constituted a large 
portion of overall expenses, particularly because donor countries have traditionally 
incurred the cost of arms. The U.S. even paid operation and maintenance costs needed to 
uphold the large military establishment, suggesting that a considerable amount of 
budgetary military expenditures went to personnel. 	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Utilizing the flow of aid, Hussein made an implicit deal with the East Bank tribes, 
in exchange for their support and loyalty, in which they received ever-growing benefits, 
mainly from public service in general and military service in particular. Appropriating no 
less than 8 percent of GDP, the military institution enjoyed grand benefits that resulted in 
the development of a welfare system that kept military personnel - as well as their 
respective tribes’ social mobility and economic prosperity - bound to military careers and 
the Hashemite rule.  
Personnel benefits ranged from advanced medical treatment in the King Hussein 
Medical City to access to special shops that sell goods to soldiers’ families at subsidized 
prices, cushioning the impact of inflation and stretching the purchasing power of military 
pay packets. Other benefits included tax-free cars and house loans as well as a wide array 
of mukrumat malakya. These benefits lasted into retirement as the welfare system also 
covered several hundred thousand military pensioners, which granted them much better 
privileges in comparison to the Civil Pension plan such as the no ceiling on covered wage 
policy.111  
Beyond the monetary benefits attached to the military’s welfare system, it also 
created a privileged class out of military men and their families. Because of restrictions 
on Palestinian recruitment, the system was effectively split between the in-group (the 
East Bank military and the Mukhabarat) and those left out of the system entirely - mainly 
Palestinians or Jordanians of Palestinian origin. For the military personnel, welfare meant 
secured employment for their families in particular and tribes in general.  Along with a 
steady income that set them apart from the rest of the population, these jobs meant that 
military men were not only well off but also prestigious.112  
This did not last, however. The kingdom could sustain economically coup-
proofing the military through large budget endowments as long as abundant foreign 
financial support flowed in. However, in the mid-1980s this seemingly stable strategy of 
institutionalized indirect economic coup-proofing began to falter with the severe fall in 
oil prices coupled with a sharp slashing of Jordan’s world markets, producing a budget 	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crisis that crippled the King’s ability to rely on budgetary allocations to maintain the 
loyalty of the military leadership.113 In his address to the Jordanian people in April 1989, 
King Hussein clearly stated that it was hard for the kingdom to meet the military’s 
growing procurement needs.114 
In an attempt to salvage the situation, Hussein embraced the IMF’s structural 
adjustment policies, hoping to secure an IMF loan worth $275 million. With their 
reduction of subsidies and erosion of the welfare system, Hussein’s policies aggravated 
the economic hardships of the already impoverished East, which struggled to make ends 
meet as the value of the Jordanian currency fell by 60 percent115 - particularly among 
military personnel -, causing severe backlashes.116 With unemployment rates reaching 14 
and 18 percent in Jordan (according to the Ministry of Labor) and at least 21 percent at in 
East Bank tribal areas like Ma’an, Karak and Tafila, more and more Bedouins pursued 
military careers,117 thus increasing the burden of military expenditures.  
With economic conditions deteriorating, the inequality gap widened as the private 
sector flourished, benefiting densely Palestinian-populated metropolises like Amman and 
Irbid in the northwest while Transjordanians in the east, mainly employed by the state, 
remained excluded from private sector wealth. Balint Szlanko (2014) highlighted this 
reality by saying “Amman, the capital, is a glitzy and throbbing metropolis, with tall 
buildings, three-lane highways, malls, sports-car retailers and Western-style restaurants. 
Jordan is considered an emerging knowledge economy with a foothold in IT and 
telecoms. But out east, in the country’s heartland, bazaars have no shoppers, the young 
have no jobs and people survive on government fuel handouts,”118  
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On account of this rapid erosion of the military’s welfare system, disgruntled 
military personnel started raising their voices more than ever before. The Jordanian 
military has a history of openly exerting pressure on King Hussein and his son King 
Abdullah II. Throughout the 1970s, demands for higher living standards - involving sit-
ins, protests and even mutinies - were common, and officers and enlisted men raised such 
demands equally. King Hussein’s usual response was to give in to their demands through 
pay increases, evident by army salaries being raised several times between 1975 and 
1981, with two pay hikes in 1980 alone.  
To give one example: In 1974, a limited military mutiny in Zarqaa’ took place 
among the Bedouin members of the 40th armored brigade (an elite force where king 
Abdullah II served as a colonel in 1993).119 This rebellion was triggered by the increasing 
cost of living and soaring inflation. Soon after, Hussein issued orders to increase the pay 
of all military members, a pattern that he preemptively extended to factions of the 
military who had not complained, including the Air Force. Around 20 percent of the 1979 
military budget was dedicated to pay increases. More recently, discontent reached an 
alarming degree as the National Committee of Military Veterans opened fire on the 
monarchy to bring attention to King Abdullah’s disadvantaging of Transjordanians in 
favor of Palestinians who, according to this group, dominate the economic and the 
political arenas.120  In a petition signed by 60 military veterans, including a considerable 
number of retired generals, veterans expressed their growing discontent with power 
changing hands from the old Transjordanian elites to the newly empowered Palestinian 
business class.   
To better explain the deterioration in the military’s welfare system and the 
increase in military discontent with economic hardships, I will examine the Jordanian 
military’s business activities, another venue where the steady allocation of military 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP could be traced. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Harold D. Nelson, "National Security," In Jordan: A Country Study, ed. by Richard F. Nyrop. 
3rd ed.  (Washington D.C.: Foreign Area Studies, The American University, 1980), 195. 
120 Assaf David, "The Revolt of Jordan's Military Veterans," Foreign Policy, June 16, 2010, 
accessed June 12, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/06/16/the-revolt-of-jordans-military-
veterans/. 
	   55	  
 
3.3	   The	  Jordanian	  Military’s	  Business	  Activities	  	  
The Jordanian military’s role in the formal economy, a major factor in the military’s 
economic incentives, was enhanced over time for two main reasons. On a financial level, 
the increasing burden of satisfying personnel demands through indirect welfare systems 
transcended the boundaries of military personnel to encompass whole families and tribes. 
With economic hardships incurred by the Jordanian economy during the 1980s and 
1990s, the risk of dissatisfaction by the regime’s backbone increased (see above for 
occasions when military openly exerted pressure on Hussein to gain more benefits), and 
so the development of a military-industrial arm can be a more direct way of focusing 
economic incentives leading to what Tell’s earlier quote described as a “strengthened 
military”. Politically, Abdullah’s decision to expand the military’s economic role was a 
way of incorporating Jordanians of Palestinian origin who constitute the private sector 
and the Bedouins (Transjordanians) who continue to form the top tier military leadership, 
which will strengthen his grip on power.121  
Under Hussein, the military did not play an extensive role in the formal economy, 
at least not in the form of ownership and management of enterprises. However, they 
constituted a power to reckon with in terms of their engagement in civic action programs. 
Like the Syrian and the Egyptian militaries, the Jordanian Armed Forces take pride in 
their position as servants of the nation. They were historically involved in nearly 
everything, as Hussein pointed out shortly after he came to power:122 They were involved 
in a large number of development-oriented civic programs, including large infrastructure 
projects like the construction of roads and bridges. They also began a number of literacy 
training projects as well as vocational trainings. Still, such initiatives did not yield any 
substantial revenues and so the military institution remained heavily dependent on the 
budget and hence on Hussein’s rule.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 According to Baylouny, there is evidence pointing to the Palestinian domination of the private 
sector. This evidence includes a report by The Center for Strategic Studies indicating that the 
share of capital owned by individuals of Palestinian origin to have been as high as 83% in 1996. 
See Baylouny, ‘Militarizing Welfare,” 279. 
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To contain coup risk, open the door for more revenues to satisfy the personnel’s 
growing demands, and rectify the military’s marginalization from the formal economy, 
Abdullah II took a different path from that of his father by encouraging and expanding 
the military’s involvement in economic activity. This expansion encompassed both the 
civil economy and arms production (both dubbed as the military’s developmental role, 
according to the Jordanian Armed forces’ official website). 
The original purpose of the Military Consumer Corporation, established in 1973 
by Royal Decree number 120 in Zarqaa’ and moved to Amman in 1974, was to provide 
the consumer goods necessary for military personnel. Over time, its mission statement 
expanded to include providing low-price food products for all the Jordanian people. The 
corporation owns stores all over the country, divided by region: Middle, South and North. 
The Middle region has thirty-seven stores, the Northern region has 38 and the Southern 
31 stores.123 They are meant to protect people from falling prey to monopolies; however, 
judging by the sheer size of the establishment, it seems to constitute a major player in the 
Jordanian food market.   
The Directorate of Housing and Military Workers (established in 1979) occupies 
esteemed positions in a number of fields, including both military and civil construction in 
addition to managing the purchase and sale of land. They are particularly involved in the 
construction, operation and maintenance of water and electrical stations.  More recently, 
the Directorate expanded its activities in the civil construction economy through the 
establishment of two companies representing major sources of revenue. The first of these 
is the Arabian International Construction and Contracting Company (AICC), established 
by the Ministry of Defense in 2006, which is engaged in large infrastructure construction 
projects all over the country and involved in the operation and maintenance of military 
hospitals, schools and many other public works. The other company is the Ultimate 
Building, Manufacturing and Development Company (Sharaket Al-Qima Lel-tasnee’e wa 
Tatweer Al-mabany), headed by General Mohamed Mobaydeen and General Mo’tasem 
al-Mohsen al- Tofaily, both descendants of Bedouins from the cities of Karak and Tafila, 
respectively. The company is particularly involved in large venture partnerships, mainly 	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website, accessed June 5, 2015, 
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construction projects. In 2009, they initiated one of their most recent housing projects 
that aimed at implementing Jordan’s first Canadian construction system “TILT-Up” at 
the King Hussein Medical City (Madenat Al-Malek Hussein al-Tibya).124  
In one example of the cooperation between the Palestinian-dominated private 
sector and the military, the Ultimate Company joined forces with a number of 
Palestinian-owned companies (private sector Tycoons of Amman) including Abu 
Halimeh Brothers Contracting company (AHCC), Falcon Investments, a Public Limited 
Company led by the Chairman of the board Younis al-Qawasmi (a Jordanian of 
Palestinian origin) and the Canadian company Site Cast (jointly owned: 50% by Falcon 
Investments and Financial Services and Ahmed Farakh, a Palestinian businessman from 
the town of Sa’eer east of Al-khalil in the West Bank, and 50% by the mother company 
in Ottawa, Canada). 125  According to the company’s official website, this triad of 
companies aims to expand their activities to the Gulf region and the Middle East as a 
whole with projects like the management complex and clinics for Queen ‘Aliaa hospital, 
the Kidney Center at the Prince Rashid Bin Al-Hussein Hospital, the construction of the 
Al-Batraa school and the Student Hostel at the Princess ‘Aisha establishment.126 
 
3.3.1	   The	  Jordanian	  Arms	  Industry	  and	  the	  KADDB	  	  
The Jordanian military has also deepened its position in the economy by taking up a role 
in international arms trade and military technology production. The King ‘Abdullah II 
Design and Development Bureau (KADDB) was established by royal decree in 1999 not 
long after Abdullah’s ascendance to the throne. Because of the confidentiality of sales 
and revenue figures, it is very difficult to assess the extent to which KADDB activities 
contribute to the funds available for economic coup-proofing.127 However, tracing the 
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organization’s expansion internationally as well as nationally can lend some insight into 
their contribution to military expenditures. 
 Through the establishment of the KADDB, the door opened for the Jordanian 
Armed forces to enhance their economic presence on the international market by entering 
into joint-venture partnerships with at least 26 foreign defense companies to produce 
everything from armored vehicles and combat boots to pre-packaged field rations.128 The 
Bureau’s establishment also aided in the securing of profitable co-production contracts 
with foreign defense companies in a process described by Shana Marshall (2012) as a 
‘tip-for-tat’ relationship.129 Moreover, the institution enjoyed similar opportunities to 
develop economic relations with various segments of the private sector, which means that 
they also focused on partnering with domestic civilian entities. Among these local 
businessmen are Yazan al-Mufti (a Circassian of the Amman large elite families) who 
formed a joint venture with KADDB called Applied Defence Systems; Majdi al-Ya’qoub, 
whose company Orange Ville Consultants partnered with KADDB to build an assembly 
and maintenance facility for Russian helicopters, and Ziyad al-Ya‘qoub, whose company 
Gravity Integrated Solutions resells many of the items produced by KADDB, including 
ballistic resistant enclosures, vehicle armoring technology, engine kits, spare parts, and 
other special forces supplies.130 
Over time, the KADDB expanded by incorporating the KADDB Investment 
Group (KIG), which functions as the establishment’s commercial and investment wing. 
According to the KIG’s promotional literature, the establishment was able to successfully 
secure display space in two of the largest military production exhibitions in the world, the 
International Defense Exhibition (IDEX) in Abu Dhabi and Eurosatory in France (the 
largest International Defense and Security Exhibition).131 In 2009, King Abdullah opened 
KADDB Industrial Park as another affiliate, which offers an optimum investment-
attractive environment for investors and manufacturers from the defense and military 
industries.  	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The organization proved its profitability on a number of occasions, evidencing the 
military institution’s growing prospects in the accumulation of funds independent of the 
official military budget. In regards to the ‘tit-for-tat’ or offset agreements, the KADDB 
was able to secure a wide array of contracts. In 2002, the KADDB officiated a joint 
venture with the newly established CLS Jordan to build auxiliary power units. In 2003, 
KADDB signed an agreement with the manufacturer Oboron prom to construct a 
production and maintenance facility for the K-A 226 Helicopters in Jordan. In 2009, 
another venture partnership with the Dutch company Daedalus Aviation yielded the 
establishment of an F-16 maintenance facility in Jordan. In addition, the Bureau 
successfully broke into a higher level of advanced arms production by signing a contract 
with the Paramount Group of South Africa. The contract stipulated the manufacturing of 
mine-resistant vehicles. They also consolidated their cooperation with UK’s Jankel group 
by producing Aigis 4x4 armored vehicles as finished products, which were exported to 
over twenty countries around the world. In the 2010 at the annual Special Operations 
Forces Exhibition and Conference (SOFEX), the organization signed one of its most 
successful deals for about $100 million worth of exports to a number of Middle East and 
African countries.132 The organization’s success was also highlighted by the Chairman of 
KAADB and Managing Director of Mowared, Moayyad Samman who stressed that the 
organization yielded over a $100 million in 2010 and predicted revenues to double in the 
following two years.133 Moreover, the revenues of KIG alone were estimated at $400 
million annually.134 In 2011, the Bureau continued to do well to the extent that they 
started establishing joint ventures with US defense firms such as Alliant Tech Systems to 
rework two CASA-235 military transport aircraft in KADDB’s own industrial park.  
In order to show the extent to which the Bureau’s activities contribute to the 
military income, it is important to look at the economic challenges attached to such 
an industry. On the surface, the expansion in Jordan’s domestic defense industry appears 
to be economically positive, but a deeper look sheds light on its burdening effects. One 	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major issue is that the whole establishment depends on the importation of raw materials, 
technology and spare parts, putting pressure on both the country’s and the military’s 
foreign currency reserves. Moreover, this high-technology industry drains the supply of 
highly skilled labor, which could affect the availability of labor needed to develop other 
civilian industries, more so in a country where the majority of skilled labor prefers to go 
abroad.135  Furthermore, according to KADDB sources, the Bureau still receives funding 
from the Jordanian government of about $12 million a year, which shows that such an 
establishment could easily increase budget strain. Marshall (2012) described the situation 
by saying that developing countries’ arms industries do not yield substantial benefits for a 
country’s economic development, stressing that national arms production might actually 
end up being more costly than importing armaments.   
Nevertheless, the benefits of the KADDB’s activities are not only economic, but 
also political. Like the Ultimate Building, Manufacturing and Development Company, 
KADDB represents an inspired model of economic co-optation where the Jordanians of 
Palestinian origin provide private investment through joint venture partnerships, and 
Jordanians of East Bank origin fill executive management posts on top of military-owned 
enterprises. This creates mutual benefits and helps to bridge the gaps between the two 
parties. It can also be viewed as an optimum venue for the distribution of economic 
incentives, through the supply of equitable management positions for retired generals. In 
addition, the military’s industrial arm provides employment opportunities for engineers 
and trained managers graduating from the institution’s technical colleges as well as for 
the vast number of unskilled laborers among the armed forces (mostly of East Bank 
origin). Such privileges can also trickle down to the East Bank tribes as a whole, as a 
positive step to remedy the already faltering public sector benefits.    
What is more, the establishment of such military enterprises provides a unique 
opportunity for the channeling of Palestinian private sector funds into indirect patronage 
for the East Bank military men and eventually to their representative tribes as a whole. 
This newly founded interaction can be useful for political stability but it can be a threat to 
the sustainability of the Hashemite as it could help generate powerful pacts independent 
of the king.  	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 Nevertheless, the military’s access to the formal economy can also leave room for 
select members to acquire personalized direct benefits through the manipulation of trade 
and industrial contracts and illicit activity.  
	  
3.4	   Off	  budget	  Economic	  Incentives	  	  
This section will explore off-budget sources of economic incentives for the East Bank 
military leadership, by examining the gradual expansion of the military institution’s role 
in the formal economy from Hussein to Abdullah II. Acknowledging the apparent 
consolidation of economic coup-proofing strategies based primarily on the previously 
discussed institutionalized incentives, the following paragraphs review other forms of 
direct incentives beyond that of the formal budget. I will derive insights from corruption 
cases. 
 Despite already receiving lavish privileges evidenced by the institution’s high 
share of the national budget, certain members of the officer corps were able to use their 
professions’ prowess to extract more profits.  Using their access to the formal economy, 
officers serve as “business protectors.” By occupying esteemed positions at the top of 
military-owned enterprises, officers are able to provide endorsement and protection for 
foreign as well as local venture partners in exchange for economic benefits. We can 
regard the case of Site Cast Construction Corporation Jordan. As mentioned previously 
Site Cast Jordan is the Jordanian arm of the mother company in Canada which is partially 
owned by Younis al-Qawasmi, whose company Falcon Investments and Financial 
services took the lead in establishing Jordan’s first tilt-up structure as part of a military 
housing project located in the Military Hospital Complex in the center of Amman. In a 
venture partnership with the military’s own Ultimate Building Company, the two had full 
agency to acquire the resources needed for the realization of the project. Three years after 
the start of construction, Qawasmi was brought before the Public Prosecutor for charges 
of corruption and profiteering.136 Upon further investigation, patterns of similar conduct 	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were discovered in the Military Hospital project whereby both parties had agreed to draw 
contracts stipulating supply prices at artificially high levels so that the excess sum could 
go directly to this group of local businessmen and military generals. Though no generals 
were ever actually called for questioning, evidence points to their likely incrimination.137  
 Another source of direct incentives extends to the military’s consumer 
corporation. Continuous allegations reporting the sale of expired consumer goods with 
the military’s label raise many questions regarding the responsibility of the distribution of 
these products.138 Whether among top-tier military men, lower-ranking officers or even 
the rank and file, these few incidents point to the existence of networks in which military 
personnel use their access to resources to make a profit by selling subsidized consumer 
goods outside the corporation. One case was brought to court and a number of employees 
were charged with embezzlement and fraud; these employees pleaded that the 
responsibility lay with higher-up generals who were not brought to justice and that they 
were simply scapegoats.139 This testimony may indicate the involvement of military 
officers who will likely never be charged. 
 One important source of off-budget economic incentive for the military leadership 
is the manipulation of lucrative arms deals by exaggerating costs, whereby the surplus 
amount is pocketed. To demonstrate this tendency, I refer to corrupt deals associated with 
British arms sales whereby corruption was exposed following Britain’s dissolution of the 
arms contract stipulating the sale of Tornado Jet Fighters to Jordan in 1989. Evidence 
recorded by Mark Pythian (2000) suggested that the price indicated in the contract for the 
Tornado was estimated at 35 million pounds while in reality the price was around 22 
million pounds.140 Pythian asserted that the difference has been paid secretly to a number 
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of military leaders, in addition to middlemen inside and outside of Jordan. 141 
Unfortunately, further information regarding such deals are rarely brought to the public’s 
attention, so it is difficult to fully comprehend the scale of these interactions, let alone 
identify the actors involved. However, it is enough to shed light on the existence of this 
pit from which favored military leaders sustain themselves. 
 
3.5	   Conclusion:	  An	  Overall	  Assessment	  of	  Economic	  Coup-­‐Proofing	  in	  Jordan	  	  
It is difficult to prove that Kings Hussein and Abdullah rely on the use of on-budget 
allocations as the major strategy dictating the implementation of the economic coup-
proofing process, mainly because of the unavailability of comprehensive information 
regarding the military’s access to off-budget resources. However, the analysis of the 
distributive channels suggests that the Jordanian Armed forces fully rely on budgetary 
allocations. This is evident in Hussein’s strategy whereby he ensured the military’s 
loyalty by establishing an elaborate welfare system, which granted military personnel and 
their families exclusive access to state budgetary resources, while at the same time 
keeping the military from developing productive capacities beyond that of civic 
engagement. This policy satisfied the tribesmen’s desire to dominate state resources by 
granting them domination over military and public service. It was also especially fitting 
as he effectively excluded – following black September – the Palestinians and the 
Jordanians of Palestinian origins from the public sphere and in exchange granted them 
access to the private sector. Thus, the utilization of indirect on-budget allocation as 
targeting the in-group became easier as the Palestinian element was drastically reduced to 
less than 15 percent.  
Despite the power of on-budget allocations over the military because of its 
complete dependence on the king’s authority for the receipt of economic incentives, the 
case of Jordan shows that it can be a double-edged sword owing to the kingdom’s 
inability to earn enough revenue to make up for the increase in living expenses as well as 
other economic hardships faced by military personnel. Therefore, Abdullah opted for the 
expansion of the military’s productive capacities.  	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Abdullah relieved part of the problem of military expenditures’ eating away at the 
national budget by attempting to create military-owned revenue-generating enterprises 
and at the same time opening the door for more targeted incentives through granting 
favored generals highly prestigious and lucrative managerial positions to restrict the 
indirect flow of funds from the military institution to tribes in general. He also helped 
channel private funding into military establishments by endorsing cooperation between 
the Palestinian-dominated private sector and the military-industrial arm.  
This strategy has a potentially stabilizing effect. On the one hand, it helps elevate 
East Bank dissatisfaction with the deterioration of public sector benefits as it presents an 
opening into profitable economic engagement. On the other hand, it helps in the 
reintegration of the out-group (the Jordanians of Palestinian origin), which lacks political 
influence even though they hold powerful ground in the Jordanian economy. 
However, the shift in economic coup-proofing from budget endowments to a 
military-industrial complex poses a threat to Abdullah’s rule in a few ways. One of these 
is the possibility of enhancing the military’s autonomy vis-à-vis the king, even though the 
military still relies on funds bestowed upon it by the king’s sanctioned budgetary 
allocations. The military’s industrial arm has the potential of generating revenues enough 
to loosen the institution’s dependence on the king. It can also create a division within the 
military, which might, because of tribal affiliations, transcend institutional borders to 
incite economic and social inequalities between tribes. To explain, the industrial-
complex’s benefactors are only the military personnel who are directly employed by such 
enterprises, including a large number of military generals occupying executive positions 
and other military engineers and unskilled labor, whereas the rest of the military 
institution (those not receiving privileges from employment in enterprises) continues to 
rely primarily on the devaluated budget benefits. Aggravating state-tribal relations, the 
king’s apparent preoccupation with the newly-founded industrial arm, coupled with his 
negligence of the kingdom’s historical backbone – the East Bank tribes – could provoke a 
reaction, which might be supported by military factions excluded from the industrial 
arm’s wealth. Even though it is unlikely that such a rebellion would target the monarchy, 
it would likely be against Abdullah in favor of his half brother Price Hamzah. 
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To conclude, this chapter uses changes in economic coup-proofing to extrapolate 
a power shift in Jordan. The transition from Hussein’s coup-proofing welfare-centered 
system propped up by budget allocations to Abdullah’s wider system of a growing 
military-industrial complex in which the private sector’s money is channeled into the 
development of military enterprises run by the old guards could indicate the beginning of 
a new order in which it is no longer the East Bank tribes who form the regime’s loyal 
backbone, but rather a powerful mixed elite consisting of East Bank military generals and 
Palestinian businessmen who are economically as well as politically wedded to the 
Hashemite kingdom.  
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Chapter	  4:	  Economic	  Coup	  proofing	  in	  Syria:	  The	  Spoils	  Model	  	  
To examine how communal military organizational structure affects the implementation 
of economic coup-proofing tactics, I will trace the development of a distinct in-group of 
Alawite officers stemming from a long line of communally-guided recruitment, and then 
focus on the social, political and economic trajectories which lead to the development of 
a military economy based on personalized spoils. Thus I will show that divide-and-
conquer policies enforced during the French mandate period were carried out and 
reinforced by post-independence rulers leading to the establishment of a minority-
dominated structure which gave rise to a complete Alawite domination of the officer 
corps in the 1990s.  
Then I will go on to investigate the implications of the persistent ethnic character 
of the military institution for economic coup-proofing tactics, arguing that military 
communality led to Hafiz al-Assad’s strategic decision to implement direct personalized 
economic coup-proofing as the main philosophy guiding the allocation of resources, in an 
effort to appeal to the chosen in-group within the institution and at the same time make 
them dependent on his remaining in power. To illustrate my argument, I will show the 
mechanisms used by the Assad regime to allocate both on- and off-budget economic 
incentives, and analyze the military-industrial complex by focusing on how an underlying 
attitude of personalism guides the allocation of incentives as a tool to garner loyalty. 
Finally, I will examine how the use of direct personalized economic coup-proofing works 
to create an Alawite privileged-consumption society based on ethnic exclusivism.  
 
4.1	   The	  Historical	  Development	  of	  a	  Communal	  Military	  Organizational	  
Structure	  	  
The Syrian military exemplifies the gradual and systematic development of a partially 
communally-organized military in which the officer corps is minority-dominated and the 
ruling elite is desperate to economically appease the majority in an effort to form a 
business alliance to pick up a severely troubled economy.  
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Syria’s first decade as an independent republic (also known as the First Republic) 
was characterized by ethnic, religious and regional diversity. Factionalism was common, 
such that loyalties to tribal affiliations and local governments superseded any central 
national allegiance.142 This was coupled with extreme socioeconomic inequalities, with 
around three-quarters of the population earning their livelihood from farming. The Syrian 
feudal system took the classic form in which a small landlord class benefited while the 
majority peasant class endured great hardship under an oppressive sharecropping 
system.143 Moreover, the development of a sense of national identity was difficult, 
considering the fact that both the political and the ruling elites reflected such inter-
communal rivalry and intra-communal allegiances.144 All of these factors contributed to 
the emergence of a weak political society that lacked a unified vision,145 in addition to an 
elevation in threat level and increased pressure to expand the military because of the war 
against Israel just four years after Syria gained its independence. This atmosphere of 
political and social insecurity made the newly independent state fertile ground for the 
military’s emergence as the republic’s main nationhood model, the disseminator of civic 
values, the economic developer and the breeding ground for political leaders.  
 Drawing on roots in the Troupes Speciales (the Special Troops, which were 
established by the French and later evolved into the Syrian National Army), the Syrian 
Forces had an established tradition of minority recruitment. The recruitment method in 
the Special Forces was guided by a rationale of divide and conquer, which assigned 
membership of the colonial army to a single ethnic group – provided they were politically 
loyal, economically weak, resided in regional peripheries and were suited to combat.146 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Gordon H. Torry, Syrian Politics and the Military: 1945-1958 (Columbus: Ohio State Press, 
1964), 11. 
143 Ibid, 20-21. 
144 Ibid, 23. 
145 The Syrian Republic’s early years were plagued with an impervious minority complex that 
Jacque Weulersse descried as “ a collective and pathological susceptibility which makes each 
gesture by the neighboring community appear a menace or challenge to one’s own community, 
and which unifies each collectivity in its entirety at the least outrage committed against anyone of 
its members.” See Nikolaos Van Dam, The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society 
Under Assad and The Ba’ath Party (London: I.B. Tauris &Co, 2011), 4. 
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general of Nigeria. See Kristen Karkness, “The Ethnic Army and The State: Explaining Coup 
Traps and The Difficulties of Democratization in Africa,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (2014): 
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The French found all of these necessary qualities in the Alawite, Kurdish and Druze 
minorities who respectively constituted 12%, 10% and 5% of the Syrian population.147   
The French mandate period was a turning point for the modern history of the 
Syrian military, as their discriminatory recruitment not only sowed the seeds of ethnic 
domination but also reinforced factionalism in Syria’s multi-ethnic society. Aggravating 
the already existing divisions, ethnic favoritism in military recruitment incited Sunni 
suspicion of Alawite and other minority groups’ collaboration with the French. Feelings 
of resentment were fed through the continued usage of the Special Troops to put down 
Sunni rebellions.148 Another legacy of the French mandate was that minority regions such 
as the Alawite-majority Latakia region and the Druze-populated Jabal al-Druze, were 
granted autonomous governance status vis-à-vis the Syrian government. 149  This 
contributed to blocking the spread of Arab nationalist discourse, leading to further 
isolation of minorities from political deliberations in the major cities Damascus, Aleppo, 
Hama and Homs and thus pushing minorities to seek political and social power through 
military careers.150  	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  The policy was particularly successful in establishing a minority-dominated military as the 
French found a loyal army and the minorities found the political and economic protection they 
were hoping for. The French found in these minority communities, the military-discipline they 
were looking for. This was evidenced through Batatu’s (1999) study of Syria’s peasantry, which 
showed that the Alawite and the Druze tribes in particular were historically accustomed to martial 
training. In addition, the minorities welcomed such favoritism for a number of reasons. A major 
pull factor was that military membership represented an optimum opportunity for poor peasant 
minorities to escape the economic domination of the Sunni elites (some hundred Sunni families 
who owned vast tracks of land, big businesses and organized trade). Another reason why minority 
groups were enlisting was that gaining influence in powerful government institutions on a 
national level could increase the chances of acquiring power and respect on a tribal level. 
Moreover, Sunni landed families; of whom the majority affiliated with nationalist sentiment 
actually despised the army as a profession and thus refused to send their sons to serve a French-
led military. See Hana Batatu, Syria’s Peasantry, The Descendants of its Lesser Rural Notables 
and Their Politics (New Jersey: Princeton	  University Press,	  1999), 12-13; Moshe Mo’az, “The 
Emerge of Modern Syria,” In Syria Under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risk, 
edited by Moshe Mo’az and Avner Yaniv (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986), 11. 
148 Patrick Seale, The Struggle for Syria, A Study of Post-war Arab Politics, 1945-1958 (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 37. 
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  Ibid, 150. Alawites were pushed further into military careers in the post-independence period 
on account of their diminishing status in other political institutions. For example, Alawite seats in 
parliament and their independent courts system were abolished as part of a policy wave aiming at 
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By the end of the mandate, several infantry battalions were composed entirely of 
Alawites, whereas not a single battalion was formed completely of Sunni Arabs.151 The 
institutionalization of ethnic favoritism continued after Syria gained its independence, 
particularly following the Ba’ath party takeover. In the 19 years from 1944 to 1963, the 
Alawites moved from being corporals, sergeants and junior officers to being leading 
members of the military committee (Salah Jadid, Hafiz al-Assad and Mohamed Umran) 
who effectively ran the country, paving the way for complete Alawite domination of the 
officer corps under Hafiz al-Assad. This expansion of the military’s communal 
organizational structure progressed through various policies that eventually guaranteed 
ideology, loyalty, class and ethnicity as determining criteria for the admission of officers 
and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) into the military.152 In the 1950s, compulsory 
military service was implemented, dictating general conscription for all eligible males 
upon reaching the age of 19.153 This meant that though the number of Sunni conscripts 
increased, the ethnic character of the elite corps remained the same as a large number of 
officers from the pre-independence army were promoted from major to lieutenant and 
from lieutenant to general.154 This indirectly reinforced the trend to increase the numbers 
of Alawite officers, since once they reached the top brass, they brought in relatives and 
others from their sectarian, regional and tribal communities, helping them to advance by 
favoring their applications to the army, navy and air force academies.155  This policy 
resulted in roughly 65 percent of the NCOs belonging to the Alawi sect, as the then chief 
of the intelligence Bureau, Colonel Abdel al-Hamid Sarraj, discovered in 1955.156  
The communal character of the military was further enhanced with the Ba’athist 
coup of 1963, also known as the 8th of March revolution, in which a coalition of 
Ba’athist, Nasserist and independent Unionists took over, consolidating their power by 
purging around 700 officers. Naturally, Alawite officers filled these positions, not 	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surprising since at the time of the coup, five out of fifteen members of the Military 
Committee were Alawite. They called upon reserve officers and NCOs with whom they 
shared family, tribal or regional ties to ensure their loyalty. One common practice from 
1965 to 1966, described by Dr. Munif al-Razzaz, Secretary General of the National 
Command of the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party, was discrimination against Sunni officer 
applicants to the Military Academy and other military training centers. Transfers within 
the military were also governed by ethnic and religious ties, such that officers who were 
trusted - mainly Alawite - were entrusted with politically and strategically critical army 
units, whereas undesirable officers - mostly Sunni - were transferred to politically less 
sensitive posts like the Syria-Israeli Front or other locations away from the capital.157 
 This contributed to the emergence of an unofficial collation rule whereby whole 
units would be stacked with Alawites while having a Sunni leader. This meant that the 
authority of Sunni commanders - no matter how many they were - was under continuous 
scrutiny as a result of the possibility that Alawi officers from other units might instruct 
their co-religionists to refuse orders.158 In order to consolidate their hold on the military 
institution in particular and Syria in general, the Alawite leaders later purged their most 
prominent Nasserist and Independent Unionist military men, who all happened to be 
Sunnis.159 This reinforced the Syrian military’s communal structure, which came to be as 
high as 90 percent of senior officers in the 1990s.160 
Upon coming to power through the coup of 1970 (the so-called Corrective 
Movement), Hafiz al-Assad intensified the ethnocentric recruitment policy, which 
enhanced Alawite dominance of the officer corps. The leadership clique or Jama’a were 
tied to him on the basis of primarily tribal or communal ties (recruiting members of his 
tribe, the Kalbiyya and his sect, the Alawites), enhanced by a policy of recruitment along 
bloodlines and marriage.161 This policy continued to such an extent that by 2011, around 
90% of army commanders were Alawites.162 In other words, each Alawite family had at 	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least one member in the military, which by default chains the whole sect to the rules of 
both Hafiz al-Assad and his son Bashar.163  
Combating coup risk by buying military loyalty, Hafiz al-Assad (and later his 
heir) devised a number of economic coup-proofing processes with the aim of controlling 
the military’s economic access to wealth - necessary given the Syrian military’s history 
as protector, planner and premier manager of economic development. Paradoxically, 
depriving military officers of resources can persuade them to take back the driver’s seat, 
especially in Syria, where the majority of political leaders came to power through coups 
d’état. The real challenge faced by Hafiz was thus to distribute just enough wealth to the 
desired people to tie them to his rule without empowering them. The military’s 
communal nature meant that the desired factions were the Alawite officers, and so the 
Assad regime implemented a statist spoils form of economic coup-proofing. Statist spoils 
means that the benefits followed a logic of personalism; to a large extent the nature of the 
benefits were illegal to maximize the officer corps’ dependence on the regime.  
The following sections show how this particular application of economic coup 
proofing works in its on-budget and the off-budget forms.  
 
4.2	   On-­‐budget	  Incentives	  	  
Pinpointing the main causes of the fluctuations of budgetary military expenditures is 
challenging, since while many scholars use external and internal threat levels as 
explanations, others find this overly reductionist. Some of the factors that may have led to 
elevations in military expenditures include securing military aid (Russia and the Gulf), 
and the discovery and the sale of natural resources such as oil, while factors causing 
drops in military expenditures may include economic crises and budget cuts. This section 
will not attempt to analyze the causes of ups and downs in military expenditures, but 
instead will shed light on the role of military communality in influencing the technique 
and the direction of money allocation. I will address on-budget incentives by first 
examining the legal frameworks which determine how the Assad regime controls 
budgetary allocations (primarily using constitutional texts). Since Assad is of the same 	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ethnicity as the military leadership, I expect to find the budget directed less at achieving 
institutional goals (arms purchases, for example) than at personnel expenses. Secondly, 
following Huntington’s rationale of “give them toys”, this section attempts to analyze the 
distribution of arms purchases. Here it is not so much the question of “how much?” but 
“who gets what?” which I will answer, by analyzing the economic privileges given to 
majority Alawite divisions compared to other ethnically diverse divisions. 
  
4.2.1	   Budgetary	  Control	  in	  the	  Constitution	  	  
Since Assad took power, Syria has seen two constitutions, only one of which is within the 
timeframe of this study.164 The 1973 constitution lacked a provision on the military 
budget, but referred to three bodies that have authority over the general budget. Article 
127 dictated that the Council of Ministers has the duty of “drawing up the government’s 
general budget bill to be approved by the People’s Assembly, as was clearly stated in 
article 71. Section 103.” 165  The third entity was Assad himself, by virtue of the 
president’s powers; according to article 105, “The President of the Republic is the 
supreme commander of the army and the armed forces. He is to issue the decisions and 
orders necessary for the exercise of this power.”166 Budgetary management was under his 
control and neither the military institution nor civilian institutions had a decisive say. 
This legal arrangement allows Assad’s great capacity to effectively utilize the budget as a 
tool of economic coup-proofing, especially in the absence of a checks-and-balances 
system.  
 
4.2.2	   Military	  Expenditures:	  An	  Analysis	  Over-­‐time	  	  
This section analyzes military expenditures in two ways. The first analysis gives an 
estimate of the annual operational and the maintenance (O&M) costs needed to sustain 
the Syrian military’s various units in relation to annual military expenditures. This is 
necessary in order to differentiate between extra money spent on the personnel’s loyalty 	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and the expenditures required to uphold the military’s vast equipment - showing the 
extent to which on-budget expenditures were used as a tool of economic coup-proofing. 
The second analysis, to demonstrate the particular advantage of Alawite units, examines 
ethnic favoritism in distribution of privileges, paying special attention to what Richard 
Bennet (2000) has labeled the ‘praetorian guards’ - including the Republican Guards, the 
Special Forces and the Third and Fourth Armored Divisions.167 With these two analyses I 
hope to provide a balanced perspective on military expenditures as an indicator of 
economic coup-proofing in Syria.  
Shawn Pine’s (2000) exploration of Syria’s defense expenditures uses costs 
calculated by the U.S Army and adapted to the Syrian military in an attempt to estimate 
the expenditures necessary to maintain the institution. The estimated annual costs of 
maintaining an armored division (excluding personnel costs) were around $146 million 
and the costs for maintaining a mechanized division about $140 million per year. In 
addition, Pine estimates the worth of an infantry division at $204 million, an airborne 
division at $750 million and an artillery brigade at around $15 million a year.168 Since 
1985, the Syrian Army has been divided into three Corps. The 1st Corps consists of four 
armored divisions and a Mechanized Division; the 2nd Corps of three armored divisions 
and two mechanized, and the 3rd Corps of a reserve armored division in addition to the 
Coastal Defense Brigade. The military security forces also include the Republican Guards 
(RG) and the Special Forces.169 According to Pine, the annual costs for maintaining the 
army’s three Corps alone amount to $1589.3 million, excluding personnel expenses. In 
addition, $140.341 million were allocated to the Republican Guard and another $230.08 
million for the reserve infantry division and its ten airborne Special Forces.170 Moreover, 
Pine estimates an aggregate sum for the Air Force and Air Defense forces at $2472.45 
million a year excluding personnel costs. Finally, he estimates the annual O&M costs for 
Navy at around $75 million. This gives a total of $4507.17 million a year, excluding 	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personnel and aside from the consideration of Syria’s chemical weapons program and 
military intelligence network. The report concludes that the expenditures most probably 
lie between 3 and 5 billion dollars.171 With an estimated budget of 1.8 billion dollars in 
2000, barely covering the costs of upholding the equipment alone, there is little evidence 
that personnel costs could have been particularly handsome – strengthening the argument 
that officers’ main source of livelihood is their membership of off-budget networks.   
Nonetheless, the ethnic character of the Syrian military allowed for some units to 
receive more loyalty-enhancing expenditures. According to a number of studies of the 
privileged position of the praetorian guards vis-à-vis other units, these select units are 
favored in terms of quality of personnel, structure, training and equipment. Studies by 
Bennet (2001) and Joseph Holliday (2013) found a pattern through which Alawite 
majority units were set apart from other units, one reason being that ordinary units consist 
of conscripts while privileged units are made up of mainly career soldiers and elite 
officers, even though at first glance the units’ arrangement resembled other units.172 A 
deeper look at the 1st Armored Division shows that it contains three armored brigades and 
one mechanized brigade with each armored brigade made up of three armored battalions 
and one mechanized battalion; each mechanized brigade includes three mechanized 
battalions and one armored battalion.173 By contrast, units like the 4th Armored Division, 
the 3rd Armored Division, the Republican Guards and the Special Security forces are 
actually structurally superior, being made up of the previously outlined structure in 
addition to a Special Forces regiment, making them larger than most other units.174 
Moreover, they have the upper hand as they are constantly maintained at full strength, 
making them much better in terms of the personnel’s training level as well as the unit’s 
readiness for combat. One can also argue that ethnically pure units (either fully Alawite 
or with Alawites in all officer positions) receive better equipment than other units. Based 
on a number of interviews conducted by Anthony Tucker-Jones (2011), the last major 
arms deliveries happened around a decade and a half ago, including 350 T-72 tanks, 50 	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MiG-29 fighters, 250 T-72s and 150 Scud C missiles.175  The possession of such 
equipment was reflected with ethnically diverse units. However, evidence showed that 
elite units such as the Republican Guard received the latest equipment through minor 
deliveries from Russia.176  
 
4.3	   The	  Syrian	  Military’s	  Business	  Activities	  
	  	  
A key component of economic incentives is the military’s presence in the formal 
economy. This is made evident by the drastic deterioration of Syrian military’s role in the 
formal economy during Hafiz al-Assad’s rule, as a result of its fostering of institutional 
interests instead of personal ones. 
 In the early years of his reign, Hafiz al-Assad eroded the Ba’ath system in which 
the military played the leading economic and political role, establishing in its place a 
personalist regime in which he dominated both the military and the state apparatus. This 
led to the deterioration of their previous role as an economic actor, enhanced during the 
union with Egypt (1958-1961), going from being the main economic actor in control of 
around 67 percent of the economy to a marginalized entity that only began to regain a 
fraction of its hold on the economy through the slow but steady development of military 
enterprises in the mid-1970s.177 In order to put in context the magnitude of Assad’s 
economic policy and its effect on the military’s business role, it is necessary to first 
identify the “winners” and the “losers” of the state socialist system in place before he 
came to power. Upon the union with Egypt in 1958, the Syrian economy was restructured 
to accommodate the establishment of a full-fledged statist economy. From 1958 to 1971, 
economic policies followed rationales of state-ownership and wealth redistribution. The 
main losers under such policies were the large merchant class, the landowning elites and 	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the big industrialists, the majority of whom were large Sunni families. 178 In the course of 
thirteen years, all of the domestic industrial enterprises were either partially or 
completely owned by the state. Extractive industries and vital manufacturing – including 
electric power, communications and transportation – were placed under complete state 
control. In theory, smaller industries, handicrafts and domestic trade were to be governed 
through a system of mixed public and private ownership; in practice, however, the 
government controlled all supply sources as well as means of transportation, which meant 
that they too were effectively managed by the state. The banking system was also subject 
to complete government ownership. The inflated public industrial sector was 
administered by two main bodies, the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Socialist’s 
Industrial Sector Administration; both answered directly to the National Council of 
Revolutionary Command (NCRC), a twenty-one-man council dominated by military 
officers and entrusted to rule Syria following the 1963 coup. 179  The council of 
revolutionary command was also responsible for the hiring and firing of the boards of 
directors for all enterprises under the state’s control.  
The winners of this period of Syrian history were undoubtedly the military 
institution. This was particularly evident in the fact that following the 1963 coup, civil 
service rules were changed to accommodate the reality of army officers’ attachment to 
ministries and other civil establishments. The amendment equated civil service grades 
and salaries with military ranks, which established as well as reinforced existing patterns 
whereby army officers occupied key positions in civil capacities.180 Landowning elites 
were devastated as the government undertook a number of agrarian reforms limiting and 
in some cases even restricting ownership of both irrigated and non-irrigated land.181 It is 	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clear that the winners were the military institution that enjoyed not only the power and 
wealth generated from a state-managed economy, but also the economic and social 
prowess that came along with it. In contrast, the traditional Sunni elites lost their 
economic base and as a result held deep and strong resentment for the newly established 
elite consisting mainly of Alawite military officers.182  
The transition was relatively smooth as Assad employed a strategy whereby he 
shut out the military from day-to-day political affairs, at the same time granting the 
ministry of defense an institutionalized form of economic incentives, thus giving the 
military institution a limited role in the Syrian economy. The military’s ability to leverage 
its way into recapturing a slim portion of its economic empire translated into the issuance 
of a number of laws that founded the military institution’s independent ownership of a 
number of economic enterprises. These organizations included the Medical Industries 
Organization, the Military Housing Organization, the Military Social Organization and 
other organizations dealing with the manufacture of batteries, bottled mineral water, and 
furniture.183 Among these enterprises were two of the largest construction companies in 
the country, M’assasat al-Iskan al-‘Askari (Milihouse) and the Constructions 
Organization (MATA).184 Though it is difficult, because of lack of data, to generate the 
total market percentage share that these enterprises occupied, it is possible to track a 
considerable amount of their activities and arrive at an estimate of their embeddedness in 
the economy. Milihouse, for example, was highly active in civilian construction projects; 
their activities included the construction of the Athlete city in Alaziqia, sporting clubs in 
Aleppo and other Syrian cities, the Assad Library and the National Theatre in Damascus. 
The organization’s hold on the construction market also extended to other sectors 
including agriculture and farming where they were responsible for erecting large national 
projects like Sad al –Thawra (Revolution Dam), Sad al- Sades A’shar men teshreen (The 
Sixteenth of November Dam) and many other irrigation and desert development projects 
that stretched all over the country.  	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The military owned large livestock farms, which allowed them to penetrate food 
production markets. Also, they monopolized the construction and the management of 
factories in the cement, steel, ceramics and asbestos industries (as a result of laws 
restricting the importation of these materials), which allowed them to control the 
development of the private sector.185 What is more, they were deeply involved in the 
importation of heavy machinery and the spare parts trade, areas in which they were 
particularly privileged on account of the ministry’s exemption from the payment of tariffs 
and taxes.186 They were particularly skilled in buying large amounts of government-
owned land at unrealistically low rates (as a result of their privileged position) and then 
reselling them to the public at a profit. They also maintained a strong hold on the housing 
sector, such that they undertook large projects all over the country consisting of hundreds 
of houses; this included affordable housing.187 In this respect the military had an 
esteemed place in the formal economy, owning and running giant enterprises, which 
allowed officers to accumulate wealth in a legally sanctioned manner.  
However, this honeymoon period did not last long, owing to the Sunni hostility 
against the state in the early 1980s, which grew with consecutive military attacks on the 
Muslim Brotherhood in March, April, June and July 1980, culminating in a full-fledged 
massacre in Hama in 1982.188 Coupled with the increased resentment towards the military 
that in the eyes of many was the Alawite shield, this potentially destabilizing situation 
called for an immediate policy of pacification and appeasement of the Sunni elites.189 The 
Sunni elites had been economically excluded by harsh Ba’athist economic policies, and 
so a novel strategy of cooptation was an inspired way of forming an Alawi-Sunni 
coalition. This led to a reversal of the strategy of empowering the military as owner and 
manager of productive business enterprises, changing its role into one governed by a 	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logic of personalized illegal incentives determined by the ties that specific officers have 
with Assad, as opposed to a privileged position occupied by the military institution as a 
whole. Assad’s need for political and economic stability led him to adopt a policy of 
greater openness also known as Infiraj.190  This policy resulted in the gradual integration 
of a handful of Sunni economic elites, primarily in Damascus.191 These included a 
number of large families like those of Sai’b Nahhas, Uthman al-Aidi and Abd al-Rahman 
al-Attar, who were able to regain some of the business influence they had lost.192  
To illustrate the effect of Assad’s change of economic coup-proofing strategy on 
diminishing the entrepreneurial role of the military, I will again refer to the Milihouse as 
representative of the miserable destiny experienced by military enterprises and how they 
were transformed into yet another venue for Assad to channel through direct personalized 
spoils. After having occupied a large share of the construction market (evident from the 
density of its activities), M’assasat al-Iskan al-‘Askari was left high and dry, with 
economic privileges shifting hands from the military institution to the Assad’s new clique 
of Sunni-Alawi businessmen. The organization couldn’t survive the strong winds of the 
economic hardships and the appreciation of the US dollar in the second half of the 
1980s.193 Instead of bailing out the military’s vital asset, the Assad administration 
watched the situation develop into a sort of tomb raid, in which royal military officers 
took turns reaping their rewards by feeding off the carcasses of the once-flourishing 
organization. Of the five different military generals, the five different general managers 
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in less than five years, each one came with a clear agenda: to sell a factory or a piece of 
land and earn a handsome sum.  
Personalism and profiteering guided the dissemination of incentives at the 
enterprises, as favored Alawite members of the officer corps would gain influential 
positions in top management where they could accumulate wealth. One of these famous 
military generals was Saleem Altoun from Latakia who was rewarded by becoming the 
head of imports and collected enough capital to start a giant enterprise called “Zeina and 
Altoun Trading companies” with his son Shaker as the official owner.194 It continued 
running even when hundreds of workers lost their jobs (the number of employees fell 
from 70,000 in the 1970s to 46,000 persons in the late 1980s) or were left unpaid for 
months. Like many other military-owned enterprises, they became empty shells to cover 
a consolidated system of personalized illegal rewards.195 One example of this practice 
included the surplus of cars bought through the enterprise’s purchasing office and labeled 
as necessary equipment, while in reality they were being distributed to loyal officers. 
Others include the distribution of affordable housing estates (earmarked for low-income 
groups) to senior and junior officers who did not need such government assistance.196 
 
4.4	   Off-­‐budget	  Economic	  Incentives	  	  
In examining the deterioration of productive military activities, this section presents an 
overview of the main off-budget sources of economic incentives that were systematically 
as well as sustainably implemented throughout the reigns of the Assads. I hope here to 
qualitatively demonstrate that the ethnic character of the Syrian military contributed to 
off-budget incentives outweighing the legal rewards as a result of the wide-spread 
networks that feed off illicit activities - networks that became attached to military careers.  
Despite the military’s declining role in the formal economy, military officers were 
able to carve out an economic role for themselves. Using the clout of their profession, 
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officers served as “business protectors.”197 Prior to liberalization, ‘protection’ entailed 
blocking the regime’s wrath as well as providing security against policy instabilities. 
However, a wave of liberalization in the 1990s gave rise to a novel investment law which 
provided a fragile framework for business owners, so that owners no longer required the 
form of protection offered in the 1980s. However, influential officers were quickly able 
to devise a new form of protection based on fending off competition, utilizing their power 
networks to endorse and facilitate business deals, thus keeping their share of the pie. A 
famous example of such a practice was Jamil al-Asad, Hafiz al-Assad’s younger brother 
and the commander of a division in the Defense Companies (Saraya al-Difaa). In the 
mid-1980s he started utilizing his position in customs at the port of Tartus to facilitate the 
import and export of goods. Over time, he came to be viewed as the main business 
protector in Azarquia and Tartus; he left behind around five billion dollars at his death.198  
Other means of appropriating a share of the formal economy included the 
“Military-Merchant complex.”199 This form of economic activity manifested in various 
arrangements. In one, military officers conducted agreements with private companies 
such that private owners represented the public face of the companies while the real 
beneficiaries were military men.200 In another, military officers made deals with their 
children in which the children played the role of business owners while the fathers took 
up the role of business protectors. The same practice was replicated in Lebanon, where 
influential Syrian officers earned a big share of business revenues, either by entering into 
secret partnerships with Lebanese businessmen or having local owners front for them.201 
Such practices involved officers stationed inside and outside Syria. Examples included 
telecommunication establishments like Liban Cell and Cellis. Supposedly, Ali and Nizar 
Dalloul, two sons of a former Lebanese defense minister, owned 86 percent of Liban 	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Cell, but it was common knowledge that they were fronting for Syrian vice-president 
Abdul Halim Khaddam and former Syrian chief of staff Hikmat Shihabi.202 
Other off-budget self-enrichment opportunities available for officers included 
illegal currency dealings like counterfeiting and money-laundering. Within Syria, 
currency dealings catered to ordinary citizens who hoped to preserve their capital by 
handing it over to quasi-private bankers known as money-changers. They offered high 
interest rates to depositors, sometimes as high as 20%.203 Officers were eligible to take 
part in such illegal transactions because they had the ability by virtue of border-control to 
smuggle money outside the country or set up offshore accounts. This also extended to a 
highly profitable business in foreign currency dealings. The Syrian presence in Lebanon 
was particularly useful for the officers’ heavy involvement in the business of forging and 
distributing US dollars as well as European currencies. One U.S. intelligence report 
estimated the Syrian officers’ share of the forging trade at around one billion dollars in 
1995, and they predicted that they must have been earning just as much on an annual 
basis since Syria’s total control of Lebanon in 1990, and an estimated $500 million in 
1987.204 Money laundering was a particularly important source of income for officers, 
who took advantage of the Lebanese banking secrecy law of 1956 (which remains in 
effect today): “All banks operating in Lebanon, whether Lebanese or branches of foreign 
banks are prohibited from revealing any information concerning the names of clients, 
their funds and related matters to any person or authorities.”205 Syrian officers laundered 
billions of dollars from other illicit activities. Some of the most scandalous money-
laundering incriminations of top Syrian generals involved two Lebanese-based banks, the 
al-Madina Bank and the Central Bank. In 2003, the two banks discovered huge cash 
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deficits accounting to around 250 million Euros. Other reports put forward an aggregate 
amount of up to 1 billion Euros of laundered money in this case alone.206 
Another set of economic opportunities for officers was the highly lucrative 
smuggling trade particularly across the Lebanese borders and Cyprus. Favored Alawite 
generals were rewarded by being handed customs posts where they could control the 
influx of consumer goods. This enabled individual members of the officer corps to 
establish elaborate smuggling channels through which they were able to accumulate 
wealth and power.207 Two famous Alawites who benefited from such channels were 
General Ghazi Kan’an, who served for twenty years as the head of Syrian Intelligence in 
Lebanon, and General Shafiq Fayyad, the commander of the 3rd Armored Division. 
Another prominent example of incentives being given to Alawite loyalists was the heavy 
involvement of the 569th Army Division, which was 80 percent Alawite during its 
establishment as apart of the Defense Companies under Rifaat al-Asad and later evolved 
into the 100 percent Alawite 4th Armored division of the Republican Guard. Although 
other divisions were stationed in Lebanon, the 569th Armoured Division was particularly 
known for using its vehicles to transport drugs and luxury cars across borders.208 These 
examples support the argument that direct patronage was given disproportionally to 
Alawite members. The intensity of Alawite officers’ involvement illustrates their access 
to huge amounts of wealth.  
Observers said that smuggled consumer goods constituted 30 to 35% of all Syria’s 
reported imports.209 As early as 1987, the Wall Street Journal estimated Syria’s drug 
trade revenue at $500 million.210 By 1990, heroin trade in Lebanon alone was estimated 
at US$1.4 billion per year.211 Though it is difficult to pinpoint the percentage that reached 
the officers’ pockets, one can easily assume that it must have been from 25 to 30 percent 	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since Syrian officers played roles of protectors, facilitators, cultivators and distributors. In 
1992, the CIA and the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) estimated the Syrian military’s 
profits from drug production and smuggling in Lebanon at between $300 million and $1 
billion.212 The report also affirmed that "most individual Syrian officers and troops 
directly profit from the drug trade…Without Syrian military participation, the present 
system of growing, producing and transporting drugs in Lebanon today would simply 
collapse."213  
 
4.5	   	  Legal	  versus	  Illegal	  Incentives	  	  
Though it is difficult to prove that the Assad regime favored the use of off-budget illegal 
incentives as a major part of the economic coup-proofing process, analysis of the 
apparent disproportional engagement of the military’s activities in on-budget and off-
budget categories gives credence to this argument. Using qualitative tools and tracing the 
activities of Syrian military’s role in the formal economy in the periods before and during 
the Assad rule, I found a great discrepancy indicating a deterioration in the size of the 
institutions’ share of the formal economy. In the 1950s and 1960s, the military’s legal 
economy played a major role in most economic sectors. However, from the 1970s 
onwards, this role gradually diminished and in the 1980s the institution’s economic 
enterprises had lost their vigor and started to disintegrate into individuals trying to secure 
personal interests at the expense of the military-industrial complex. With the 
enhancement of direct patronage within the military’s economic organizations, the 
officers’ personal interests became more salient as they expanded to carve out economic 
benefits in an off-budget illegal manner, leading to a business model based on secret 
partnerships and spoils. Whether the cause was the military’s sense of entitlement or 
Assad’s encouragement, the observable result was the deep engagement of military 
personnel in lucrative illegal activities to which Assad repeatedly turned a blind eye.  
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Another level of the analysis lends insight into Assad’s use of the flexible nature 
of such benefits to steer them towards the Alawite factions. Though there is a lack of 
comprehensive evidence showing direct orders from Assad to bestow personalized 
benefits disproportionally on Alawite officers, his placement of certain Alawite leaders 
and Alawite units in strategic positions where they are able to generate wealth is surely 
evidence enough. Because of the challenges associated quantifying off-budget incentives, 
this chapter does not make any claims regarding the size of the military’s off-budget 
economy; however, a careful consideration of estimates by reliable organizations, as well 
as of the entrenchment and the expansion of military officers’ role in illegal activities - 
especially that revenues from each field accounts for no less than $300 million a year by 
way of comparison to an average expenditure of around $2 billion -, inevitably leads to 
the conclusion that off-budget incentives outweigh legal on-budget incentives and that 
the military economy is in fact based on spoils.  
 
4.6	  	   Reflections	  on	  Assad’s	  Economic	  Coup	  proofing	  and	  the	  Officer	  Corps:	  
Between	  Strength	  and	  Vulnerability	   	  	  
Syrian military officers’ reliance on illegal off-budget benefits makes them vulnerable to 
the regime’s wrath, such that whenever their loyalty is doubted, the Assad regime can 
decide to punish illegal activities to which it had previously turned a blind eye. The 
officers’ consequent vulnerability ties them strongly to Assad. 
The legislation criminalizing currency dealings is a perfect example. Law No. 24 
of 1986 states that “the illegal holding and trading of currency is punishable with a period 
of imprisonment ranging from 10 to 25 years.” As a result, the constituents of illicit 
benefits endowed on military officers are crimes punishable by law, which means that 
their sustainability depends on the Assads’ lack of willingness to implement it. Numerous 
cases exemplify this fact. Assad Sr. undertook an anti-corruption campaign in 1977 in 
which he announced the formation of an independent council whose mission was to 
investigate acts of bribery, abuse of functions, graft and other corruption crimes. 
However, it was considered a failure by many analysts, who observed widely spread 
impunity towards the involvement of military leadership in illegal activities - including 
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the President’s brother, Colonel Rifa’at al-Assad.214 This was followed by another 
campaign in 1987 where impunity again protected loyal members of the officer corps 
including General Shafik Fayad, General Ibrahim Safy, General Ali Haider, General Aly 
Doba and General Mohamed al-Kholy. The highest-ranked person to benefit from 
impunity was then-Minister of Defense Mustafa Talas, even though in October 1987 he 
had been caught in possession of a large amount of smuggled products on his way back 
from Lebanon.215 The desire of both the state and the military to protect officers’ 
economic interests was also salient in the 1993 Syrian crackdown on drug cultivation, in 
which targeted obvious cultivation sites while ignoring major laboratories in Hermel, 
Baalbek, Zahle, and other Bekaa Valley towns that were closely tied to Syrian military 
partners and represented a chief source of profit for officers.  This incident demonstrated 
that the Syrian authorities had the capacity to remove an important source of income for 
military officers but did not necessarily have the willingness to do so.216  
  The officers’ vulnerability was highlighted when their engagement in illegal off-
budget activities was used as a tool of elimination. In 1995, for example, an investigation 
into the finances of the head of national intelligence, General Bashir al-Naggar, resulted 
in his imprisonment for 12 years on corruption charges.217 Another anti-corruption 
campaign was launched in the mid-1980s in which Altoun was charged with forgery. A 
similar form of elimination took place in an anti-corruption wave in 1997 in which major 
moneychangers were arrested, some of whom were military officers.218 In March 2000, 
Assad Sr. initiated another corruption campaign through which he eliminated the prime 
minister, Mahmoud al-Zu’aby and indirectly coaxed members of the old guard into 
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retirement in preparation for his son Bashar’s takeover of power. These included a 
number of the previously mentioned officers in addition to general Ali Saleh. 219  
 The officers were also sometimes able to leverage their loyalty to protect their 
illicit activities. For example, in 1984 Assad Sr. gave the order to eliminate Prime 
Minister Abdul Ra’aouf al-Kasm.220 However, top members of the officer’s corps 
resisted Assad’s decision, which led to the order being repealed and al-Kasm retaining his 
position for three more years. Al-Kasm was known for facilitating illegal revenues 
derived from shady deals in the public sector and military enterprises. According to 
Sa’ad-Allah Gadri, a Millihouse engineer who was working on a large housing 
construction project in Domr, an investigation into officers’ corruption was ended upon a 
direct order from al-Kasm, even though incriminating evidence had been brought to the 
attention of an investigative council regarding obvious profiteering from construction 
supplies, especially cement. He explained in an open letter in 2006 that Rifa’at al-Assad, 
along with other members of the officer corps, were issuing purchasing contracts for four 
times the market price of materials in order to appropriate the difference.221  
Over the years, Assad’s continuous initiation of anti-corruption campaigns gave 
the impression that the axe could fall at any moment. Whether arrests actually took place 
or not, the threat made clear to the military leadership their vulnerability to Assad’s 
demands and the fact that their undisputed loyalty was essential for the survival of their 
individual economic interests.   
 
4.7	   Conclusion	  	  
We examined the Syrian case to show how military communality has influenced the 
technique, execution and direction of the distribution of economic benefits, looking at 
both on-budget and off-budget incentives to understand what and how much is being 
distributed, the means of distribution, and who the beneficiaries are. The discussion of the 
historical development of military communality in Syria shows that the phenomenon has 	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been entrenched in the military’s structural evolution since its birth, such that the 
independent variable for the communal character may have been enhanced over the 
years, but was never fundamentally altered.  
The analysis showed that there was a gradual shift in the military’s business role 
due to Assad’s use of economic coup-proofing. Starting by marginalizing the institution 
from its previous role as the leading actor in owning and managing economic resources, 
Assad’s need to strike a balance between tying the military to himself without falling in 
the trap of granting the institution economic independence led him to a strategy of illegal 
off-budget benefits. This led to the military’s playing a dominant role in organizing and 
sustaining networks to facilitate their involvement in illegal activities, ranging from 
secret deals with the private sector for a share of the formal economy to making 
partnerships with drug dealers inside and outside Syria. Assad’s reliance on off-budget 
incentives also provided him with enough room to maneuver its distribution in such a 
way as to give it a more personalized character to selectively ensure the loyalty of the 
Alawite officers as well as a handful of other strategic Sunni generals.  
In short, Assad’s economic coup-proofing tactics, joined with the military’s ethnic 
character, reduced the military’s economic roles to that of spoils collector, which caused 
the organizational and corporate interest of officers of all levels to be replaced by the 
need to serve primarily individual interests and secondarily to satisfy communal interests 
whether through pursuing illicit activity or by upholding Alawi rule. As I wrote in my 
introduction, the form of military organization (communal or institutionalized) directly 
affects whether economic coup-proofing takes the form of indirect institutionalized 
benefits (on-budget) or of direct personalized incentives (off-budget). This will be further 
illustrated through the examination of economic coup-proofing in the cases of Jordan and 
Egypt: a communally organized military and an institutionalized military, respectively.  
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Chapter	  5:	  Economic	  Coup	  proofing	  in	  Egypt:	  
The	  Institutionalized	  Entrepreneurial	  Model	  	  
 
A study of the Egyptian military is essential for describing how variation in military 
organizational structure contributes to the development of economic coup-proofing 
patterns, in contrast to the other cases, in which we saw how certain societal factions 
were favored for military recruitment (i.e. the Alawite officer corps and the Jordanian 
military’s Transjordanian tribes) and were politicized and economically nurtured for their 
unique connection to the ruler. Egypt presents the case of an institutionalized military that 
underwent sporadic phases of politicization, especially under the leadership of the 
republic’s first real ruler (after Mohammad Naguib, who was deposed by the other Free 
Officers shortly after his inauguration), Gamal Abdel Nasser.  
I will begin by tracing the historical development of an institutionalized military 
in Egypt, providing a brief overview of the country’s societal composition and describing 
the recruitment policies which led to the military’s reflecting the makeup of Egyptian 
society. We will also look at the evolution of conscription legislation, going back in time 
to examine conscription under Mohamed Ali, and see that the consistent implementation 
of general conscription yielded an institution that reflected Egyptian society at large. 
Every family, no matter their background, would have at least one male who took part 
served in the military.  
I will then investigate the various implications of military institutionalization on 
shaping economic coup-proofing tactics. In line with the overall hypothesis, I argue that 
the absence of clear ethnic or religious lines within the military institution created the 
need for coup-proofing that overwhelmingly targeted the institution in the form of 
institutionalized practices as opposed to personalized direct coup-proofing targeting a 
specific in-group.  
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This chapter analyses the mechanisms used by presidents Anwar al-Sadat and 
Hosni Mubarak 222 to distribute on- and off-budget economic incentives with the intention 
of garnering the military’s loyalty. We can in this way examine the military-industrial 
complex.  
Finally, the chapter lends insight into how the implementation of institutionalized 
economic coup-proofing reinforces military autonomy and enhances corporate interest. 
 
5.1 The	  Historical	  Development	  of	  an	  Institutionalized	  Military	  in	  Egypt	  	  
Ethnically a relatively homogeneous society constituting of a majority Sunni population 
and a large Christian minority, Egypt lacks severe social divides corresponding to those 
of Jordan and Syria. Though religious strife threatened Egypt’s cohesion at times, such 
clashes, no matter how severe, did not lead to the exclusion of any one ethnic or religious 
group from military service. Therefore, the Egyptian military grew to reflect Egyptian 
society’s makeup.  
Unlike the Syrian and the Jordanian militaries, the Egyptian military predates 
colonial domination. Mohamed Ali Pasha, ruler and founder of the Egyptian modern 
army, introduced the first Egyptian cadets to the officer corps in 1823, trained in the 
Aswan Officers School and the General Staff and Command School in Khanka.223 He 
later enshrined military conscription into the army’s doctrine in the 1830s in his attempt 
to expand and modernize the military institution.224 This policy dictated that the military 
rank and file be recruited from the Egyptian peasants (Fellahin) who constituted the 
majority of the population at that time.225 Consolidating the Egyptian element in the 
officer corps, Ali’s successors, Khedives Said and Said’s son Abbas, maintained a policy 
of compulsory military service for all classes of society and promised Egyptians 
prestigious positions in the officer grades. Fostering the professional identity of 
Egyptians in the officer corps and making it even more reflective of Egyptian society, 	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Khedive Ismail  (1863 to 1879) established advanced military schools and academies in 
addition to military training missions abroad, to which Egyptians had access.  
Resistance from the officer corps (which was mainly stacked with non-natives 
including Turks, Circassians and Europeans) hindered Egyptians’ joining their ranks, but 
nonetheless Ali’s conscription policy and its subsequent laws helped promote the military 
values needed for military socialization and accustom Egyptian society to the idea of 
military service. General Ahmed Urabi’s revolt in 1881, whereby the officer corps called 
for change on behalf of the Egyptian masses, is evidence of this.   
Another major stride in building the military’s institutionalized character occurred 
in 1936, during the period of the British protectorate, when the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty 
granted native Egyptians control over the military for the first time since 1882. The 
British required Egyptian officers to attend British military academies for advanced 
training, which introduced them to military professionalism. In 1936 the armed forces 
consisted of 398 officers and 11,991 noncommissioned soldiers (NCOs) and enlisted 
men. By 1937, the army had grown and was slowly transforming from a constabulary 
into a mobile though still lightly-armored conventional force with 982 officers and 
20,783 of other ranks.226 Until the early 1930s, officer recruitment and promotion was 
mainly determined by birth, which meant that career officers were drawn from Egyptian 
elites that were especially loyal to the king and his administration (Diwan).227 However, 
the growth in military size necessitated a corresponding expansion within the officer 
corps. Consequently, in early 1936, the Egyptian government, dominated by the ultra-
nationalist Wafd, took the momentous step of opening the Royal Military Academy to the 
sons of members of the middle and lower-middle classes.228 Liberalizing the Academy’s 
application, young officers flowed in “regardless of family background, social class, or 
economic status” which characterized the officer corps in the years to follow.229  
 The Free Officers can be directly linked to this batch of young Egyptian officers 
– eight out of eleven members entered the Academy in 1936 –, who came to view the 	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monarchy as corrupt, exploitative and unjust. They started taking an active interest in the 
country’s political reality, especially following the 1948 defeat by the newly founded 
Jewish state. 
 The defeat was a particularly pivotal event in mobilizing the young officers. The 
defeat brought to the surface old tensions as it brought the Wafd back to power, which 
was highly disappointing for the frustrated masses. Vatikiotis (1961) described the party 
saying “The Wafd’s failure to deal successfully with the British question and to satisfy 
inflated popular expectations was compounded by its reluctance, hesitation, and inability 
to face internal social and economic problems.”230 Moreover, the period following the 
intervention in Palestine was mainly characterized by the rise of violent political-
religious extremism, embodied by a number of assassinations that underscored the state’s 
inability to contain security threats.   
Most importantly, the defeat enhanced the political consciousness of these young 
officers, instilling a heightened awareness of the Egyptian government’s political 
deterioration while at the same time striking a huge blow to the public’s image of the 
military. These young, professionally trained officers were shocked by the country’s 
decline in combat capability and military readiness, and appalled at the blatant patterns of 
nepotism, poor training and mistreatment of enlisted soldiers. This discontent gave rise to 
a number of autonomous groups within the institution, one of which was the Free 
Officers. The Free Officer movement reflected these officers’ institutionalized character 
and society’s grievances. They were made up of personnel who shared the socio-
economic background of the majority of the population, which allowed them to organize, 
strategize, rise up, and ultimately overthrow the monarchy, evict the British and set up a 
republic led by an Egyptian for the first time in the country’s modern history.231  
  Despite the success of 1952 coup, the young republic inherited many troubles, and 
with a brittle institutional setup that was unable to effectively penetrate society, ridden 
with income inequality and political fragility232, the country was vulnerable to the rise of 
a military-dominated order. The Revolutionary Command Council stacked with fourteen 	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military men and cabinets composed of 65 percent serving officers233, ruled the country 
under the leadership of Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
  This power arrangement paved the way for a highly politicized military which 
developed into the most powerful institution in the autocratic state, manifesting in various 
ways according to change in leadership: from direct decision-making, organizing, 
managing and executing plans of economic and social change in the early years under 
Nasser towards having their role reduced to that of a political moderator but at the same 
time compensated by a major stake in the economy under Sadat and even more so under 
Mubarak. 
 Ensuring the hegemony of the military institution demanded that general 
conscription be one of the defining pillars of the Egyptian military; this was the natural 
growth of the institutionalizing seed planted by Mohamed Ali. Nasser cemented general 
conscription first by passing Law 505 of 1955, which introduced mandatory general 
conscription, and more importantly expanded the promotion of NCOs to officers thus 
enhancing the heterogeneity of the officer corps.234 A year later, the legislation was 
absorbed into the 1956 constitution as a national duty bared by all eligible Egyptian men 
which was upheld by all the constitutions that followed.   
Upon coming to power in 1970 – not having history on his side, Sadat had to 
shoulder the burden of the military’s wavering professionalism which had led to two 
humiliating defeats in the span of 11 years - the 1956 tripartite aggression and the 1967 
defeat by Israel, in which the Israeli forces seized the Sinai peninsula. Because he had to 
deal with the pressing goal of restoring the military’s readiness for war, he promptly 
initiated a period of reform known as the Corrective Revolution of 1971, through which 
Sadat was able to enact a number of processes to achieve his goal. One necessary step 
was to lessen the political influence, which the military had enjoyed under Nasser by 
reducing the number of officers serving as cabinet members,235 as well as by diminishing 
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their management of state-owned enterprises through a process of gradual privatization 
(‘the open-door policy’).236  
However, following the “victory” of 1973, and the subsequent conclusion of the 
peace agreement with Israel in 1979, Sadat realized that the state had a large military that 
was suddenly no longer busy preparing for war. Fearful of what this unprecedented 
situation might entail, he began incorporating the military institution as an autonomous 
economic actor, giving birth to a new form of military subordination. 
Subordinating the military institution by buying off military loyalty, Sadat (and 
later his successor Mubarak) devised a number of economic coup-proofing mechanisms 
aimed to dilute the military’s interest in taking a major role in the day-to-day political 
deliberations - a necessary step, given the Egyptian military’s entrenchment in political 
affairs under Nasser. In exchange for the military’s surrender of a considerable chunk of 
its political power, Sadat, and on a larger scale Mubarak, allowed and even steered the 
institution to carve out a dominant role in the economy, not only through the management 
of state-owned enterprises already sanctioned by Nasser, but also in the form of direct 
ownership of enterprises through the gradual development of a number of industrial arms 
under the control of the defense ministry.  
It is not that the rulers in question refrained from the use of other forms of 
economic coup-proofing, for they both used on-budget as well as off-budget benefits in 
varying degrees. However, I argue that the overarching logic is one of an institutionalized 
system of privileges that developed into a path-dependent web of networks, to the extent 
that they are almost independent of the incumbent. 
The following sections examine this particular application of economic coup 
proofing in the on-budget and the off-budget forms.  
 
 
5.2 On-­‐budget	  incentives	  	  
The distribution of military expenditures remains a taboo subject in Egypt. No one really 
knows the principles governing the process, so this section presents my own depiction 	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supported by previous works in the field. I start by providing an overview of the rules 
dictating budgetary control (mainly constitutional text) in order to give an idea of the 
extent to which the incumbent can influence the distributive process and use it as a tool of 
economic coup-proofing. The section goes on to explore the flow of funds over time in 
relation to change of leadership, and how it translates into a change in the strategy of 
distributing economic incentives. To such ends, I argue that economic coup-proofing is 
highly institutionalized, as the underlying logic is one of economically enhancing the 
institution and not a particular in-group of individuals.  
 
5.2.1 Budget	  Control	  in	  the	  Constitution	  	  
Since Sadat came to power and up until the overthrow of Mubarak in 2011, Egypt has 
seen one constitution, which came into force in 1971 and saw a number of amendments 
over the years. However, the control of the military budget has remained unchanged 
across the board of alterations. The constitutional text does not refer specifically to the 
military budget, which account for its confidential nature. However, it includes a detailed 
manual for the drawing, management and enforcement mechanism of the general budget. 
This implies that, as in other departments, the legislator has a wide range of powers to 
exercise control over military expenditures. The ministry of defense is thus required to 
make annual presentations before the parliament’s Committee of Defense and National 
Security, providing the opportunity for the committee, as well as parliament members, to 
question the nature of military expenditures. However, Steven Cook (2007) declared that 
in reality the ministers of defense have been making fewer appearances over the years –
maybe once every two years – and when they do appear, are rarely ever thoroughly 
questioned.237 This suggests that military expenditures lack civilian oversight.  
More importantly, in order to help determine the incumbent’s capacity to utilize 
military expenditures for buying loyalty, the powers granted to the president in relation to 
the institution must be examined. The president’s supreme commandership of the armed 
forces give him the agency to propose an increase or decrease in military expenditure, 
which would then be addressed to the Committee of Defense and National Security for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
237 Steven A. Cook, Ruling but not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, 
Algeria, and Turkey (Washington: John Hopkins University Press, 2007), 167. 
	   96	  
approval. According to Cook’s analysis of the Committee’s impotence, the process was 
merely on paper. Therefore one can assume that in accordance to the 1971 constitution, 
the president had the capacity to influence the budget. But again, because of its 
confidentiality, it is difficult to make a clear assertion about the president’s exercise of 
such power. 
The opacity of the military budget, coupled with the lack of clear guidelines 
pointing to the dynamics of its determinacy, make any claims about its nature difficult. 
However, one can deduce that, contrary to the legal procedure implied in this grey 
legislation, the only major entities capable of enacting any real changes on military 
expenditures are the military leadership and the president.  This implies that decisions 
pertaining to economic allocations with the intention of garnering loyalty most likely take 
place as a result of an agreement between the named entities, as opposed to the general 
understanding of coup-proofing in which the incumbent unilaterally devises strategies. 
This reinforces the institutional nature of the distribution of economic incentives, as it 
limits the incumbent’s ability to harness the loyalty of the few in-group individuals 
ignoring the institution’s corporate interest.  
 
Graph 3: Military Expenditures in Egypt: An Analysis Over Time 
 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers reports (WMEAT) 
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Since the establishment of the Arab Republic of Egypt, the military institution has always 
used a considerable share of GDP with the exception of the last ten years (see Graph 3). It 
is also common knowledge that the publically-revealed budget represents a fraction of 
what the Egyptian military institution receives in reality from its productive activities, 
military aid and government subsidies (mostly secret affairs). Political leaders have used 
the budget to target the institution through arms purchases and the establishment of an 
economic empire but not so much the individuals directly, which they did on a bigger 
scale in the last twenty years through granting senior officers second incomes from 
positions in civilian bureaucracy and later post-retirement careers. These processes were 
also institutionalized as part of a military career path, rather than attached to the 
durability of a certain incumbent.  
Utilizing the government’s easy access to massive properties and enterprises as a 
result of nationalization policies establishing a statist economy, Nasser’s economic coup-
proofing relied completely on directing benefits towards active officers (both young and 
senior) by granting them de-facto management positions in the bureaucracy wherein they 
received additional salaries, bonuses, allowances and later pensions. Because of the 
officer’s position on top of state-owned enterprises, military personnel and their families 
had the upper hand in utilizing nationalized property, whether for personal use or to 
extract funds which were not directly derived from the budget. 238  Still, military 
expenditures were channeled through the creation of an institutionalized welfare system 
that granted military personnel and their families’ exclusive access (in relation to the rest 
of the public sector) to subsidized cars, housing facilities, health care and family 
vacations.   
With demilitarization, military expenditures dropped from around 10.3 percent in 
1979 to 5.9 percent of GDP in 1980 during Sadat’s reign, but at the same time military 
funds were channeled towards the establishment of an independent economic empire that 
would eventually yield profits benefiting the institution as a whole. In terms of arms 
purchases, the military was particularly blessed in Sadat’s era following the signing of the 	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peace accords with Israel in 1978, with the United States granting it an average of US 
$1.3 billion in military aid in the form of grants and loans, which were then used by law 
to procure arms from US manufacturers.239 Military aid also covered upgrades, operation 
and maintenance of existing equipment. Establishing such a relationship helped to keep 
arms purchases from making a large dent in the budget, as up to 30 percent of the annual 
military aid was spent on acquiring new weapons systems, amounting to around 80 
percent of Egypt’s procurement budget.240 
The financial burden was relieved even more during Mubarak’s reign as the US 
pardoned Egypt’s FMF debt incurred between 1982 and 1988 and switched all military 
assistance to the form of grants with no repayment required. This provided Mubarak with 
the easy access to funds necessary to prop up an institutionalized system of economic 
coup-proofing, by fulfilling the institution’s arms needs in addition to securing the funds 
needed for the military’s industrial complex. 
However, with US pressure to liberalize the economy, initiated under Sadat and 
intensified under Mubarak, the process of subsidy erosion coupled with privatization of 
state-owned enterprises negatively affected the military’s welfare system. During the 
three-decade Mubarak era, the military’s welfare system experienced a serious blow. The 
severe fall in oil prices in the mid-80s, coupled with sharp cuts in Egypt’s world markets 
(particularly following the economic recession of 2008), produced a debt crisis that 
crippled Mubarak’s ability to rely on budget allocations to maintain the loyalty of 
military leadership.241 Attempting to salvage the situation, Mubarak adopted structural 
adjustment policies in 1991 that relied on privatization, decentralization and reduction of 
subsidies.  
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During the latter years of Mubarak’s rule, particularly from 2004 onwards, the 
Egyptian state doubled its privatization revenues from those of the previous two 
decades.242 This economic shift from a state-led to a more liberalized economy certainly 
caused a corresponding shift in the economy’s main beneficiaries: from military 
personnel with practically unlimited access to state-owned economic enterprises leading 
the development of an all-encompassing welfare system, to a growing private sector 
dominated by around 490 families with assets amounting to $30 million each.243  
 Though the military was able to maintain a stable percentage of the national 
budget with a slow but gradual decline (See Graph 3), its welfare system was greatly 
affected since pressure to slash subsidies, aggravated by rising two-digit inflation rates to 
which military salaries and benefits were not adjusted, eroded public sector benefits in 
general. Thus personnel benefits drastically deteriorated in the last ten years of 
Mubarak’s rule to the point where young officers barely made 2000 Egyptian pounds 
(333 dollars) a month. Bou Nassif quoted one officer who said that that military 
personnel were public servants and that, in order to raise their salaries, the government 
had to do the same with all public servants.244 Moreover, the previously granted benefits 
faltered as active officers had to wait three to four years for a humble apartment or a car, 
which they ended up paying for by deducting monthly installments from their already 
low salaries.245  
Building on the deterioration in the military’s welfare system, Mubarak and then-
defense minister Abu Ghazalah, agreed to expand nurturing of the military’s productive 
activities in order to generate necessary funds. The following section describes the 
expansion of the military’s business activities, another venue where military expenditures 
were systematically channeled.  
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5.3 The	  Egyptian	  Military’s	  Business	  Activities	  	  
One fundamental element of the military’s economic incentives is military presence in 
the formal economy. I will show that the Egyptian Armed Forces’ role in the economy 
was drastically enhanced over time as a result of an accumulation of developments. From 
a financial standpoint, the military’s growth in size from a total strength of around 288 
thousand in 1970 with a budget of US $1272 million246 to 367 thousand in 1981 with a 
budget of US $2.17 billion 247 to 420 thousand active personnel with US $4.27 billion 
budget in 1991 and to 469 thousand active personnel with US $4.56 billion in 2010248, 
towards the end of Mubarak’s reign. This provides insight into the institution’s rapid 
growth, which produces increasing personnel costs. Also, the added costs of military 
modernization contribute to budgetary strain and intensify the possibility of its 
insufficiency as a source of material incentivization. From an economic perspective, 
severe economic struggles incurred by the economy following the defeat of 1967 limit 
the availability of lucrative funds to uphold the institution let alone provide incentives for 
its personnel. This is coupled with the privatization initiated by Sadat and deepened by 
Mubarak, which contributed to the erosion of the previously military-managed state-led 
economy, thus subjugating the institution’s corporate image as Egypt’s economic 
vanguard and increasing the possibility of mounting military dissatisfaction. From a 
political standpoint, the military’s de-politicization following Nasser’s death called for an 
implicit deal stipulating an institutional shift from the political sphere to the economic 
one to avoid backlash, not to mention the need to invent an occupation for a peacetime 
army following the Camp David Accords.  
 The previous reasons help us understand the circumstances that gave rise to the 
expansion of the military’s productive activities. The following paragraphs review 
military business activities with a focus on how they enhance military autonomy.  
 In the Nasser era, though the military did not play a pivotal role in owning 
enterprises, they were entrenched in the management of state-owned establishments. 
Steering resources towards the military, Nasser installed members of the officer corps to 	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replace civilian factory and business owners, allowing them a wide range of benefits 
especially since there was little to no oversight.249 This did not last, however, for the 
defeat of 1967 signaled the military’s preoccupation with civilian posts and the resultant 
neglect of combat preparedness, which called for a withdrawal of the military from 
politics.  
Upon rising to power, Sadat directed his efforts at correcting some of the missteps 
that occurred after the 1952 revolution. One major step was planting the seed for the 
military economy. This step can be traced back to his initiation of the Arab Organization 
for Industrialization (AOI) in 1975.250 This was particularly important as it commenced 
the development of the military’s arms industrial sector. With a small bilateral agreement 
intended to build a limited number of aircrafts purchased from France, the EAF’s defense 
industry started to flourish.251 Establishing the military’s involvement in the civilian 
economy, Sadat launched the National Services Products Organization (NSPO) in 1978, 
which overlooked the development of military enterprises.252 Both of these were subject 
to the Ministry of Military Production. To help set the institution’s enterprises above the 
competition, Sadat endorsed law 32 of 1979, which granted the military “financial and 
institutional independence from the government’s budget and allowed it to open special 
accounts in commercial banks.” 253  Subsequently, military enterprises gained a 
competitive advantage whereby they were not only subsidized by the state but also 
exempted from taxation. Moreover, the military’s industrial-complex was immune from 
any form of civilian or legal oversight. Sadat also ensured the institution’s economic 
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supremacy by granting it the right to seize public land at any time for reasons of national 
security, thus enhancing their privileged access to investment opportunities.254  
The military’s economic empire was truly consolidated in the period following 
Sadat’s assassination in 1981. Following in Sadat’s footsteps, Mubarak enhanced the 
military’s competitive edge by making all its imports effectively tariff-free in accordance 
to a 1986 law. In 1997, a presidential decree granting the military the right to control all 
undeveloped non-agricultural land gave them de facto management over around 87 
percent of the country.255 Hence, during his reign, economic coup-proofing expanded 
greatly in the 1980s under the leadership of Field Marshall Abdul-Halim Abu Ghazalah. 
Ghazalah founded a coup-proofing system based on the expansion and deepening of the 
military-industrial complex, which could benefit the military as a whole.256 In addition to 
providing it with political leverage derived from its vast economic power. From then on 
the military industrial arm expanded in two directions: the arms industry and the civilian 
economy. 
 
5.3.1 The	  Civilian	  Economy	  	  
According to scholars who have studied the EAF’s economy, including Zeinab Abul-
Magd and Robert Springborg 257, no one really knows the exact share of Egypt’s 
economy that the military occupies. Nonetheless, expert estimates range from 5 to 40 
percent.258 Other experts attempting to generate more precise estimations include Amr 
Hamzawy who asserted that the military controls up to 30 percent of Egypt’s US$180 
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billion economy shaping up to around US$54 billion.259 Mohamed Kadry Said, a retired 
general and an analyst at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, brought 
the number down to about US $15 billion. Ahmad al-Nagar estimated the military’s 
industrial complex at no more than 18 percent,260 while a western expert, Paul Sullivan, 
placed the amount at US $35 billion. In spite of the aura of secrecy surrounding the 
military economy, a careful tracing of the military’s economic holdings and activities can 
shed light on the expansion of its industrial complex following Mubarak’s use of 
institutionalized indirect economic coup-proofing.  
 Zeinab Abul Magd’s work is probably the most comprehensive analysis of the 
military’s civilian economy yet.261 Building on the establishment of the NSPO under 
Sadat, the military institution was able to expand its productive capacities to generate an 
economic empire that included consumer goods, food products, land holdings, chemical 
factories, telecommunications, construction and maritime transport companies, not to 
mention the military’s vast and fast-growing service industry, spread across the country, 
which includes restaurants, sporting clubs, luxury hotels and resorts.   
 However, Abul-Magd (2011) along with other voices including Farouk (2008) 
cast doubt on the profitability of these enterprises. Abul-Magd asserts that there is a 
continuous pattern of mismanagement and wastefulness associated with the running of 
military enterprises, contributing to low revenues. Farouk seconds this argument by 
mentioning Central Auditing Authority reports, which point to the so-called economic 
empire’s inability to generate adequate profits.262 These arguments suggest that though 	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the military’s economic engagement has expanded tremendously over time, they are not 
viable long-term sources of income, and that the reason behind their sustainability is a 
political one.  
 Even though the enterprises may not be particularly profitable, the military’s 
economic empire still bestows benefits on the whole institution. Contributing to 
personnel costs, a portion of the revenues allegedly goes to supporting officers’ benefits 
including salaries, allowances, housing, cars, hospitals, scholarships etc. Another portion 
of the profits enhances corporate interest by complementing spending on operation and 
maintenance costs, weapons procurements, training etc.263 It also allows the military 
institution to maintain its grip on the increasingly privatized economy through forming 
joint ventures with private sector tycoons like Shafiq Gabr, whose company Artoc Group 
supplies the military with equipment such as ejector seats and fitness supplies for the 
army’s fitness studios. Another example is Moataz Al-Alfi who represents the Kharafi 
Group in Egypt, a venture that will be explained in the section on the EAF’s arms 
industry.264  
 Though it is difficult to compare military incomes from the national budget and 
revenues generated by the institution’s economic activities (confidential revenues), expert 
opinions and analysis on the empire’s size and its entrenchment in the civilian economy 
show that it could in fact contribute to loosening the institution’s dependence on the 
budget and in turn enhance its autonomy even if the profits are not substantial. Though 
quantitatively military expenditures almost doubled between 1999 and 2010, they still 
gradually declined as a percentage of GDP.  
 
5.3.2 The	  EFA’s	  Arms	  Industry	  	  
Like the military’s engagement in the civilian economy, the EAF’s arms industry went 
through remarkable developments following Mubarak’s ascent to power, whereby 
military budget funds must have been channeled to expand the following enterprises, 
especially considering the deterioration in personal benefits previously discussed. 	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Building on the establishment of the AOI in 1975, the military aspired to establish its 
own arms production complex with the aim of raising Egypt as a major exporter in the 
region. 
By 1981 the organization grew to incorporate 32 factories in which Egypt 
manufactured $400 million worth of arms, the majority of which were light arms and 
small naval ships.265 However, the industry mainly catered to the local market, because so 
much equipment had been destroyed in the 1973 October War. Springborg (1987) stated 
that, consolidating a position in the manufacture of small arms, the AOI’s production 
accounted for around 60% of the Egyptian military’s small arms needs.266 Hazem Kandil 
added that arms surplus was exported for around $1 billion a year.267  
In the second half of the 1980s, the organization began to prove its capabilities 
and so it was able to gradually expand through the procurement of coproduction 
agreements with western manufacturers aiming to go beyond simple final assemblage and 
parts manufacturing to a more sophisticated form of high-tech military production. Arms 
exports rose from US $1 billion to around $4 billion, according to the US Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency.268 Through the US Pacer Forge Facility Support Program 
(PFFS)269, the United States channeled direct military aid towards financing the creation 
of new production facilities ranging from low-tech production (light weapons, bombs and 
ammunition) to armored vehicles, heavy guns, planes, missiles and ships.270  
Examples of such development include the Sakr Factory for development 
industries, which produced the Sakr 30, a 122 rocket in addition to its eventual 	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production of 23 mm ammunition and air defense guns with two muzzles exported to 
Morocco, Iraq, Sudan and Somalia.271 Increasing its international presence, Sakr and 
other affiliates of AOI expanded through the consolidation of international defense 
agreements, starting with manufacturing an improved version of the American TOW 
wire-guided anti-tank missiles, the French Matra Magic R-550 air-to-air missile and the 
Matra Crotale surface-to-air missile batteries. 272  Benha Electronics, another factory 
subsumed under the AOI took part in the development of a coproduction agreement with 
the French company TRT and was also involved in another contract with the American 
GTE-Sylvania stipulating the manufacturing of SB-3614 automated tactical telephone 
switchboard.273 Expanding into the field of aerospace, AOI started the Helwan Aircraft 
and the Helwan engine factories, which produced the Spanish-designed 63 HA-200 jet 
trainers, the even more sophisticated French Alpha Jet and the Mirage 2000 engine in 
cooperation with the French company, SNECMA. 
A major expansionary phase took place in the 1990s whereby the military’s arms 
industry was able to secure a number of long-term joint ventures with foreign defense 
firms as well as non-western companies. Among the most important were the Arab-
British Dynamics producing the SH-60 Lynx commando helicopters and the Rolls-Royce 
jet engines and the American Motors Corporation which mainly aimed at the production 
of Swing-fire anti-tank missiles in addition to civilian vehicles including the Jeep 
Wrangler and the 4X4 Jeep Cherokee.274 Other developments include the establishment 
of the Arab British Helicopters Co. and Arab British Engine Co. for the production of 
H14 engine of the Gazell helicopter, the T.V.2 engine used in the M1-8 aircraft in 
addition to the repair and overhauling of helicopter engines.275 
Nonetheless, the highlight of this decade was the military’s ability to diversify by 
furthering their joint ventures with the private sector that came to be known as public-	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private partnerships (PPP),276 thus tapping into private capital. Utilizing privatization 
policies, the military took control of many vital enterprises, such as the Alexandria 
shipyards. Because of this the military leveraged its way into profitable partnerships that 
incorporate funds from public sector banks with foreign funding. One example is the 
military’s partnership with the Gulf conglomerate Kharafi Group in manufacturing 
warships, merchant vessels and commercial boats.277  
 At the turn of the century, the military expanded its productive activities through 
joint ventures with western and non-western firms. One of these was General Dynamics’ 
M1A1 tank coproduction program, which facilitated cooperation on a number of large-
scale projects. These include an agreement with United Technologies to co-produce 
M88A2 tank recovery vehicles in 2005.278 In 2009, the organization secured another 
contract with Oshkosh Defense worth about US $20 million, to produce the M1070 tank 
transport and refueling vehicle. Most projects were carried out at the Egyptian Tank 
Factory (Factory 200) where Oshkosh was already co-producing the MTT (medium 
tactical truck) with the Egyptian army. Further contracts were also secured for the 
construction of new facilities for depot-level maintenance of military vehicles, as well as 
for the expansion of existing facilities279 - among them the program intended to overhaul, 
maintain and repair HMMVW (military-grade Humvees) worth US$7 million. Like the 
M1A1 program, the HMMVW also extended into manufacturing for civilian use through 
using military equipment to perform maintenance on Hummer civilian vehicles.280  
Other signs of the organization’s growth included a wide range of partnerships 
with non-western defense firms, ranging from joint ventures with Chinese manufacturers 
in 2005 (for the coproduction of 120 Chinese K-8E trainer/light attack aircraft) to even 
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larger agreements with Pakistani manufacturers in 2010 for producing the JF-17 multi-
role fighter.281 
Critical readings of the EAF’s arms industry include Shana Marshall’s (2012) 
analysis which suggests a decline in the military’s arms-industrial complex’s ability to 
expand at a pace that enables it to assume a dominant role in arms export on a regional 
level. The generals’ failure to realize their desire to expand weapons export is made 
evident by the fact that joint ventures fell short of generating the type of snowball effect 
anticipated by Abu Ghazalah. Marshall suggests that the main reason for the development 
of enterprises of this kind is political: in a 2015 piece, she writes on the nature of the 
coproduction contracts, saying that all U.S government statements on weapons sales to 
Egypt make clear the absence of offsets involved, contributing to the EAF’s arms 
industry being a source of financial independence for the institution, as the way the 
system was set up reduces dependence on official channels and instead increases reliance 
on the sustainability of direct ties between military generals and foreign defense firms.282 
This ensures arms supply and the continuation of profitable defense trade transactions 
regardless of the incumbent.   
Though the enterprises’ reputation for poor quality might limit economic gains, 
the military’s expanding arms industry is particularly useful for providing the institution 
with an independent supply of hard currency. It also generates employment for the 
institution’s engineers, technicians and the unskilled - mostly conscripted - laborers. 
More importantly, the military’s productive activities contribute to its financial autonomy 
and enhance its institutional reputation. Moreover, the military’s economic empire helps 
steer state subsidies towards the military as a whole, and joint ventures with defense 
firms allow it to cultivate direct connections with western as well as domestic business 
actors, regardless of the incumbent.  
Nevertheless, the military’s access to the formal economy leaves room for select 
members to acquire personalized direct benefits through the manipulation of trade and 
industrial contracts in addition to illicit activity.  
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5.4 Off-­‐budget	  Incentives	  	  	  
Here I will explore officers’ access to off-budget direct incentives through the military’s 
productive expansion, and examine institutionalized post-retirement packages heavily 
sanctioned under Tantawi’s leadership, as well as other off-budget venues of self-
enrichment derived from personnel’s access to the formal economy.  
By virtue of his close relationship with Mubarak, Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, 
who was appointed Minister of Defense in 1991, deepened the military’s involvement in 
the economy, but most importantly he expanded the distribution of direct incentives, 
which at first glance seem to target the most loyal senior officers, in order to secure their 
support for Mubarak’s succession. However, a deeper look at the process of allocation 
shows that the distribution follows a highly institutionalized pattern, which transcends 
Mubarak’s rule. 
The appointment process was highly institutionalized. It is undeniable that loyalty 
played a major role in the selection process, but Sayigh (2012) explains how post-
retirement careers occur irrespective of the incumbent. The institution responsible for the 
organization of the process is the Administrative Monitoring Authority. The Central 
Authority for Organization and Administration reinforces the pattern. Established by 
Article 8 of Law 118 of 1964, the body is responsible for development and reform of the 
civil service and for “mobilization for the war effort.” In reality it fulfills a vital role, 
beyond the preparation for war, through sending lists containing the names and 
qualifications of all officers approaching retirement to all cabinet ministers, in order to 
ensure their placement in second careers.283 
In line with Sayigh’s finding regarding the institutionalization of the post-
retirement process, senior officers were granted post-retirement careers in a number of 
venues within the state bureaucracy according to their degree of specialization. Bou 
Nassif (2013) and Abul Magd’s (2012) exploration of the top tier officer-corps post-
retirement careers showed that the placement process includes a high degree of 
specialization tying the officer’s pre-retirement position to the post-retirement career he 
receives. Bou Nassif argues that officers from specific corps were more likely to fill 	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position in local government than officers in the navy or the air force, who were more 
likely to enjoy top positions in enterprises.284 To illustrate, three out five chiefs of staff of 
the Egyptian navy were placed as presidents of the national navigation company and as 
presidents of the Suez Canal Authority.285 Moreover, of all of the Chiefs of Staff of the 
Egyptian Air Force (a sector particularly favored by Mubarak as he came from it), three 
were later appointed as ambassadors, one became a governor and the last one was the 
famous presidential candidate Ahmed Chafiq who was appointed minister of aviation, 
then prime minister. Chiefs of Staffs of the second and third Egyptian field armies were 
also granted potentially profitable positions, ranging from directors of the military’s 
largest industrial arm, the Arab Industrial Organization to the directorship of the National 
Statistics Bureau and Mohamed Tantawi, the tenured minister of defense.286  
Furthermore, Bou Nassif (2014) looked beyond the top brass to examine the 
extent to which lower-ranked officers contributed to governors’ positions, and discovered 
that during Mubarak’s reign, out of 156 governors, 63 came from the armed forces.287  
What is more, a wider range of retired officers held an even larger portion of 
subordinate posts such as deputy governor, director of the governor’s office, secretary 
general and assistant secretary-general of governorates. This whole range is broadly 
replicated at the lower administrative levels: to highlight the magnitude of post-
retirement careers, Sayigh’s 2012 analysis went even deeper in the state institutional 
structure to detect the placement of retired officers beyond obvious strategic positions, 
exploring positions that include subordinate centers and cities’ planning directorships, 
finance projects, and/or technical and engineering affairs - also stacked with retired 
military officers. He also examined the quarrying and geological services department and 
the environmental division in the Sinai and Red Sea governorates (particularly lucrative 
because of natural resources), which were predominantly staffed by retirees. Retired 
officers also fill civil service positions at universities, academic boards and research 
facilities including The Central Agency for Mobilization and Statistics. In addition, they 
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fill directorial posts of consumer protection, water regulation associations, public 
hospitals and sports stadiums.288  
They also occupy a significant number of posts on the directing boards of a wide 
range of state-owned public utilities, including the holding companies for aviation and 
airports, maritime and land transport, electricity, water and sanitation, natural gas and oil 
industry, and communication (Egypt Telecom).289 Most importantly, they occupy posts in 
ministries and agencies dealing with land-related activities: housing, real estate 
management, public works, agricultural development and reclamation, and tourism. 
These constitute particularly profitable positions through which they can easily 
appropriate sales commissions. 
The institutionalized process through which the positions are distributed, coupled 
with the sheer scale of those second career packages, reinforces my initial argument that 
the development of officer’s economic interests did not only target a favored few, but in 
fact post-retirement careers provided lucrative and prestigious opportunities for a vast 
number of officers upon reaching a certain age. Therefore, the distribution of economic 
incentives was attached to the personnel’s belonging to the institution rather than a social 
or a religious group (as in Syria, for example), thus binding personnel closer to the 
military institution itself, in opposition to the general premise that post-retirement careers 
tie officers to the incumbent.  
Another piece of evidence supporting the premise that no particular minority was 
the beneficiary of the post-retirement packages, but that the process was part of a whole 
production line ensuring officers’ transition from military careers to second careers, was 
revealed by Sayigh (2012). He asserted that in order to encourage officers to maintain 
their loyalty until they reach the post-retirement prized positions, the Illawat walaa 
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(loyalty allowances)290 were mainly lavished on the second and third echelons of officers 
who were not necessarily receiving as high salaries as senior officers.291  
 Officers utilized post-retirement careers in order to carve out their own shares of 
the economy. Through access to esteemed management positions in the public sector as 
well as in the bureaucracy, they took advantage of Mubarak’s expanded privatization 
policies in the twenty-first century to appropriate extra funds by selling public properties 
below market price in exchange for handsome commissions. Bou Nassif (2013) tracked a 
number of cases involving major generals Sa’d Khalil (former governor of Matruh), 
Samir Farag (former governor of Luxor), Sayf al-Din Galal (former governor of Suez), 
‘Abd al-Galil al-Fakhran (former governor of Isma‘iliyya), and ‘Abd al-Fadil Shusha 
(former governor of South Sinai). They earned commissions amounting to millions each, 
which is fitting for the value of properties being sold.292 This brief overview suggests 
huge illegal fortunes; nonetheless impunity is the rule, for the cases that became public 
knowledge are only the tips of the iceberg.   
  Other venues for direct personalized incentives are associated with generals’ 
involvement in arms deals, especially in relation to the EAF’s defense industry. Writing 
on US-Egyptian arms deals, Bou Nassif  (2013) explained the process in which the 
Egyptian military gets to choose which weapons to buy and is also free to pick where to 
buy them. Utilizing such privileges, generals cut commissions based on their ability to 
favor specific companies. Sums from such deals amounted to hundreds of millions of 
dollars hidden far from legal reach in secret bank accounts abroad.293 Marshall (2015) 
detected a similar pattern by showing an incident involving general Abdel Hamid Wasfi, 
the Chairman of AOI’s Kader Factory for Developed Industries (producer of the 
Mercedes Benz G320), who allegedly accepted a bribe from Daimler-Benz in return for 	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his guarantee that the Egyptian military would continue to order supplies from this 
firm.294  
 
5.4 	  	   Conclusion:	  An	  Overall	  Assessment	  of	  Economic	  Coup-­‐Proofing	  in	  Egypt	  	  
This chapter showed the possible effect of an institutionalized military structure on the 
implementation of economic coup-proofing. Even though many have described the 
Egyptian military as a ‘black box’, in the past four years there has been a surge in the 
amount of research attempting to understand the coup-proofing mechanisms of the last 
sixty years.  
Studying the military’s historical development, we looked at how the military 
reflects the makeup of society because of the systematic implementation of general 
conscription and the lack of discrimination in military academies’ admission process, as 
well as the professionalism resulting from US training. This contributes to the rise of an 
officer corps that identified with the military as an institution and thus is more likely to 
promote corporate interests than parochial personnel interests. The chapter then explored 
the implementation of economic coup-proofing with a focus on the reigns of Sadat and 
Mubarak, when the military was segregated from day-to-day political deliberations.  
Even though it is difficult to prove that Sadat and Mubarak relied primarily on 
budget allocations to garner the military’s loyalty, due to the unavailability of numbers 
telling us how much the military leadership receive in off-budget incentives - the 
majority of which are in the form of under the table loyalty allowances and commissions 
– we were able to see the institutionalized manner with which economic incentives were 
distributed, whether on-budget or off-budget. The findings showed that budgetary 
distribution-related decisions were not left to Sadat or Mubarak; rather, the military 
leadership gained a strengthened role in determining how the funds were spent, seen in 
the big stride made in the construction of the military’s industrial complex (in the 
expansion of the military’s armament and civilian manufacturing enterprises). Also, the 
deterioration in the military’s welfare system despite the steady increase in monies 
received by the institution suggested that more money was being spent on weapons 	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purchases and/or invested in the expansion of military’s economic empire as opposed to 
personnel benefits, especially considering that Egypt received a handsome sum of 
military aid that was mainly dedicated to weapons procurement.  
In terms of off-budget incentives, the analysis gave us reason to believe that the 
president’s influence on the placement of officers after their military careers was 
somewhat compromised. Since the 1980s, placement patterns seem to have been 
increasingly institutionalized, with lists of the names of retiring generals being routinely 
handed over to ministries for the arrangement of post-retirement packages. Moreover, 
positions within the military lead to specific posts in the bureaucratic apparatus, showing 
a form of career specialization independent of the officers’ bond (or lack thereof) to the 
incumbents.  
This overview is by no means exhaustive, especially because of the secrecy 
surrounding the subject. Nonetheless, the apparent expansion in the military’s industrial 
complex suggests that economic incentives were targeted at the institution as a whole. By 
contrast, the withering of personal benefits among the officers’ lower echelons indicates a 
relative neglect of satisfying personal interest and a focus on satisfying corporate interest. 
Because of indirect institutionalized coup-proofing, the military’s economic and 
institutional autonomy was enhanced, thus making officers more loyal to the institution 
than to Mubarak. 
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Chapter	  6:	  How	  Does	  Economic	  Coup-­‐Proofing	  Work	  in	  	   	  
	   	   Communal,	  Partially	  Communal	  and	  Institutionalized	  	  
	   	   Militaries?	  	  
This dissertation refutes the idea of economic coup-proofing as a monolithic instrument, 
instead proposing that it differs according to the structural realities of both the societies 
and the armies that the incumbents rule over. Because of differences in organizational 
structures, economic coup-proofing takes various routes. To explain this I suggest that 
historical developments in recruitment strategies create path dependencies according to 
which the incumbent has to model his personal patterns of economic coup-proofing. By 
studying the cases of Jordan, Syria and Egypt, the analysis shows that the different 
historical backgrounds/trajectories gave rise to three varied military organizational 
structures, creating imperatives for the development of economic coup-proofing models.  
Egypt, Syria and Jordan share a number of similar trajectories leading to the 
implementation of economic coup-proofing in the period studied here, 1970-2010. Even 
though the state of Jordan did not come into being through anti-colonial military coups 
like Syria and Egypt, the establishment of the Arab Legion which later formed the 
Jordanian Armed Forces played a pivotal role in uniting the Transjordanian tribes under 
one nation-state.  This sheds light on the fact that all the militaries in question were 
saluted for their unparalleled role in state formation. The militaries in all three countries 
played a significant role in political leadership in the first two to three decades of state-
building processes and socio-economic modernization. For instance, in Egypt and Syria, 
presidents hailed from the military institution. By virtue of being a kingdom, Jordan was 
never directly run by military men. However, during King Hussein’s reign, martial law 
was enforced which placed considerable political power in the hands of the General 
Intelligence Agency. Later, in the early 1970s, military officers were prime ministers and 
resided over cabinets, giving them a distinguished ability to influence political decision-
making. Also, the militaries were dominant economic actors, as all three states followed a 
form of state-led economic development, in which military institutions gained de facto 
roles either in managing state-owned economic enterprises (as in Egypt and Syria) or in 
being embedded in undertaking civic engagement projects (as in Jordan). Nonetheless, 
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the regimes eventually saw the strengthening of ruling parties and political leaders 
(presidents in Egypt and Syria, kings in the case of Jordan) vis-à-vis the military 
apparatuses and the subsequent separation from day-to-day political management. 
However, the militaries retained weighty roles in regime protection as the incumbents 
continued to rely on their respective militaries to quell internal conflicts. Incidents 
include the Jordanian army to suppress the Palestinian insurgency in 1970, the Syrian 
military’s role in countering a Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Hama in 1982 and the 
Egyptian military’s suppression of bread riots in 1977 and a revolt of the Central Security 
Forces in 1986.  
Aiding the military’s withdrawal from day-to-day political decision-making, the 
economic situation began to change through a process of economic liberalization and 
privatization. Though it was slower in Syria and Jordan than in Egypt, in the course of 
economic liberalization all three cases adopted structural adjustment policies, which cost 
militaries a substantial share of their economic prowess, sanctioned under etatist policies. 
Moreover, later neo-liberal economic policies ate away at militaries’ welfare systems. 
Privatization also caused economic privileges to shift away from the military institutions 
and towards the new economic elites who dominated the private sector and were wedded 
to the now consolidated authoritarian regimes: the Palestinian Jordanians, a handful of 
Sunni elites in Syria and the business elites in Egypt. To subordinate military institutions, 
economic coup-proofing was implemented. To assure the system’s maintenance and to 
help military institutions cope with rotations of power within the elite, incumbents in 
Syria, Egypt and Jordan devised distributive recipes to buy off officers’ loyalty; this will 
be comparatively analyzed in this chapter.  
Other similarities include rentierism and state capacity to control the military’s 
access to budget resources. All three cases are considered semi-rentier economies. Full-
fledged rentier economies (as in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar) arise from states’ 
principal dependence on the sale of oil on the international market. Hazem Beblawi 
described semi-rentier states as “those that reply on external rentism on a more limited 
fashion. Instead of oil, semi-rentier countries usually depend upon foreign aid or workers’ 
remittances as their main sources of rent.”295 This means that all the three cases are more 	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or less of similar standing in terms of their financial ability to provide funds needed for 
economic coup-proofing.  
There are no substantial differences in the degree of state capacity to control the 
military’s access to economic resources, for in all three cases, the budget is confidential. 
Civilian control is also very low, as can be seen in the legislature’s diminished role in 
budget control, suggesting a weak state capacity to control the military’s access to 
economic resources; the power is vested instead in the military leaders and incumbents.  
The main differences between the three cases pertain to military organizational 
structure and social composition. In Syria, the divide-and-rule tactic had already been 
implemented by the French, leaving behind a legacy of sectarian divides in the military 
recruitment policy, whereas the Egyptian military fared well, as it had undergone a long 
process of professionalization in which a military identity which promoted general 
conscription, meritocracy and equal opportunity regardless of race and class was created. 
Jordan presents a special case of drastic demographic changes from Palestinian absence 
to Palestinian influx from the 1950s onwards, with a military constituency that never 
reflected the ratio of Palestinians/Palestinian Jordanians in the population. The maximum 
representation they received was 15 percent of the officer corps (in 2011) when they 
actually formed up to at least 40 percent of the total population (according to the U.S. 
State Department).296     
With these varied historical backgrounds, the Egyptian incumbents: Nasser, Sadat 
and Mubarak built upon the already enshrined general conscription policy, which ensured 
the social heterogeneity of the rank and file and the Non-Commissioned Officers 
(NCOs). They also preserved the social heterogeneity of the officer corps through non-
discrimination in the acceptance of career soldiers (aside from criminal history). 
Moreover, the Egyptian military applied meritocracy to determine promotions. This 
resulted in the development of an institutionalized military with a-communal traits (no 
ethnic or blood ties in recruitment). Following the path-dependent networks built by 
minority recruitment during the French Mandate, the Syrian military was fertile ground 
for the Assad regime to use targeted recruitment to enhance the existing sectarian divides, 	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contributing to the development of a partially communal military organizational structure 
in which the officer corps is dominated by members of the Alawi sect, while the majority 
of the rank and file were Sunni, thus forming an ethnic shield of Alawi officers who were 
personally loyal to Assad Sr. and later supported Assad Jr. The Jordanian Defense Forces 
display a special case where the officer corps is primarily drawn from Transjordanain 
tribes who historically supported Hashemite rule. Hussein abolished general conscription, 
thus facilitating the role that nepotism and tribal ties play in the acceptance of career 
soldiers, and by restricting the Palestinian element to around 15 percent of the military’s 
manpower, he created the organizational structure of a communal military.   
Comparing economic coup-proofing in Egypt, Syria and Jordan is intriguing 
because, though patronage was distributed through a mix of indirect institutionalized and 
direct personalized economic coup-proofing strategies, the overall distributive processes 
took entirely different paths. In the cases of Egypt and Jordan, the militaries 
predominantly relied on indirect economic coup-proofing in the form of budget 
allocations and the development of military industrial complexes with expansive 
productive activities that contribute to institutions’ organizational autonomy.  On the 
other hand, the Syrian military’s economic coup-proofing takes the form of personalized 
direct incentives drawn from military personnel’s heavy engagement in illicit activities 
such as the smuggling trade and illegal currency dealings.  
  
6.1	   Analysis	  of	  Economic	  Coup	  proofing	  in	  Egypt,	  Syria	  and	  Jordan	  	  
The starting point of analyzing economic coup-proofing is military expenditures 
as a percentage of GDP (see Graph 4). Finding out how much of the overall national 
product goes to the military institution is the first step toward understanding conventional 
civil-military relations. In a setting where this one number is representative of the 
institution’s actual share of the national budget, looking into this number can help us 
determine the value of the institution within the political machine and its functions. It can 
also provide insight into the overall civil-military relations. However, the cases at hand 
are far from giving us an ideal picture, for the budgets available to the public are mere 
estimates – conflicting reports at times – generated by a number of entities.  	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Graph	  4:	  A	  Comparative	  Illustration	  of	  Military	  Expenditures	  Over	  Time	  
 
Source: World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers reports (WMEAT) 
 
The military budgets of the cases at hand describe the funds that are dedicated to 
military spending. Nonetheless, they give us little to no information about other sources 
of military incomes including government subsidies, military aid, and revenues from 
productive activities; most importantly, budgets tell us nothing about alternative means of 
self-enrichment available for military personnel, whether it be post-retirement funds in 
Egypt, commissions on arms deals in Jordan, or the black market in Syria.  
Therefore, in order to generate a comprehensive picture of economic coup-
proofing, this chapter addresses all of the named sources from which military institutions 
can extract funds. It will compare military expenditures as a percentage of GDP in an 
attempt to examine trends in the allocation of funds and thus show that the 
institutionalized Egyptian military dedicates bigger percentages to military spending than 
communal and partially communal militaries in Jordan and Syria respectively. The reason 
I expect such a result is because the Syrian and the Jordanian militaries possess more 
clear in-groups, receiving greater amounts of money through hidden and illicit means, 
than in Egypt, where such ethnically devised lines are absent.  
In all three cases, the military used a considerable share of expenditures. They 
also received sizable military aid packages from their patrons, satisfying corporate 
interests through vast contributions to arms procurement, operation and maintenance 
costs and training. In Egypt, we see a rising trend that lasted for just under a decade 
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leading up to the year 1979 peaking at 15.9% in 1973 and 1974. This particular elevation 
in military expenditures can be explained by pointing to preparations for war that started 
in the late 1960s and went on even after the 1973 war, as in the following five years 
Egypt went through a military modernization phase whereby they upgraded and replaced 
all equipment damaged during the war. In this phase, the military procured large 
quantities of arms from US manufacturers. However, after the signing of the Camp David 
accords in 1979 expenditures as a percentage of GDP gradually decreased. This is not to 
say that the military lost a portion of its funding but rather that the Egyptian military 
acquired an alternative source - US military aid consisting of around $1.3 billion a year.  
In Jordan and Syria, budget allocation differs significantly from the Egyptian 
experience. In Jordan more military expenditures are spent as a percentage of GDP than 
in Egypt: during the period between 1970 and 1975, the military got at least 12.5 % of 
GDP, peaking at 20.8% in 1972. This can be explained by the guerilla war with the PLO 
in 1970, a threat that demanded higher combat preparedness and thus elevated military 
expenditures. But expenditures remained at quite a high percentage throughout the 1980s, 
decreasing gradually from 1992 on – accompanying peace negotiations and the signing of 
peace agreement with Israel in 1994. Expenditures held steadily from 10.1 percent in 
1991 to 6.5 in 2010 within a period of 20 years. Like Jordan, the Syrian military received 
a minimum of 9.2 percent of GDP between 1970 and 1975 with a peak of 15.9 percent a 
year after the 1973 war, a fact which can be explained by the common threat present in 
all three cases. Unlike Egypt and Jordan, though, Syria experienced another peak at 21.6 
percent in 1979 - explained by growing Muslim Brotherhood hostility, which led to the 
violent confrontation in the early 1980s. Also, through its support for the joint US-Saudi 
initiative against Iraq, Syria gained about US $2.5 billion297 in assistance, which could 
have contributed to another expenditure hike in 1991. Following this elevation, military 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP decreased gradually to reach 4.8 percent in 2007.  
Thus we can see that threat level plays a dominant role in explaining sudden 
elevations in military expenditures. With the exception of these elevations we can argue 
that, contrary to the initial hypothesis, Jordan and Syria have a higher military spending 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297 Ray Moseley, “Syria’s Support of U.S. in Gulf War Paying Dividends,” Chicago Tribune, 
March 12, 1991, accessed June 3, 2015, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-03-
12/news/9101220963_1_syria-president-hafez-assad-peacekeeping-force.  
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than Egypt. However, the estimated budgets also show that all three countries share a 
common trend: the period between 2000 and 2010 witnessed stability military spending 
as a percentage of GDP, at levels that were quite low relative to the previous thirty years. 
This was a period of low threat levels; at the same time it could indicate a form of 
economic coup-proofing that worked well, considering not only the reduction in military 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP but also the absence of coup incidences.  
Building on the fact that military spending as a percentage of GDP decreased over 
time in all three cases, this section explores the channeling of patronage through money-
generating productive activities. Relying on secondary sources, I assess the forms of 
productive activities as well as their growth and decline. During the four decades studied 
here, all three countries witnessed the establishment of military-business economies, 
though the nature of such activities differed, as did the corresponding incumbent-officer 
relations. Military-industrial complexes were strengthened in Egypt and Jordan, but 
weakened in Syria. 
In the mid-1970s, Sadat forged a new economic role for the military by making it 
an owner and manager of economic enterprises. Later, in the early 1980s, Mubarak and 
Abu Ghazalah expanded the military’s role in both the civilian economy and the arms 
industries. Even though the military’s exact share of the economy remains disputed, its 
outreach in terms of production of small arms, tanks, ammunition, and consumer goods, 
and in the agriculture, construction and service industries, indicates extensive depth.  
Establishing the military economy helped the regime channel funds by allowing 
the military to act as a profit-seeking corporate body. Through this Institutionalized 
Entrepreneurial Model, the military could go beyond public sector enterprises to tap into 
a growing pool of private sector funds, undertaking joint ventures (as with the Kharafi 
group) and thus gaining a source of income independent of the incumbent. Another 
important aspect of this model is that it generates executive positions for both active and 
retired generals, and gives young graduates of military academies profitable job 
opportunities. Military enterprises also offer employment prospects to unskilled labor 
forces made up mostly of conscripts.  
Jordan joined the Institutionalized Entrepreneurial Model much later than Egypt. 
King Hussein laid the foundation by establishing the Directorate of Housing and Military 
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Workers, which had a limited role in civilian construction projects. King Abdullah II, 
however, upgraded the military economy to become a full-fledged military-industrial 
complex. Initiating The Arabian International Construction and Contracting Company 
(AICC) and the Ultimate Building, Manufacturing and Development Company (Sharaket 
Al-Qima Lel-tasnee’e wa Tatweer Al-mabany), Abdullah opened the door for large-scale 
military involvement in construction. Moreover, he helped establish the KADDB (King 
‘Abdullah II Design and Development Bureau), which paved the way for the military’s 
development of an independent arms-industrial complex. The KADDB made the JDF 
into a rising weapons exporter in the region. Creating executive positions for senior 
officers and employment prospects for graduates of military academies, military 
enterprises helped support the military as an institution.  
In these two cases, personal bonds with the incumbent played a minor role in 
determining the distribution of economic incentives. In Syria, on the other hand, 
communal ties with Assad were decisive in organizing patronage distribution patterns. 
With the military organizational structure based on Alawite domination of the officer 
corps, Assad’s economic coup-proofing model favored the Alawite officer in-group. The 
Syrian military’s industrial complex dates back to when Assad came to power in the early 
1970s. However, it did not survive, as it received little to no preferential treatment, as 
opposed to the Egyptian and the Jordanian cases. Utilizing the dying industries to 
distribute targeted economic incentives, Assad appointed Alawite loyalists or people with 
direct ties to himself (people from his hometown, for example), in key executive 
positions through which they could accumulate wealth from the sale of such enterprises 
in exchange for handsome commissions.  
Assad’s wealth-allocation strategy included turning a blind eye to illicit activities. 
The Syrian military expanded its economic activities to areas like drug trafficking, 
currency dealings, and smuggling, from which it reaped tremendous profits. Through 
placing certain Alawite-dominated brigades as well as Alawite officers at the border with 
Lebanon, Assad utilized the military’s access to illicit markets to steer funds towards his 
loyal guard of Alawi officers.  
The Egyptian and Jordanian militaries also have their dark sides. For instance, 
military men take commissions from corrupt arms sales. Then there are Egyptian 
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officers’ second careers, organized and executed through an institutional setup that 
maintains officers’ access to such positions regardless of Mubarak’s time in power. 
Jordanian officers take part in business protection deals in which they offer privileges and 
business opportunities to a handful of local as well as foreign businessmen, in return for a 
good cut of the overall profits.  
 
6.2	   Conclusions	  	  
It is neither communal ties, nor an army’s professionalization, nor the decline in 
military spending as a percentage of GDP, which guarantee the development of a certain 
form of economic coup-proofing. Rather, it is the way in which personal bonds of loyalty 
with the incumbent are incorporated in the distribution of economic incentives. Whereas 
Syria and Jordan both have communally-guided methods of distribution, the analysis of 
economic coup-proofing in Jordan and Syria as similar cases showed that economic 
coup-proofing in Jordan bears more resemblance to that of Egypt.   
The main explanation for this similarity regarding economic coup-proofing in 
Egypt and Jordan is that the level and the form of communality play a role in determining 
the technique, implementation and execution of economic incentives. Communality in 
Jordan and Syria differs along two main lines. One major distinguishing factor is the 
nature of communal ties between the incumbent and the military elites. 
 On the one hand, Assad relied on his own religious sect, more certain of their 
loyalty as the regime’s vanguard and of their acting as a buffer between the regime and 
the internal threat from the sometimes hostile Sunni majority. Assad’s ascendance to 
power in 1970 was a result of the Alawites’ clever strategizing to dominate the military 
and through it seize control of the political arena. Thus the continuation of Assad’s rule 
not only represents a victory for the Alawis, but also protects them against the Sunni 
majority.  
In Jordan, on the other hand, the Hashemite kings lack a communal tie to the 
Transjordanian tribes on which the Hashemite rule depends. Unlike Syria, the 
Transjordanian military’s main function was to police other Transjordanian tribes and 
with the rise of Palestinian militancy, their role evolved into one of fighting the 
Palestinian out-group, but they have been pacified ever since the violent confrontation of 
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Black September in 1970. From then on, the Transjordanians themselves had been the 
cause of discomfort for the regime as they gradually started opposing Hashemite policies 
towards Palestinians. Therefore, the underlying logic of communal recruitment for 
relying on one group varies in the two cases. Communal ties were even shakier under 
Abdullah who, despite deriving a certain legitimacy from his bloodline (as a descendant 
of the Prophet Muhammad), was perceived as an outsider on account of his having grown 
up outside Jordan, his imperfect command of the Arabic language and his apparent 
closeness to the Palestinians (his Palestinian wife Queen Rania and her family aside, his 
clique and advisors were overwhelmingly of Palestinian origin).   
The scale of communality differs, and thus the magnitude of the in-group within 
the military institution varies. In Syria, the Alawi sect constitutes 12 percent of the 
population, hampering the feasibility of a majority Alawi military and necessitating coup-
proofing to create a more personalized direct distribution. In Jordan the Transjordanian 
tribes make up 40 to 50 percent of the total population, and so their eagerness to protect 
their domination of the military translates to blocking all possibilities of Palestinian 
recruitment – resulting in Palestinian representation in no more than 15 percent of the 
institution (as in the period following the implementation of general conscription and the 
Darak forces).  
In a nutshell, the organization of the Jordanian military resembles Egypt more 
than Syria, as the communal scale is so large that it overturns the initial premise of the 
obvious divides, causing more direct personalized coup-proofing. This suggests that the 
deeper the communality, the more homogeneous the military – leading to convergence 
rather than divergence in economic coup-proofing technique. 
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Chapter	  7:	  Conclusion	  	  
How	  Does	  the	  Variation	  in	  Military	  Organization	  Affect	  the	  
Implementation	  of	  Economic	  Coup-­‐Proofing?	  
	  
The focus of the research was concerned with the ways in which military organization 
can influence the technique, execution and distribution of economic coup proofing. It has 
been argued that the historical path-dependencies of military organizational structure 
have not been adequately accounted for in the study of coup proofing and thus the effect 
that the development of in-groups and out-groups has on the allocation of economic coup 
proofing has been ignored.  
 
Identifying military organizational structures 
Depending on the available sources outlining recruitment patterns in my three cases, I 
examined the development of military organizational structures. With military 
organization defined as the extent to which ethnic ties, bloodlines and tribal connections 
are used to guide officer recruitment, I distinguish between communal and 
institutionalized (non-communal) militaries. This dissertation identified the Syrian 
military as communal (because of the historical and systematic favoritism of Alawi 
recruitment in the officer corps). Likewise, the Jordanian military was identified as a 
communal, as East Bank tribal ties dictated the acceptance of applicants into military 
academies. Egypt, by contrast, was identified as having an institutionalized military on 
account of the persistent adherence to general conscription and meritocracy as the main 
determinants for recruitment and promotion processes.  
 
Varied Military Organizations and Patterns of Economic coup proofing 
The first hypothesis claimed that military expenditures as a percentage of GDP will be 
higher in Egypt than in Jordan, with Syria lying somewhere in the middle. However, 
findings showed that Syria and Jordan spent more on their respective military institutions 
than Egypt. This particular finding gave rise to the consideration of threat level as a factor 
determining elevations in military expenditure. However, the assessment of the allocation 
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of military expenditure showed that a portion of the budget (varying according to the size 
of the military) was used in all three cases to cater to some sort of military welfare system 
that supplied exclusive benefits such as subsidized housing, cars, healthcare etc. 
Nonetheless, the research showed that all three cases experienced a gradual 
decline in military expenditures as a percentage of GDP, coupled with a deterioration in 
personnel benefits, particularly in the period between 1999 and 2010 – indicating a shift 
of focus from garnering military loyalty using budget allocation to another source of 
economic incentives. 
This brings me to the second hypothesis, which differentiated between indirect-
institutional and direct-personalized forms of coup-proofing. I argued that in extension of 
the development of clear in-groups in the communal cases of Jordan and Syria, 
incumbents utilize ethnic divides to bid certain in-groups against the out-group by 
favoring the specific in-group with direct personalized incentives. In Egypt, the blurriness 
of ethnic lines stimulates the rise of indirect institutional forms of coup-proofing. 
   The examination of economic coup-proofing in Egypt showed an obvious focus 
on developing the military-industrial complex which expanded under Mubarak’s rule, 
particularly in the last ten years. While the military-industrial complex generated returns 
for the whole institution, other forms (off-budget post-retirement careers, loyalty 
allowances and commissions on arms deals catering to top-tier officers), were also on the 
rise. Yet, the institutionalization of the off-budget incentives meant that to a great extent 
the allocation process functioned independently of the incumbent, supporting the earlier 
premise that the Egyptian military functioned as a corporate body even when it came to 
the distribution of personalized incentives.  
In contrast to the initial hypothesis, the examination of economic coup-proofing in 
Jordan revealed that there was a move away from Hussein’s budget-oriented method of 
economic coup-proofing in the late 1990s. King Abdullah authorized the shift to a 
strategy that resembled the Egyptian case, wherein the military both owned and managed 
its autonomous economic organization, thus empowering the military as a corporate body 
instead of economically enhancing a targeted in-group.  
In line with the hypothesis, personal and ethnic ties guided economic coup-
proofing in Syria. The analysis exhibited that those illegal off-budget incentives 
	   127	  
overshadowed budgetary indirect rewards facilitated by existing networks between the 
Alawi in-group members. Initiated under Assad Sr. and continued under the rule of Assad 
Jr., officers with direct connections, either ethnic or personal, to the incumbent were 
lavished with privileged positions allowing them to accumulate wealth through 
smuggling, currency dealing and business coverings. This meant that unlike the cases of 
Egypt and Syria, the military in Syria is financially dependent on the durability of the 
Assad regime.  
 
How does this variation influence the military as an economic actor? 
As argued by Sorenson (2007) militaries in developing states often see themselves as 
“high modernizers" who “placed a premium on science and technology” and so their 
involvement in the economy is almost always embedded in their historical development. 
However, as we have seen, the segregation of military institutions from the political arena 
involves a subsequent economic policy outlining the role that the institution plays in the 
economy. These cases showed that permitting the militaries to build economic enclaves 
allows them to take up an institutionalized entrepreneurial role whereby the military 
institution itself behaves as a profit-seeking corporation. In the case of Syria, the 
deterioration of the military-industrial complex and its replacement with personnel’s 
heavy reliance on illegal deals reduces the military’s role to spoils collectors, seeking to 
advance personal interest of the Alwaite in-group.  
This examination of economic coup-proofing in Egypt, Jordan and Syria showed 
that ultimately the process leads to the practice of some sort of exclusivism - whether of 
an ethnic kind as in Syria, or of an institutional nature as in Egypt and Jordan. The real 
difference between the two is that communal exclusiveness delves into societal divisions, 
privileging one ethnicity over others, whereas economic coup-proofing of the kind found 
in the Egypt and Jordan sets the military institution as a whole above all other public 
institutions, thus privileging its personnel in comparison to other public servants. The 
most important conclusion here is that the main goal of these institutions varies according 
to the form of exclusivism. Communally exclusive militaries hold the goal of upholding 
the supremacy of their ethnic leadership in order to maintain a position of privilege, 
which could overshadow the institution’s corporate interest in favor of the in-group’s 
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personal benefits. In contrast, institutionally exclusive militaries aspire to maintain their 
economically privileged situation vis-à-vis other state institutions and other private 
actors. 
The concurrence of economic coup-proofing in Egypt and Jordan also brings to 
light the fact that the presence of in-group and out-group dynamics within communalism 
is essential, such that communalism on its own matters but it is not a sufficient condition 
to explain the variation in the distribution of economic benefits. This is especially evident 
in the Egyptian case where we witnessed the development of various cliques within the 
military who shared a strong common identity along with a corresponding material 
privilege without the communal factor being present. Examples of such cliques are the 
Free Officers and later General Abdel Hakim Amer and his surrounding “Shila” and on a 
more limited scale the members of the SCAF during the last decade of Mubarak’s rule. 
This emphasizes the various group-formation mechanisms that could include 
organizational factors, societal dynamics, rank and age.   
 The close examination of the military organizational structures in the cases at 
hand highlights a number of problems associated with the designation “Institutionalized”, 
which was operationally utilized here to refer to the Egyptian military. A major issue 
becomes apparent, which is the fact that by describing the Egyptian military as 
institutionalized, by default, I declared the Syrian and the Jordanian ones as 
uninstitutionalized. This is not necessarily true, especially for I highlighted the systematic 
nature of discriminatory recruitment patterns in both cases. One can easily argue that the 
Syrian military is institutionalized; however, the Alawite-dominated officer corps 
functions as an informal institution within itself. As we have seen in countless examples, 
informal institutions pertain to specific group-formations within formal military 
institutions and are also capable of engendering particular material interests.  
 
Limitations 
The limitations of this study were mainly related to the unavailability of data in addition 
to the uncertainty attached to the existing data. A major drawback of studying military 
expenditures in the MENA region is that disaggregate budgets are unattainable and 
therefore it is near-impossible to derive concrete information about aspects such as 
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personnel costs, arms purchases etc. The available empirical data are limited to lump 
sums estimated by foreign entities such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Jane’s Defense Budget, US Arms 
control and Disarmament Agency, etc. At the same time, the majority of these sources 
contain a number of grave problems in the form of missing data, and uncertain numbers – 
as far as discrepancies for the same year that vary in the millions.   
Another set of limitations was related to the sensitivity of the topic and the related 
challenges to conducting field research. Militaries in the states in question are surrounded 
by secrecy and confidentiality, which contributes to the difficulty of acquiring primary 
information, and thus studies of this nature rely primarily on such “grey” data as news 
articles, wikileaks documents and secondary sources to assess the extent of militaries’ 
involvement in business activities.   
 
Future research 
The research conducted here can be useful in opening doors for future research. 
One important factor to be considered is the possible variation in the influence of British 
colonialism versus French colonialism in fostering professional values pertaining to the 
development of institutionalized militaries (as in Egypt) as opposed to communal ones 
(as in Jordan and Syria). This could include questions pertaining to training of personnel 
and the indoctrination of officers, which students can research through looking at the 
evolution of military academies’ curriculums in former British colonies comparison to 
former French colonies.  
Another question concerns the extent to which external powers and patrons can 
affect the course taken by MENA militaries as economic actors. One prominent tool in 
the hands of external patrons is military aid: in all three cases, military aid was a major 
source contributing to military budgets. However, Egypt and Jordan depended largely on 
the US FMF, while Russia was Syria’s major military sponsor. In Egypt and Jordan, the 
militaries built economic enclaves partially using US military aid; Syria did not. The 
question arises: What role does military aid play in the development of economic coup-
proofing in the MENA region? 
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This study can also be used to address deeper problems in the coup-proofing 
literature as a whole. My main point was that the process of coup-proofing is best studied 
as a number of distinct mechanisms sensitive to structural realities. The following 
question can be posed: How do the different coup-proofing mechanisms contribute to the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the overall coup-proofing process? This is a complex 
puzzle that requires a clear separation between the mechanisms and the development of a 
success/failure threshold, which can prove very useful to the evaluation of coup-proofing. 
A possible way of tackling this problem can be through performing a large-N study 
compiling information on how often each mechanism is used in each case (keeping in 
mind differences in military organization) and its effect on coup incidences.  
A further analytical lens through which coup-proofing can be studied is the 
mechanisms’ applicability to different regime types. For instance, a study of coup-
proofing in monarchies versus republics could illuminate the reasons for fewer coup 
incidences in Arab monarchies than in Arab republics.   
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